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Recent controversies over identity claims have prompted 
questions about who should qualify for affirmative action, who 
counts as family, who is a man or a woman, and who is entitled to the 
benefits of U.S. citizenship. Commentators across the political 
spectrum have made calls to settle these debates with evidence of 
official designations on birth certificates, application forms, or other 
records. This move toward formalities seeks to transcend the usual 
divide between those who believe identities should be determined 
based on objective biological or social standards, and those who 
believe identities are a matter of individual choice. Yet legal scholars 
have often overlooked the role of formalities in identity determination 
doctrines. This Article identifies and describes the phenomenon of 
“formal identity,” in which the law recognizes those identities 
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individuals claim for themselves by executing formalities. Drawing 
on Lon Fuller’s classic work on the benefits of formality in 
commercial law contexts, it offers a theory explaining the appeal of 
formal identity. But it concludes that reformers should be skeptical of 
the concept. Formal identity may set traps for the unwary, eliminate 
space for subversive or marginal identities, and legitimize identity-
based systems of inequality. Ultimately, this Article urges critical 
examination not merely of formal identity, but of the functions 
identity categories serve in the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Controversies over identity claims have commanded the attention of 
courts and the public in recent years. At oral argument in a 2013 Supreme 
Court case involving the validity of affirmative action, Chief Justice Roberts 
asked whether a person who is “one-eighth Hispanic” ought to “check the 
Hispanic box” on her application to the University of Texas.1 In another case 
that term, the Supreme Court was asked to address whether a man who 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(No. 11-345). 
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renounced his custody rights via text message still counted as a “father.”2 In 
2013, a Utah district court held that cohabiting “sister wives” were not legally 
“wives” for purposes of Utah’s prohibition on bigamy.3 Recently, those states 
that only allowed marriage between a man and a woman grappled with how to 
categorize transgender individuals.4 And in the months leading up to the 2012 
presidential election, President Barack Obama faced scrutiny over whether he 
was a “natural born citizen” eligible for the office.5 
As these examples demonstrate, the law requires determinations of 
individual identity in a variety of contexts and across a range of categories, 
such as race, sex, family, and citizenship.6 When identity disputes arise, a 
common move is to call for records like birth certificates, marriage licenses, 
application forms, or other documents to settle the issue.7 These types of 
formalities may take on a special importance to individuals and the law, 
functioning not merely as evidence of identities, but as their conclusive proof.8 
Consider the everyday importance of a marriage license and ceremony in 
constituting a marital union, adoption papers in creating a parent-child 
relationship, or a passport in establishing citizenship. A birth certificate may be 
considered the final word on a transgender individual’s sex, and a checkbox 
may be considered the answer to the question about a multiracial individual’s 
race. But while formalities are quintessential legal practices, legal scholarship 
has largely overlooked their role in determining race, sex, family, and 
citizenship.9 Instead, debate on identity has navigated between two poles: the 
 
 2. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013) (holding that an unwed 
biological father who never had custody of the child and abandoned the child prior to birth could not 
block an adoption under the Indian Child Welfare Act). 
 3. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that cohabiting 
“sister wives” and their husband were not engaged in bigamy because the husband had officially 
married only one of his wives). 
 4. See, e.g., Radtke v. Misc. Drivers & Helpers Union, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (D. Minn. 
2012) (concluding, in a case challenging a marriage between a man and a transgender woman, that “it 
is logical” to determine a spouse’s sex based on the “‘designation appearing on [his or her] current 
birth certificate’”). Since this case was decided, Minnesota has legalized same-sex marriage. See 
MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2014). 
 5. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Citing ‘Silliness,’ Obama Shows Birth Certificate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at A1. 
 6. This Article analyzes race, sex, parentage, marriage, and citizenship rather than other 
identity categories because they provide the richest set of examples of controversies over formal 
identity. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5. 
 8. My focus here is on identities in the sense of demographic properties of individuals, 
particularly citizenship, family, sex, and race, not identification in the sense of verifying an 
individual’s unique personal identity for security purposes. 
 9. Though scholars have noted the importance of identity formalities in isolated contexts, no 
scholarship has offered a theory of formal identity. See, e.g., ESTELLE LAU, PAPER FAMILIES: 
IDENTITY, IMMIGRATION ADMINISTRATION, AND CHINESE EXCLUSION (2006) (historical analysis of 
the role of documents in creating immigrant families during the era of the Chinese Exclusion Acts); 
Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 362 (2014) (examining the birth 
certificate); Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage 
750 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:747 
idea that identities are (or should be) a matter of essential status versus the idea 
that they are (or should be) freely chosen. 
This Article introduces the phenomenon of “formal identity”10 to the legal 
literature, offers a positive theory explaining its appeal,11 and identifies 
potential problems with the use of formalities to resolve contested claims to 
citizenship, family, sex, and race. This Article defines formal identity as the 
view that identity is conferred through the execution of formalities by 
individuals claiming identities for themselves.12 It defines formalities as 
practices intended to confer status in the eyes of the law. Formalities may be 
documentary, like signing paperwork, or ceremonial, like saying “I do.” These 
practices do not simply reflect an underlying identity status; they create and 
constitute that status for legal purposes. They may also take on cultural 
significance. 
This Article asks whether formal identity might expand the legal and 
social space to resist prevailing conceptions of identities. The question is 
relevant to issues such as whether the transgender rights movement should 
focus on urging governments to allow people to more easily change the sex 
designations on their birth certificates,13 whether Native Americans should 
have to provide tribal enrollment numbers to qualify for affirmative action,14 
whether immigrants’ rights groups should advocate for expanding access to 
 
System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 23–24 (2010) (noting that the debate over common law 
marriage is between formality and informality, among other theoretical distinctions); Dean Spade, 
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 738–39 (2008) (describing the formalities of legal 
gender classifications and calling for their reduction). The work that comes closest to such an 
examination is Christopher A. Ford’s Administering Identity: The Determination of Race in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1280–85 (1994). Ford, however, viewed legal classifications 
as reflective of biological, political, or social identities, not as constitutive of those identities. Id. at 
1237–40. He therefore did not offer a theory of formal identity. 
 10. I do not mean “formal” in the sense of Platonic forms or the philosophy of legal formalism 
exemplified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), although formalities are related to both 
forms and formalism. See Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). I 
discuss these distinctions further in Part I.C.  
 Much scholarship has considered abstract legal “forms” of identity but not concrete formalities. 
For example, the term “formal race” has been used to describe the Supreme Court’s color-blind 
ideology, but not the role of formalities in racial determinations. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1991). Other scholars have used the term 
“formal” in the context of parenthood to mean traditional. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet 
Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional 
Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 428 (2013) (defining formal parenthood as any 
“traditional” definition based on “status-based indicators such as biology, adoption, marriage, and the 
use of presumptions”). This Article employs a more specific concept of formality. 
 11. This theory draws from Lon Fuller’s classic work on the benefits of formality in 
commercial law contexts. Fuller, supra note 10. This Article’s title is a tribute to Fuller’s. 
 12. This Article does not include in its definition of formal identity those identities conferred 
by formalities executed by someone other than the individual laying claim to an identity, such as birth 
certificate race designations assigned by hospital staff. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 324–48, 571–78, 598, 611, 618 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 392–402, 586–87, 598, 615 and accompanying text. 
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naturalization,15 and whether reconceptualizing marriage and parenthood as 
nothing more than matters of formal registration would better accommodate 
new types of families.16 This Article contributes to these debates by examining 
the limitations of social justice projects that seek to expand formal routes to 
legal identities. It argues that, while formal identity has significant appeal, it 
risks disadvantaging those without resources, conferring the power to define 
identities on bureaucratic processes, opening the door to discriminatory 
enforcement, forcing individuals to fit their lives into Procrustean categories, 
and legitimating exclusionary arrangements. This examination of formal 
identity not only reveals its stakes, but also forces reconsideration of the many 
functions identity categories serve in the law. 
The formal model of identity responds to deficiencies in models that 
understand identity categories as ascriptive or elective. Ascriptive models 
determine identities based on certain biological or social standards considered 
to be objective. Elective models, by contrast, view identities as self-determined 
labels that each individual may freely adopt and change. For example, a 
particular race might be ascribed to an individual based on her appearance, or 
she might be free to choose her own racial identification. 
Both ascriptive and elective definitions create problems for legal 
doctrines. Legal actors are skeptical of the accuracy and fairness of ascriptive 
definitions, and they are concerned about the potential for fraud and lack of 
administrability of elective ones. By requiring formalities as prerequisites to 
identity claims, the law avoids troublesome efforts to ascribe identities, protects 
an individual’s interest in self-determination, and provides a degree of stability 
and a safeguard against inauthentic claims. 
To explain how formalities work in identity contexts, this Article borrows 
from Lon Fuller’s classic work on contracting, Consideration and Form, in 
which Fuller described three functions of legal formalities: (1) evidentiary, or 
providing proof of the underlying validity of the claim; (2) cautionary, or 
ensuring that the parties take care in making the claim; and (3) channeling, or 
ensuring that everyone understands and can organize their behavior around a 
clear distinction.17 This Article transposes Fuller’s theory, which was intended 
to illuminate commercial contexts, to the context of identity. Consider, for 
example, a requirement that a person designated male at birth change her birth 
certificate if she wishes for the law to recognize her as a woman. This 
requirement serves the evidentiary purpose of providing ready proof of her sex 
in the event of future controversies. It serves the cautionary purpose of 
ensuring that she has fully considered her choice and is serious enough about it 
to follow the requisite bureaucratic procedure for changing a birth certificate. 
And it serves the channeling purpose of making clear that if she fails to change 
 
 15. See infra notes 175–76, 560–62, 612 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 228–53, 279, 563–70, 599–602, 613, 614 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Fuller, supra note 10, at 800–01. 
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her birth certificate, the law will continue to recognize her as a man rather than 
a woman. 
Formal identity seems an attractive compromise between ascriptive and 
elective definitions. Formalities capture some of the advantages of ascriptive 
definitions. Because they are thought to be neutral and authoritative, formalities 
appeal to those who seek to avoid fraudulent claims or exclude newcomers 
from contested identities. But the fact that formalities lack substance may 
strengthen the argument of those seeking to contest the ascriptive meaning of 
an identity category. Formalities can curtail the use of discretion by authorities 
who might apply ascriptive definitions in discriminatory ways. Formalities 
might also be manipulable by members of subordinated groups, serving as 
“weapons of the weak.”18 Additionally, they may have expressive value for 
individuals who seek official recognition of contested identities. Conversely, 
by making clear that identities will not be ascribed to those who do not 
formalize them, formalities may give people the option to live their lives off the 
legal grid. 
But requiring formality may perpetuate systems of inequality linked to 
identity status. The costs of complying with administrative requirements to lay 
claim to an identity may effectively commodify that identity status.19 For 
example, those who cannot afford legal counsel may be unable to overcome the 
formal hurdles along the path to citizenship.20 Claimants without legal 
sophistication may find themselves estopped from asserting certain identities 
based on past identifications. Thus, someone who disclaims paternity on a legal 
document will have trouble later establishing that he is a father.21 Further, 
parties with less bargaining power may find themselves on the losing end of 
identity disputes. A woman who cannot convince her cohabiting partner to 
agree to a formal marriage, for instance, may find herself without property 
rights when the relationship dissolves.22 Formalization of identity may also 
give bureaucratic processes a monopoly on defining the terms and conditions 
 
 18. See JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT 
RESISTANCE xvi (1985) (describing the significance of “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless 
groups” such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance . . . and so on” that 
“typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority”). 
 19. See infra Part III.A. Whether administrative cost or any other theoretical disadvantage is a 
reason to resist a move to formality in a particular situation depends on the potential alternative legal 
rules. See infra Part IV (discussing alternatives). 
 20. See infra notes 419–21 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra note 444. 
 22. Common law marriage has been justified by the argument that women in relationships 
with men often do not have the bargaining power to insist on formal marriage. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant 
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 756–57 
(1996). On the other hand, some cohabitating women may prefer to remain formally unmarried, 
particularly if their potential spouses are not financially stable. See generally JUNE CARBONE & 
NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 
(2014) (discussing the interactions of economic forces and trends in marriage, divorce, and 
childrearing). 
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of identities, legalizing spheres of human interaction that would otherwise have 
socially generated meanings or be domains for experimentation.23 
Moreover, formalization is likely to be partial, leaving intact ascriptive 
definitions of identity that perpetuate discrimination.24 Formal requirements 
may be imposed only on certain claimants, such as the nongestational lesbian 
mother who must adopt her child, while others achieve identities by default, 
such as the gestational mother.25 Formalities may pigeonhole liminal, marginal, 
disruptive, diverse, and dynamic identities into a set of ill-fitting options, or 
penalize them with nonrecognition.26 For instance, while the transgender rights 
movement in the United States has often succeeded in persuading governments 
to allow changes to sex designations on birth certificates, those documents, by 
and large, still require that all individuals be designated “male” or “female,” 
with no possibility for permutations or rejections of those two binary 
categories.27 
And finally, formalization may reinforce the legitimacy of regulatory 
projects based on citizenship, family, race, and sex, discouraging much-needed 
scrutiny of those projects.28 The appeal of formal identity as an ostensibly 
neutral doctrine risks obscuring questions about the substantive ends of identity 
determinations in the law. By appearing to transcend controversies over 
ascriptive versus elective definitions of identities, formalities depoliticize 
identity disputes, turning them into legal questions to be resolved on the basis 
of simple evidence. Individuals come to experience their identities as “real” 
only once those identities are formalized through processes such as 
naturalization, marriage, adoption, or birth certificate changes. These 
experiences may prove difficult to disrupt. By rendering identity somewhat 
more responsive to individual choice and far more easily administrable, 
formality invites new forms of identity-based regulation. This is a particular 
risk as technological advancements better standardize identity documentation 
practices, making regulation more feasible and efficient. 
The potential dysfunctions of formal identity suggest that legal reformers 
should be cautious about adopting this model for the adjudication of identity 
claims. Rather than debating which definition of identity ought to apply across 
the board, this Article urges reexamination of the many purposes of identities 
for law. Legal distinctions based on marriage, for example, might serve the 
ends of subsidizing caregiving, enforcing agreements between spouses, 
ensuring family unity, or promoting traditional forms of intimacy. Once the 
 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. See infra Part III.C. 
 25. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
201 (2009). 
 26. See infra Part III.D. 
 27. See infra notes 307–08 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part III.E. 
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substantive purposes of legal identities are disaggregated, it may be possible to 
ask whether a formal, ascriptive, or elective definition is best in each context. 
Formal definitions may be appropriate where the evidentiary, cautionary, 
and channeling functions of formality serve the substantive ends of the law. In 
some contexts, evidence may facilitate reliance on stable identities, while in 
others, stability may be stifling. Formalities do not serve cautionary purposes 
unless they make clear their consequences, are universally accessible, and 
induce a level of circumspection proportional to the rights at stake. And 
examining formal identity in terms of its channeling function requires that 
reformers ask what purposes the law serves by inducing individuals to sort 
themselves into channels based on sex, race, family status, and citizenship. 
Rather than pointing toward formal identity, this inquiry might reveal reasons 
to resist identity-based regulation altogether. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the two prevailing 
models of identity as ascriptive and elective, introduces the formal model, and 
outlines the theoretical reasons for formal identity’s appeal over the other 
models. Part II provides examples of formal identity in four legal contexts—
citizenship, family, sex, and race determinations—and discusses the functions 
of formality in each. Part III identifies potential dysfunctions of formal identity, 
which it describes under the labels commodification, bureaucratization, 
discrimination, pigeonholing, and legitimation. Part IV argues for rethinking 
and disaggregating the many substantive purposes identities serve for the law 
rather than moving wholesale toward formalization. 
I. 
MODELS OF IDENTITY 
This Article analyzes identity determination doctrines—the legal 
frameworks used by courts to determine whether a particular group status, such 
as national, racial, or sexual identity, or a particular kinship status, such as 
parent or spouse, should be attributed to an individual. Identity determination 
doctrines assign labels to individuals such as citizen or alien, parent or stranger, 
white or minority, man or woman.29 These types of identity are generally 
considered fundamental characteristics of human beings, contributing to a 
person’s “sense of self and place in the world.”30 But claims to these identities 
also have legal import, as demands for public recognition or redistribution of 
 
 29. These types of identity are frequently “associated—implicitly and explicitly—for purposes 
of contrast and comparison in daily life, as well as by investigators across the political and 
methodological spectrum.” JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE 14 (1999); id. at 15–17 
(analogizing citizenship, family, race, and sex). 
 30. AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 
54 (2009) (describing one understanding of citizenship); cf. Charles Taylor, The Politics of 
Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1994) (defining identity as “a person’s understanding of who they are, of their 
fundamental defining characteristics as a human being”). 
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resources, cutting across domains such as employment, immigration, public 
benefits, and tax law.31 Although there are many examples of legal identity 
categories, this Article focuses on citizenship, family, sex, and race, because 
there are legal controversies over whether these identities are formal, and 
because their definitions frequently overlap.32 
National, familial, sexual, and racial identities might be ascribed based on 
biological or social definitions, chosen by individuals, or established by 
formalities. Consider the following table, which lays out examples of the core 
meaning of a claim to identity under each of these models: 
 
 31. See generally NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A 
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 1–2 (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003) (discussing problems of 
recognition, such as disrespect for cultural differences, and problems of redistribution, such as 
economic exploitation or deprivation of material resources). 
 32. See infra Part II (discussing examples of formal citizenship, family, sex, and race). This 
Article does not examine age, sexual orientation, religion, disability, or other identity categories due to 
the limited number of legal examples demonstrating how those identities might be “formal” in the 
specific sense that term is used in this Article. See infra Part I.C (defining formal identity). However, 
this Article’s framework for analysis may be applied to future or hypothetical controversies involving 
formalization of many other kinds of identity. 
The law also assigns identities to individuals in many commercial contexts, to name just a few: 
employee, customer, landlord, tenant, partner, shareholder, property owner, and taxpayer. Cf. Halley, 
supra note 9, at 31 (asking whether being “married or single” could become more like “being a toll-
payer on the turnpike”). I do not focus on commercial or professional statuses because their formal 
dimensions do not want for scholarly attention. 
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TABLE 1: THREE MODELS OF IDENTITY 
 Ascriptive Elective Formal 
Citizenship • Birthplace 
• Physical Presence 
• Parentage or 
Marriage 
• Language 
• Civics 
• Moral Character 
• Belonging 
• Consent of 
Individual and 
State 
• Naturalization 
Papers and 
Ceremony 
• Passport 
Marriage • Commitment, 
Love, and 
Attachment 
• Spiritual Union 
• Interdependence 
• Bilateral 
Agreement 
• License and 
Ceremony 
• Changing 
Surnames 
Parenthood • Gestation 
• Genetics 
• Commitment, 
Love, and 
Attachment 
• Caretaking or 
Support 
• Intention • Adoption Papers 
• Birth Certificate 
Designations 
• Voluntary 
Acknowledgments 
of Paternity 
• Putative Father 
Registries 
Sex • Chromosomes 
• Hormones 
• Genitals and 
Secondary Sex 
Characteristics 
• Comportment 
• Self-Identification • Changing Sex 
Designations on 
Identity 
Documents 
• Changing First 
Names 
Race • Genetics 
• Phenotype 
• Ancestry 
• Comportment 
• Associations 
• Reputation 
• Self-Identification • Changing Race 
Designations on 
Identity 
Documents 
• Tribal Enrollment 
 
These models serve to answer a normative question about what is at the 
core of an identity claim: an ascriptive status, a choice, or a formality?33 A 
distinct question is what legal rules flow from each model. In certain cases, 
each model might support the same legal rule. For example, a legal rule might 
defer to the sex designation on a birth certificate because it demonstrates the 
claimant is phenotypically female (ascriptive identity), because it reflects her 
choice to be female (elective identity), and because it shows she has complied 
with the requisite administrative procedure to claim a female identity (formal 
identity). 
This Article claims that the formal model is influential, in both law and 
culture, particularly in those liminal cases in which identity determinations are 
 
 33. These models answer the question “what is identity?” An entangled question is “who 
decides?” Under the ascriptive model, the law defers to experts or community standards. Under the 
elective model, the law defers to the individual claiming the identity. Under the formal model, the law 
defers to the evidence that the formality was executed—generally a document demonstrating that the 
individual complied with the official rules to claim the identity. 
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most difficult and rights are at stake. For this reason, formal identity deserves 
theoretical scrutiny. This Article does not claim that the formal model has 
replaced ascriptive or elective models. Nor does this Article claim that these 
models are discrete. Indeed, due to identity’s complications, overlap is 
inevitable. Finally, this Article does not claim that these models exhaust the 
possibilities for understanding identity. Rather, the claim is that they are useful 
for examining the role of formalities in legal definitions of identities. 
This Part will begin by providing background on the ascriptive and 
elective models. It will explain these models and discuss why they are 
controversial for legal definitions of citizenship, family, sex, and race. It will 
then introduce formal identity and outline the theory that supports it. Drawing 
on Fuller’s explanation of the functions of legal formalities, it will discuss 
generally how formality might resolve some of the controversies generated by 
ascriptive and elective identity definitions, leaving more detailed examples for 
Part II. 
A. Ascriptive Identity 
The ascriptive model understands identity categories like race, sex, 
family, and citizenship as pertaining to an individual’s objective underlying 
status—whether that status is determined based on her phenotype, decided by 
her genetics, enacted in her behaviors, or formed by her life experiences. 
Historically, the term “ascriptive” was often applied to status roles fixed at 
birth.34 Modern theorists use the term to refer to any number of identity 
definitions that do not understand the core meaning of identity to be an 
individual’s subjective choice.35 More specifically, I use the term to refer to 
any definition that assigns identity labels based on whether an individual meets 
certain biological, social, or cultural standards that are considered objective. 
Legal actors employing ascriptive definitions consider the process of assigning 
labels to be independent of the underlying reality of the identity; it is not 
understood as constituting or bringing about that identity. Ascriptive definitions 
may measure conformity to medical or other scientific standards, or to social or 
cultural norms. They may include “performative” definitions that examine an 
individual’s course of conduct to determine if she acted in the manner expected 
of a member of her group, as opposed to those definitions concerned only with 
her subjective intent to belong.36 
 
 34. Cf. STEVENS, supra note 29, at 16 n.34. 
 35. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 117 (2005) (using 
the term ascriptive in this sense); AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 117 (2003) (describing 
ascriptive identities as those “largely beyond people’s ability to choose”). 
 36. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional 
Practice, 84 OR. L. REV. 563, 564 (2005). In theory, performative definitions may also be elective, 
insofar as they are concerned with an individual’s intent to affiliate with a particular group. See Murad 
Hussain, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges 
to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 922 (2008) (“Unlike ascriptive group identities 
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Ascriptive definitions enjoy common sense acceptance but are out of 
vogue among theorists and are sources of trouble for the law. This is because of 
three problems: (1) there is extensive disagreement over how to define an 
identity, (2) any definition will entail essentialism, and relatedly (3) ascriptive 
definitions are deterministic. 
Definitional disagreements plague legal and scholarly efforts to determine 
the metrics for measuring identities. Race, for example, has been defined based 
on “appearance, ancestry, reputation, status, performance, science, and 
associations.”37 Courts resist definitions based on physical appearance, holding 
that even expert opinions on visual racial identifications are “just eyeball[ing]” 
and lacking in scientific support.38 
Racial definitions based on ancestry are also controversial. Consider Chief 
Justice Roberts’s question at oral argument about what percentage of Hispanic 
ancestry an individual must have to qualify as Hispanic for purposes of a 
university’s affirmative action program.39 The premise behind such a question 
may be that race is transmitted through ancestry.40 In the eras of slavery and 
Jim Crow, “[c]ase law that attempted to define race frequently struggled over 
the precise fractional amount of Black ‘blood’—traceable Black ancestry—that 
would defeat a claim to whiteness.”41 It was once thought that “the presence of 
Black ‘blood’—including the infamous ‘one-drop’—consigned a person to 
 
based on passive pigmentation or phenotype, ‘cultural’ group identity can be viewed through the lens 
of performativity, whereby an individual can affiliate herself with a community by embracing traits 
and conduct that continually recommit her to membership within it.”). In practice, when the law 
recognizes performative identity, it does not generally defer to an individual’s choice to perform an 
identity role; rather, it focuses on whether that performance was a successful one, meeting social 
standards and being accepted by the community. See Clarke, supra, at 564. 
 37. Ariela J. Gross, Reply, Book Review Symposium: What We Do When “Blood Won’t Tell,” 
Reviewing Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America (2008), 83 
S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (2010). 
 38. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 2014). In Kaplan, the 
EEOC alleged that an employer’s policy of using credit reports to screen job applicants had a disparate 
impact on black applicants. Id. at 750. To prove this claim, the EEOC had to present statistics about 
the racial breakdown of Kaplan’s job applicant pool. Id. Because Kaplan had not collected racial data, 
the EEOC subpoenaed the driver’s license photos of approximately nine hundred job applicants from 
state Departments of Motor Vehicles, and hired five individuals with advanced social science degrees 
to determine the races of the individuals in each photo. Id. at 751. The district court held the testimony 
was not admissible because there was “no evidence that determining race by visual means is generally 
accepted in the scientific community.” EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 
2882, 2013 WL 322116, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013), aff’d, 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014). The 
court also rejected the plaintiff’s alternative argument that racial identifications are fact questions 
within common knowledge, not requiring expertise. Id.  
 39. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 32–33. 
 40. This may not have been the purpose of Justice Roberts’s question. He may have intended 
to use this example to challenge the very possibility of racial determinations, in support of the premise 
that admissions ought to be “colorblind.” He may also have intended to express skepticism about the 
idea that racial disadvantage could result from a small number of relatives in a far off branch of one’s 
family tree. 
 41. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1738 (1993). 
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being ‘Black.’”42 This rule of “hypodescent” is now disregarded as based in 
outdated notions of racial purity.43 But modern science on racial differences 
does not supply ready answers either. Even if we were to assume that the 
measure of race is genetic (a topic on which there is much disagreement),44 
there is no agreement on what sort of genetics would qualify one as a member 
of a particular race.45 
Social definitions of race compete with those based on appearance, 
ancestry, and genetics.46 For example, legal historians such as Ariela Gross and 
Daniel Sharfstein have examined cases determining whether individuals were 
white for purposes of slavery and Jim Crow laws, and demonstrated that courts 
often deferred to evidence of whether an individual acted according to social 
expectations for white persons—for example, did the claimant go to a white 
church or school, live in a white neighborhood, and have the manners expected 
of a white person?47 These approaches create problems for the law because 
they require judges or juries to determine what sorts of conduct are at the core 
of a racial identity—questions subject to vast contestation and ever-shifting 
social meanings.48 
Similar disputes trouble ascriptive definitions of sex (i.e., male or female). 
Determining whether a person is a man or a woman is generally thought to be a 
matter of common sense. As one judge put it, “There are some things we 
 
 42. Id. at 1737 (citing F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? 5 (1991)). 
 43. Id. at 1738. Blood-quantum rules continue to apply in federal Indian law. For example, the 
Department of the Interior issues “Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood.” Kirsty Gover, Genealogy 
as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership 
Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 252 (2008). The requirements for 
procuring such a certificate are “famously murky.” Id. at 253. 
 44. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG 
BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xii (2011) (“After five years of intense 
research [on genomic science] and soul-searching, I found not one shred of evidence to counter my 
belief in the political nature of race. In fact, my journey only strengthened my understanding of our 
common humanity and the dehumanizing consequences of believing in innate racial differences.”). 
 45. Geneticists refer to regional “ancestry” rather than “so-called racial groups,” and to 
“estimation” rather than determination. See, e.g., Charmaine D. Royal et al., Inferring Genetic 
Ancestry: Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications, 86 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 661, 670 (2010). 
Although geneticists have identified certain genetic “ancestry informative markers,” or “AIMs” that 
correlate with geographic regions, “not all people from a given population have the AIM(s) identified 
with that population, and people from different populations can have the same AIM(s).” Id. at 665–66. 
“Population genetic inference is ultimately a statistical exercise, and rarely can definitive conclusions 
about ancestry be made beyond the assessment of whether putative close relatives are or are not 
related.” Id. at 668. 
 46. See, e.g., DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN 
POST-RACIAL AMERICA 141–46 (2013); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR 
CIVIL RIGHTS 188 (2006). 
 47. ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN 
AMERICA 48–72 (2008); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 
YALE L.J. 1473, 1475 (2003). 
 48. See, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 46, at 148 (explaining that asking a court to 
decide whether someone was discriminated against because she “acted black” involves “messy” and 
“controversial” questions about “the degrees of blackness of particular plaintiffs”). 
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cannot will into being. They just are.”49 But medical tests based on 
chromosomes, hormones, and phenotype do not always give consistent “male” 
or “female” answers.50 In 2008, Professor Dean Spade conducted a 
comprehensive study of state, local, and federal regulations on changing sex 
classifications on identification documents, and found a great deal of variation, 
even with respect to what types of surgeries were required.51 And like 
performative definitions of race, performative definitions of sex are 
controversial for recognizing certain behaviors as the core of male or female 
identity.52 
Ascriptive definitions also run through family law, raising disputes about 
whether family is defined by biology, culture, or performance. That biological 
definitions have traction in the context of parenthood is obvious: consider the 
neologisms “bio-mom” and “bio-dad” often heard in discussions of 
stepparenting and assisted reproductive technologies.53 Biological notions of 
parenthood also shape arguments about the meaning of marriage. For example, 
some have asserted that marriage ought to be limited to a man and a woman 
because only a man and a woman can have biological children.54 Marriage, in 
turn, shapes the meaning of parenthood, as the law often presumes that the 
husband of a woman who gives birth to a child is the child’s father.55 
Biological definitions compete with social, functional, or performative 
understandings of family. Some jurisdictions, for example, employ multifactor 
 
 49. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that a marriage between 
a man and a transgender woman was invalid). 
 50. See, e.g., SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 18–19 (1998) 
(discussing medical management of incongruent results from chromosomal, hormonal, and 
phenotypical tests of sex); id. at 88 (discussing “chromosomal mosaics, neither completely XX nor 
XY”). “Intersex” is a term “used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a 
reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male.” 
What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015). 
 51. Spade, supra note 9, at 735 fig. 1; see also Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics 
Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government 
Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 388 (2013) 
(discussing various treatment options). 
 52. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 933 (2002) (“Protecting particular traits 
as constitutive of particular identities thus risks essentializing those identities as always embracing 
those traits. If feminine behavior is protected because it is constitutive of being a woman, then 
nonfeminine women . . . will be told that they are covering simply because they do not conform to that 
stereotype.”). 
 53. Due to DNA testing, “almost every parent who chooses to do so can discover the truth of 
biological parenthood, whether or not a court chooses to admit the evidence.” June Carbone & Naomi 
Cahn, Marriage, Parentage and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 219 (2011). To complicate 
biological definitions of motherhood, the gestational mother may not be the egg donor. See, e.g., 
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 431 (2007) 
(“[S]cience has . . . split biological motherhood into two parts: begetting by the ‘genetic mother’ and 
bearing by the ‘gestational mother.’”). 
 54. There are good reasons to be skeptical of this argument. See Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, 
Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1473–74 (2013). I offer it only as an example. 
 55. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989). 
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tests to determine whether a person acted according to social expectations for 
parents (i.e., by providing care or financial support to the child).56 
Ascriptive notions of citizenship are also controversial. U.S. citizenship 
may be ascribed based on territory (place of birth)57 or ancestry (parentage).58 
Territorial citizenship is contested by those who argue that place of birth is not 
meaningful.59 Ancestry-based citizenship is criticized for being parasitic on 
controversial ascriptive definitions of family.60 The concept of American 
citizenship has long been parasitic on ascriptive notions of race as well.61 The 
name for the process of becoming a U.S. citizen—naturalization—implies a 
transformation of one’s natural status rather than a simple choice.62 The 
requirements for naturalization, which include moral character,63 proficiency in 
the English language, and knowledge of American civics,64 reflect an 
understanding of U.S. citizenship as a set of specific behaviors or 
performances.65 Citizenship also has a variety of disputed ascriptive meanings 
 
 56. See Clarke, supra note 36, at 630–41; Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 589, 590–97 (2013). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”). 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012) (both parents citizens); id. § 1401(g) (parents married; one a 
citizen); id. § 1409 (parents unwed; one a citizen); see STEVENS, supra note 29, at 9–10 (discussing the 
idea that nationality is transmitted through intergenerational inheritance). 
 59. Allison S. Hartry, Birthright Justice: The Attack on Birthright Citizenship and Immigrant 
Women of Color, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 57, 75–76 (2012) (describing arguments against 
territorial citizenship from conservative politicians and legal scholars). 
 60. See, e.g., Victoria Degtyareva, Note, Defining Family in Immigration Law: Accounting for 
Nontraditional Families in Citizenship by Descent, 120 YALE L.J. 862, 864 (2011) (discussing the 
overlap between family and citizenship). 
An individual can also be naturalized as a U.S. citizen after living in the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident for a certain period of time and meeting other requirements. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423–
1424, 1427. See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 
(2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-476.pdf. Most individuals who meet the 
residency requirement for naturalization are eligible to become permanent residents based on family 
relationships with U.S. citizens. Degtyareva, supra at 863–64. Thus, citizenship is also parasitic on 
ascriptive definitions of marriage. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 
407 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., GROSS, supra, note 47, at 6–8 (2008). 
 62. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 115 (2006) (describing the origins of the phrase “to 
naturalize” as lying “in a time when divine will and natural law were thought to explain why someone 
was born a subject of one worldly ruler or another”). 
 63. Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 
IND. L.J. 1571, 1572 (2012). 
 64. PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 33–
59 (2008). 
 65. Social or performative definitions of citizenship may “require controversial interpretation” 
when translated into law. Seyla Benhabib, Birthright Citizenship, Immigration, and Global Poverty, 63 
U. TORONTO L.J. 496, 509 (2013) (arguing that “one must be wary that a ‘thick’ interpretation of what 
constitutes a ‘real and effective link’ or ‘genuine and affective ties’ [to a political community] can lead 
to problems of under-inclusion, by subjecting ambiguous cases to substantive and stringent criteria”). 
For an argument on how citizenship may be performed subversively by engaging in acts of political 
762 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:747 
for political theorists, for example, as acting according to civic norms or 
holding various rights and duties.66 
Thus, ascriptive definitions are the source of tremendous controversy, 
whether based in nature or nurture, biology or culture. Apart from definitional 
disagreements, ascriptive definitions are prone to the interrelated problems of 
essentialism and determinism. Essentialism means assuming that a particular 
category has a “unitary and coherent essence” that is its true, real meaning.67 In 
the context of identities, essentialism entails stereotyping in the form of 
assumptions about how groups are, or the assumption that individuals possess 
characteristics typical of their groups.68 Essentialist understandings can create a 
false sense of stability between and within categories that might otherwise be 
malleable. They may result from biological understandings of categories like 
race or sex that presume certain aptitudes, interests, or roles flow naturally 
from genetics. But social understandings of the meanings of categories like 
“father” and “mother” may also involve stereotypes about what is entailed or 
required for each.69 These stereotypes may reflect the biases of dominant 
groups.70 
Essentialism may also take the form of determinism: prescriptions about 
how group members should behave that may narrowly circumscribe an 
individual’s life choices.71 Identities may be ascribed to individuals who did 
not fully intend to adopt them. Thus, ascriptive understandings of identity lend 
themselves to the idea that identity is destiny. 
 
participation, see Kathryn Abrams, Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and Immigrant Rights 
Movements (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2409971, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409971. 
 66. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 463, 470 
(2000) (discussing various definitions of citizenship from social and political theory, including “the 
enjoyment of certain important rights and entitlements” and “active engagement in the life of the 
political community”). 
 67. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 
86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1242 (2011). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Essentialist understandings include but are not limited to those based on “biological 
causation.” Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument 
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 547–48 (1994) (“Essentialism assumes at minimum that a 
pure and perfect definition of a particular thing can be found. . . . Attribution of a natural essence, 
then, is but one kind of essentialism.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
 71. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the Constitution forbids not simply race-conscious 
measures, but rather “a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race”). Biases 
may also result in pressure on individuals to assimilate, downplaying aspects of their selves 
experienced as authentic but understood to be consistent with stereotypes about subordinated groups. 
See generally YOSHINO, supra note 46. 
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B. Elective Identity 
The elective model is a second paradigm for understanding identity.72 
Professor Camille Gear Rich has described this model as one that “places 
primary emphasis on . . . voluntary, . . . self-identification decisions.”73 Elective 
identity is akin to a contractual right to opt into or out of a particular identity. 
This choice may be ad hoc or a narrative process. It may be partial, 
inconsistent, or context dependent.74 The elective model allows individuals 
“free entry into and exit from” identity categories, as well as opportunities to 
revise their identities.75 
“Self-identification” is the key concept for the elective model in the 
context of identity characteristics like race. The EEOC, which requires 
employers to submit data on the racial composition of their workforces, 
discourages employers from relying on any method other than self-
identification.76 Institutions that administer affirmative action programs 
generally defer to self-identification as well.77 
Self-identification is also important in the context of sex. An elective 
concept of sex or gender78 would require legal recognition of all choices by 
individuals to identify as men or women. For example, a bill passed in 2013 by 
the California legislature provides: “A pupil shall be permitted to participate in 
 
 72. Cf. GUTMANN, supra note 35, at 24 (contrasting ascriptive and voluntary identities). 
 73. Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial 
Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179, 183 (2013). Professor 
Rich analyzes elective identity in the context of race. This Article applies the theory to other identity 
categories as well. 
 74. See Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of 
Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1529 (2014). 
 75. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION 333 (2003). According to Professor Kennedy, these rights should be limited only by a good 
faith requirement. Id. 
 76. Questions and Answers – Implementation of Revised Race and Ethnic Categories, EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, questions 13 & 14, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1/qanda 
-implementation.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (providing that an employer must accept an 
employee’s self-identification, even if it does not believe the employee, and may only use visual 
means if an employee refuses to self identify); see also Revisions to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,782 (Oct. 30, 1997) 
(providing that “[r]espect for individual dignity should guide the processes and methods for collecting 
data on race and ethnicity; ideally, respondent self-identification should be facilitated to the greatest 
extent possible, recognizing that in some data collection systems observer identification is more 
practical”). For a discussion of EEOC policy, see Rich, supra note 74, at 1520–23. 
 77. See Rich, supra note 73, at 195 (“[E]mployers and other entities charged with the 
administration of affirmative action now tend toward capacious definitions of race that are extremely 
accommodating of an individual’s self-identification choices.”). 
 78. I use the terms “sex” and “gender” deliberately. Gender is commonly understood as social, 
while sex is commonly understood as biological. Elective models eschew both social and biological 
meanings in favor of individual choice. I note, however, that legal actors often use the term “gender” 
to mean “sex,” out of concern that “sex” may connote “what occurs in porno theaters.” Mary Anne C. 
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (discussing Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s avoidance of 
the term “sex” in constitutional sex discrimination litigation in the 1970s). 
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sex-segregated school programs and activities, including athletic teams and 
competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, 
irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”79 “[H]is or her gender 
identity” is not defined any further. The language “his or her” suggests the 
choice between these options is left entirely to the student. Although there is 
some suggestion in the legislative history that gender identity must be 
“consistently expressed,” this language was not incorporated into the statute.80 
Many legal scholars and advocates for transgender rights81 also support 
elective sex.82 One advocate has proposed the term “trans*” with an asterisk to 
better signify the open ended nature of sex and gender identifications.83 The 
asterisk here is used in the computer-programming sense of a wildcard.84 The 
point is, “‘[t]he asterisk allows for the inclusion of many identities . . . . Rather 
than enumerating a single subset of identities, the term trans* recognizes our 
incredibly diverse community and widely varying self-identification.’”85 The 
“trans*” label may include, for example, people who identify as 
“genderqueer,”86 which may mean that they identify with neither or both 
gender categories.87 
 
 79. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5(f) (West 2015). 
 80. CAL. ST. ASSEMB., BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 1266, at 2 (Apr. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1251-1300/ab_1266_cfa_20130501_170107 
_asm_floor.html. 
 81. The term “transgender” describes an individual whose current gender identity does not 
match the sex he or she was assigned at birth. Transgender Terminology, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/resources/TransTerminology_2014.pdf. 
 82. See, e.g., Mottet, supra note 51, at 386 (arguing that an Argentine law allowing individuals 
to update the sex designation on their birth certificates without “any proof of gender identity, other 
than the person’s statement, is enlightening and encouraging.”); Eric A. Stanley, Introduction: 
Fugitive Flesh: Gender Self-Determination, Queer Abolition, and Trans Resistance, in CAPTIVE 
GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 1, 5 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat 
Smith eds., 2011) (“[G]ender self-determination at its most basic suggests that we collectively work to 
create the most space for people to express whatever genders they choose at any given moment. It also 
understands that these expressions might change and that this change does not delegitimate previous or 
future identifications”). 
 83. Olga Tomchin, Comment, Bodies and Bureaucracy: Legal Sex Classification and 
Marriage-Based Immigration for Trans* People, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 815 n.4 (2013). 
 84. Cf. Julie Scelfo, An Evolving Glossary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at ED19 (defining 
trans* as “[s]hort for transgender, with the asterisk meant to indicate the wide range of identities 
beyond the norm”). 
 85. Tomchin, supra note 83, at 815 n.4 (quoting Trans* Guide, OHIO UNIVERSITY LGBT 
CENTER, http://www.ohio.edu/lgbt/resources/transgender.cfm). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Definition of Terms, GENDER EQUITY RESOURCE CTR., http://geneq.berkeley.edu/ 
lgbt_resources_definiton_of_terms#gender_queer (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (defining “genderqueer” 
as “[a] person whose gender identity is neither man nor woman, is between or beyond genders, or is 
some combination of genders”). 
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Elective identity concepts operate in family law, too, alongside ascriptive 
presumptions.88 Marriage is often discussed in terms of its elective 
dimensions.89 As Professor Mary Anne Case put it, “The history of marriage in 
Anglo-American law seems thus far to have been one of movement from 
contract to status and only part way back again.”90 The earliest English laws 
treated marriage as an elective agreement: a contract for the sale of a woman 
from her father to her husband (although wives were chattels, not parties).91 
These private agreements did not require formalities such as licenses or 
ceremony.92 It was not until the eighteenth century that the English government 
began an aggressive campaign to regulate marriage as an official status that 
entailed a husband’s duty of care and a wife’s duty of obedience.93 The return 
to marriage as contract, in the more egalitarian form of a bilateral agreement 
between spouses, has long been a theme of legal scholarship.94 The modern 
move to no-fault divorce is an example of the idea of marriage as an elective 
agreement that a person can opt out of for any reason.95 
Or consider the concept of intentional parenthood, that “[t]he law grants 
parental rights and responsibilities to those who caused a child to come into 
being with the intent of parenting that child once it was born.”96 Intent can play 
different roles in parenthood determinations.97 Sometimes it can serve as a 
tiebreaker where biological definitions conflict; for example, if two potential 
mothers both have biological claims to a child, one as egg donor and one as 
 
 88. See supra notes 53–56 (discussing legal presumptions related to ascriptive definitions of 
family based in biological, social, functional, and performative metrics). 
 89. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(contrasting the “consent-based” view of marriage with the “traditional” view). 
 90. Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1766 (2005). The reference 
to the story of “status to contract” is to Henry Maine, who posited that civilized societies progress from 
orders based on family status to orders based on contractual liberty. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, 
ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO 
MODERN IDEAS 140 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861). Maine’s distinction between status and contract maps 
roughly onto the distinction between ascriptive and elective. 
 91. Case, supra note 90, at 1766 (citing 1 GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF 
MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 285 (1904)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for 
State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 208 & n.2 (1982) (discussing marriage as a contract “in the 
modern sense of design of the relationship’s expectations and obligations by prospective intimate 
partners rather than in the older sense of marriages arranged between families of prospective marriage 
partners”). For a summary of legal scholarship on marriage as private ordering, see Adrienne Davis, 
Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1955, 2040 n.280 (2010). 
 95. Halley, supra note 9, at 18. 
 96. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 
649, 701 (2008). This is a less radically elective concept than elective race, sex, or marriage, in that the 
rights and duties of parenthood are not up for renegotiation or easy exit. 
 97. Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 210, 227–30 (2012). 
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gestational surrogate, a court might defer to the individual who intended to be 
the child’s mother.98 Or intent may help courts determine who is a parent 
before a child is born, when definitions that evaluate a parent based on her 
conformity with social norms about how a parent should act are hard to apply.99 
Citizenship, too, is often envisioned as an elective regime, or a sort of 
social contract between an individual and the state, at least in theory.100 For 
most, U.S. citizenship is ascribed based on birthplace, but for many, it is an 
identity that is chosen and then formalized through naturalization.101 Elective 
elements had more of a driving force in determinations of citizenship for white 
immigrants in the early years of the United States than they do today. Under 
the first naturalization statutes, any “free white person[]” of “good character” 
could become a citizen by filing “first papers” declaring an intent to become a 
citizen and meeting a residency requirement.102 A mere declaration of intent to 
naturalize by a free white person could entitle him to vote or subject him to the 
draft.103 
The elective model responds to the definitional problems, stereotyping, 
and determinism of the ascriptive model by deferring to an individual’s own 
decision as to his or her identity and what that entails. Under the elective 
model, there is no need to decide among the various biological, social, and 
performative definitions of identities—the law ought to recognize an 
individual’s intent. Such recognition respects an individual’s liberty and 
autonomy to choose her own status, as well as her dignity and privacy in 
having that choice respected.104 That elective identities are more “capacious” 
and “fluid” is considered a virtue because they can “destabilize” stereotypical 
or deterministic views of those identities.105 Thus, elective models have 
tremendous appeal for scholars and activists, who prefer that individuals—
 
 98. See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 818–20 (2006). 
 99. Id. at 820. 
 100. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: 
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 25 (1985) (describing a concept of citizenship “based on 
the tacit or explicit consent of an individual who had reached the age of rational discretion” along with 
the agreement of the members of the existing community). Citizenship may also have an elective 
meaning when defined as “the affective ties of identification and solidarity that we maintain with 
groups of other people in the world” or “patriotism, a term denoting identification with and loyalty to 
one’s country and compatriots.” See Bosniak, supra note 66, at 479–80 (footnote omitted). 
 101. See supra notes 58–66. 
 102. See MOTOMURA, supra note 62, at 115–16 (describing naturalization law from 1795 until 
1952). From the perspective of persons deemed nonwhite, this naturalization regime embodies more 
ascriptive and fewer elective components than today’s rules. See id. at 116. 
 103. See id. at 116, 118; Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing 
Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 379–81 (2013). 
 104. Rich, supra note 74, at 1505. 
 105. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Against Individualized Consideration, 83 IND. L.J. 1405, 1407 
(2008). 
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rather than the state or society—select and define the content of the categories 
that will apply to them.106 
But there are two main problems with elective identity for legal 
regulation: inauthenticity and disuniformity. The inauthenticity problem is that 
elective identity claims may be made in bad faith to commit fraud, made in 
good faith on the basis of a sincerely held but disputed understanding of 
identity, or made under conditions of coercion and constraint. Fears of 
inauthenticity have particular salience when a claim to an identity is a claim for 
redistribution of resources. Thus, concerns about fraudulent identity claims 
arise with respect to affirmative action based on self-identification, particularly 
for the categories Hispanic and Native American.107 In a variety of legal 
contexts, authorities police against marriage fraud by evaluating the substantive 
validity of marriages.108 Until very recently, elective notions of sex met with 
the objection that same-sex couples might fraudulently represent the sex of one 
partner to marry in states that only allowed cross-sex marriage.109 Relatedly, 
California’s law requiring schools to respect students’ self-identified gender 
identities has been criticized based on the hypothetical possibilities that boys 
might fraudulently assert female gender identities to infiltrate girls’ 
bathrooms110 or join girls’ sports teams.111 Due, perhaps, to the great number of 
perceived benefits associated with U.S. citizenship today, the concept of purely 
elective citizenship has little political traction.112 
 
 106. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1189 (2001); 
Rodríguez, supra note 105, at 1406; YOSHINO, supra note 46, at xii. 
 107. Tseming Yang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing Race 
in Affirmative Action, the Census, and a Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 367, 369 (2006). 
 108. See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 109. Mottet, supra note 51, at 413. Mottet noted, however, that there were no reported cases of 
individuals who did not identify as transgender attempting to change the sex designations on their 
identity documents just to facilitate marriage. Id. 
 110. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast Aug. 9, 2013) (statement of host Greg 
Gutfeld, “As a devious teen growing up, I would tell girls that I’m a girl trapped in a boy’s body, just 
so I could sneak into the girls’ bathroom.”). 
 111. Don Thompson, Transgender Bathroom Rights Bill Passed by California Lawmakers, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 9:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/transgender 
-bathroom-rights_n_3543601.html (“Sen. Steve Knight, R-Palmdale, and Sen. Rod Wright, D-
Inglewood, each said that male athletes who are mediocre in competition against their own gender 
could game the system by competing against female athletes.”). For a response to this point, see Scott 
Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student Athletes, 28 
WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 277-79 (2013) (arguing that the fear that boys will join girl’s sports 
teams for competitive advantage is speculative, and that “in the context of youth sports, the physical 
differences between males and females are not significant enough” to justify concerns about 
unfairness). 
 112. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 54, 66 (1997) (“An ‘open borders’ policy [allowing anyone to claim American citizenship] may 
be impractical, but it is notoriously difficult for liberal political theory to justify restrictions upon 
immigration.”). But cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea 
of Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 373–76 (2012) (making arguments sounding in 
contractual principles for recognition of unauthorized immigrants). 
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The concern about fraud usually assumes that an individual is engaged in 
deliberate impersonation of a member of an identity group to which she knows 
she does not belong.113 The concern might be voiced as the fear of 
opportunism: that an individual is only claiming an identity on an ad hoc basis 
to accrue some advantage, while avoiding any disadvantages that the identity 
might entail under other circumstances. A purely elective regime has no 
principled basis for policing entrance into and exit out of identity categories,114 
or ensuring that individuals must take on both the benefits and burdens of 
particular legal identities.115 
A related problem is the subjectivity of elective definitions. What if an 
individual who is white by all indications, but whose grandmother claimed to 
be African American, considers himself African American?116 If identity is 
elective, who is to say his claim is inauthentic? By reference to what objective 
standard? Concerns that elective definitions are too expansive may lead to 
controversy and calls for ascriptive limitations on who may claim identities.117  
A final variation on this critique questions the premise that law can 
protect authentic self-determination in any meaningful sense, when individuals 
choose their identities under conditions of constraint imposed by social 
relationships, cultural norms, or systemic inequality.118 An example might be a 
woman who chooses to become a mother in a community that applies 
overwhelming pressure on all women to be mothers.119 
A second drawback to the elective model is lack of uniformity. This 
relates to the “numerus clausus” principle, a phrase from scholarship on 
property law.120 Most legal doctrines offer individuals a limited menu of 
 
 113. See, e.g., supra notes 108–111. 
 114. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Live and Let Love: Self-Determination in Matters of Intimacy and 
Identity, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2197–98 (2003). 
 115. See Rich, supra note 74, at 1559 (discussing this concern in the context of race). 
 116. See infra notes 363–67 (discussing Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Sup. 
Jud. Ct., Suffolk Cnty., July 25, 1989)). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Professor Martha Minow argues that identities are necessarily “negotiat[ed] . . . in relation 
to others and against the backdrop of social and political structures of power.” Martha Minow, 
Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 127 (1991). “Paradoxically, underestimating individuals’ 
latitude for choice despite their assigned identities, and failing to acknowledge the constraints on 
individuals despite the powers to choose, are two central mistakes in legal assessments of identity.” Id. 
 119. To give another example, those who elect naturalization may do so defensively, “in 
response to increasing anti-immigrant sentiment.” Paul M. Ong, Defensive Naturalization and Anti-
Immigrant Sentiment: Chinese Immigrants in Three Primate Metropolises, 21 HARV. J. ASIAN AM. 
POL’Y REV. 39, 40 (2010–11). 
 120. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000). I do not mean “numerus 
clausus” in the sense of a limit on the number of racial minorities who may be admitted to an 
institution, as that term has been used in affirmative action debates. “Numerus clausus” here means 
“the number is closed” and it refers to the principle that legal rights “must conform to certain 
standardized forms” that are “fixed and limited in number.” Id. at 4–5. For example, property law 
recognizes only a limited number of arrangements as property, as opposed to contract law, which 
2015] IDENTITY AND FORM 769 
choices in terms of identity categories, or standard forms, for purposes of 
administrability.121 Often, these categories must be binary and exclusive—for 
example, with respect to a child, a person is either a parent or a legal 
stranger.122 Individuals, however, may self-identify in an unlimited variety of 
manners, combinations, and shades of gray, or not at all. Such wildcard 
identifications may not be intelligible to legal rules. The concept that identities 
might require lengthy narratives to be truly understood magnifies problems of 
administrability, as narratives require even more individualized consideration, a 
time consuming task for legal actors. 
C. Formal Identity 
The formal model is an alternative way for the law to understand identity. 
Fuller described legal formalities as things “deliberately used” and “intended to 
be so used, by the parties whose acts are to be judged by the law.”123 Fuller’s 
classic example was the wax seal, affixed to a letter as a symbol of its 
legality.124 Today the signature has replaced the seal. Although documentation 
practices like signing paperwork are paradigmatic formalities,125 formalities 
have historically included other practices as well, such as swearing an oath or 
taking part in a ceremony.126 Twenty-first century formalities may increasingly 
be electronic.127 Following Fuller, this Article defines formalities as practices 
used to render a legal status an official designation. It uses the terms “form” 
 
allows parties “the freedom to ‘customize’ legally enforceable interests.” Id. at 3. Allowing free 
customization of property rights would “create unacceptable information costs to third parties” who 
must be able to easily ascertain what other’s property rights are to avoid violating them, to acquire 
them, and to maintain an efficient market for them. Id. at 26. It would also create “administrative 
costs” for government. Id. at 38. 
 121. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 114, at 2197 (arguing against racial self-determination 
on the ground that “[o]nly by using the same definitions can American society identify the people 
likely disadvantaged by historical discrimination and determine whether the effects of such 
discrimination have been remedied”). 
 122. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child 
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1014 (2003) (“The 
law draws bright line distinctions between parents and non-parents and attributes decision-making 
power exclusively to the former (or those acting in their stead).”). 
 123. Fuller, supra note 10, at 801. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 800–02 (discussing the statute of frauds). 
 126. For example, the “medieval ceremony of ‘livery of seisin’ . . . gathered the buyer and the 
seller of a land parcel in a field to exchange ownership by handing over a clod of dirt.” Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1189 (1999). 
 127. They may also be mediated by corporations. See, e.g., Jesse Fox & Katie M. Warber, 
Romantic Relationship Development in the Age of Facebook: An Exploratory Study of Emerging 
Adults’ Perceptions, Motives, and Behaviors, 16 CYBERPSYCHOL., BEHAVIOR, & SOC. NETWORKING 
3, 3 (2013) (discussing the concept of “going Facebook official” or inaugurating a romantic 
relationship through designation on a social networking website). 
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and “formality” in this sense of a device, not in the sense of an abstract rule as 
contrasted with a contextual standard.128 
This Article defines a formal identity as one that comes into being through 
the execution of a formality by the parties laying claim to a particular identity. 
Although formalities are sometimes executed by third parties, this Article is 
concerned with formalities that individuals use to claim identities for 
themselves. Formalities executed by third parties, such as the designation of a 
baby’s race on a birth certificate by hospital staff, are likely to be considered 
mere reflections of ascriptive definitions of identity.129 This Article is focused 
on formalities that constitute identity statuses for legal purposes, rather than 
those thought to merely reflect a status.130 For example, through licensing and 
ceremony, a couple becomes married.131   
 
 128. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 112 (2000) (discussing Rudolf von 
Jhering’s explanation of the difference between the question of formalities and the debate over rules 
versus standards). It is true that formalities are often required by rules rather than standards. And the 
reasons for preferring rules to standards, such as certainty, predictability, and administrability, may 
also be reasons for requiring formalities. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989) (discussing virtues of rules). But not all legal rules require 
formalities. Some legal rules may confer recognition on informal arrangements. For example, one 
could imagine a rule recognizing a couple as married after a certain number of years of cohabitation. 
Whether the law employs rules or standards is a separate issue from whether an identity is 
conceptualized as formality, choice, or ascriptive status. 
For similar reasons, formalities are not the same as legal formalism, nor are they opposed to legal 
realism. Formalism “describes legal theories that stress the importance of rationally uncontroversial 
reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or quite abstract principles.” Thomas 
Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983). Legal realists stress judicial 
idiosyncrasies, fact situations, and social realities over abstract rules, viewing law as a tool for shaping 
private behavior. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960, 3, 6–7 (1986); 
see also Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World 
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 71–94 (2009) (discussing variants of 
legal realism). Formalities may appeal to formalists when they facilitate the application of objective 
and abstract rules, and they may appeal to realists as useful tools for shaping private behavior. 
 129. A different set of policy considerations, such as those pertaining to authority, institutional 
competence, and res judicata, may attend to questions of whether the law should defer to identity 
formalities executed by those other than the parties whose identities they govern. I deliberately refer to 
“parties” here and not individuals so as to include, in the context of marriage, both members of a 
couple, and in the context of citizenship, both the citizen and the polity. 
 130. French philosopher Louis Althusser described this process as “interpellation”: the process 
through which an ideology “hails” an individual as a “subject,” as when a police officer shouts “Hey, 
you there!” to a person on the street, and the person turns around, acknowledging he is the subject of 
the address, and is subjected to the law. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 173–74 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 1971). Ideologies, according to Althusser, are ways of representing our social 
“reality,” id. at 158, that are manifested in rituals, behaviors, and practices, id. at 160–67. 
 131. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 99–100 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà 
eds., 2d ed. 1975). J.L. Austin uses the term “illocutionary” for utterances that perform acts, like 
saying “I do” at a marriage ceremony. Id. The marriage example is discussed further in Part II.B. 
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Although Fuller discussed formality in commercial contexts,132 his theory 
has applications to identity determinations as well. In the context of 
contracting, formal requirements can serve contract law’s substantive aims, 
such as protecting private autonomy, facilitating reliance, and avoiding unjust 
enrichment.133 As elective understandings of identity come to compete with 
ascriptive ones, and identities begin to look more like contracts,134 formal 
requirements may serve the substantive aims of identity regulation as well. 
Formalities facilitate individual self-determination, but in a different sense than 
rules recognizing elective identities.135 Fuller contrasted the concept of 
autonomy, defined as self-governance, against “the will theory,” under which a 
party “must be free to change his mind at any time, since it is his will which 
sets the rule.”136 On this view, autonomy is not unconstrained freedom; it is the 
ability to choose the laws that govern oneself.137 Formalities, as modes of 
governance, ensure a degree of stability by setting rules that facilitate reliance 
and avoid unjust enrichment. This distinguishes formality from election. 
Moreover, regulators can limit who is eligible to enter into formalities and 
delineate what types of formalities the law will recognize. 
In the identity context, the formal model offers a way to sidestep the main 
drawbacks of the ascriptive model (definitional disagreements, essentialism, 
determinism), and the elective model (inauthenticity, disuniformity). It does so 
by performing the three functions of form that Fuller identified: (1) evidentiary, 
(2) cautionary, and (3) channeling.138 These functions are “formal” rather than 
“substantive” because they are related to “considerations of 
administrability.”139 
The evidentiary function is to provide reliable proof of the validity of the 
claim in the event of a dispute.140 The seal, for example, streamlines judicial 
 
 132. Fuller offers an explanation for the requirement of “consideration” in contract law. Fuller, 
supra note 10, at 814–24. For a contract to be enforceable, both sides must offer something in 
exchange. This raises many questions. For example, why shouldn’t the law enforce promises to give 
gifts without any exchange? Why doesn’t the law inquire into whether the “consideration” is of far less 
value than what it is to be exchanged for? Fuller argued that the requirement of consideration fulfilled 
the purposes of formality. Id. at 815. 
 133. Id. at 799. Other considerations animate contract law as well, but these three concerned 
Fuller. See Kennedy, supra note 128, at 160–61, 172–73. 
 134. See supra note 90 (discussing Maine’s distinction between status and contract as a rough 
analogue to the distinction between ascriptive and elective). 
 135. See Fuller, supra note 10, at 805. 
 136. Id. at 807. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 799. 
 139. See Kennedy, supra note 128, at 96. 
 140. Fuller, supra note 10, at 800. Accordingly, many documentary formalities are admissible 
in court. Public records of vital statistics, defined as “record[s] of a birth, death, or marriage, if 
reported to a public office in accordance with a legal duty,” are exceptions to the hearsay rule under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(d); see also FED. R. EVID. 902 (providing that 
certain public documents and other records do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity to be 
admitted). 
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decision making by “furnish[ing] a simple and external test of 
enforceability.”141 Similarly, identity formalities set aside the definitional 
quandaries that plague ascriptive notions of identity. There is no need for 
debates over nature versus nurture or biology versus experience, no need to 
mediate among conflicting cultural understandings, because the formality 
provides the answer. Additionally, formalities generate documentary records 
that provide security to individuals seeking recognition of their identities, and 
may estop those who executed them from challenging their legitimacy or terms. 
This assurance allows identity claimants and third parties to take action in 
reliance on the identity.142 Finally, records mitigate the concerns about fraud 
that afflict the elective model, by providing a way to disprove those bad-faith 
or opportunistic identity claims that are unsupported by documentation.143 
Formal requirements can therefore prevent the unjust enrichment of parties 
who seek the benefits but not the burdens of identities. 
The second function of formality is cautionary: to ensure that the parties 
take care in making claims so they do not later reverse, resist, or regret their 
decisions. Formality thus serves as “a check against inconsiderate action.”144 
Fuller described how the “seal” fulfilled this role: “The affixing and impressing 
of a wax wafer—symbol in the popular mind of legalism and weightiness—
was an excellent device for inducing the circumspective frame of mind 
appropriate in one pledging his future.”145 Others have called this the “ritual 
function,” emphasizing the psychological impact of formalities on 
individuals.146 Ceremony is required because “[p]eople are often careless in 
conversation and in informal writings.”147 
Scholars have often discussed the cautionary function with respect to wills 
and trusts, an area of the law in which formalities predominate. The specific 
formal requirements for a will vary based on the state, but states most 
commonly impose three requirements: (1) attestation of witnesses who are not 
receiving any bequests from the will, (2) signature of the testator, and (3) a 
 
 141. Fuller, supra note 10, at 801. Fuller argued this streamlining function was classified under 
“channeling” but, following more recent scholarship, I classify it under the heading “evidentiary.” See, 
e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 124 (1989) (“[T]he evidentiary function of legal formalities is to 
provide information to courts in order to lower the costs of subsequent decision making.”). 
 142. Fuller, supra note 10, at 810. 
 143. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and 
Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 68 (1974) (“Witnesses are subornable, but forgery is 
a difficult art.”). 
 144. Fuller, supra note 10, at 800. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE 
L.J. 1, 4 (1941); cf. Perillo, supra note 143, at 45 (describing the cautionary function of form as 
appealing to “conscious, rational” decision-making processes while the ritual function appeals to the 
“unconscious, non-rational” ones). 
 147. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 146, at 3; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of 
Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2005) (“Rituals command attention.”). 
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writing.148 These requirements take the creation of a will out of the realm of 
mundane communications and impress upon the testator the significance of the 
document for the law.149 They are meant to ensure that the will represents the 
testator’s carefully considered intent, and to protect the testator against fraud, 
undue influence, and incapacity. 
In identity contexts, formal requirements may caution individuals against 
hasty decisions that they will later regret. By clarifying the moment when an 
individual may (or must) choose her identity, formalities provide some 
safeguard against creeping social forces that shape identity. Thus, the 
cautionary function addresses the authenticity concerns related to elective 
identity choices. 
The third key function of formality—the channeling function—ensures 
that everyone understands how to stake a legal claim and can organize their 
behavior around “a neat division between the legal and the non-legal.”150 A 
formality “offers a legal framework into which the party may fit his actions, or, 
to change the figure, it offers channels for the legally effective expression of 
intention.”151 By channeling, formalities facilitate both private and public 
ordering. 
The clarity offered by legal channels “facilitate[s] private ordering”152 by 
informing parties of the steps they should take to claim a particular legal 
status.153 It allows individuals to arrange their own lives, thus avoiding the 
problems of essentialism and determinism that afflict ascriptive definitions. So 
long as the law does not erect barriers to who may enter into a formality, 
formalities can open space for individuals who do not meet ascriptive 
definitions to achieve legal recognition.154 Professor Duncan Kennedy 
explained, “Formalities are premised on the lawmaker’s indifference as to 
which of a number of alternative relationships the parties decide to enter.”155 
 
 148. Margaret Ryznar & Angelique Devaux, Au Revoir, Will Contests: Comparative Lessons 
for Preventing Will Contests, 14 NEV. L.J. 1, 7 (2013). 
 149. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 146, at 4 (explaining that these formal requirements fulfill 
the cautionary function by “impressing the transferor with the significance of his statements and thus 
justifying the court in reaching the conclusion, if the ceremonial is performed, that they were 
deliberately intended to be operative”). 
 150. Fuller, supra note 10, at 803. 
 151. Id. at 801. 
 152. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1691 (1976). 
 153. To illustrate how the evidentiary and channeling purposes are separate, Fuller mentions 
debates over the parol evidence rule, which prohibits a judge from considering evidence outside the 
four corners of a contract. Fuller, supra note 10, at 804. The objective of this rule may be evidentiary, 
on the premise that the contract is the best and only evidence of the parties’ intent, or it may be 
channeling: inducing the parties to channel their agreement into a legal formality, on pain of 
nonrecognition. Id. 
 154. Halley, supra note 9, at 24. 
 155. Kennedy, supra note 152, at 1691. 
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For this reason, Professor Janet Halley has written, “[a] libertarian could love 
formality.”156 
At the same time, formalities facilitate public ordering.157 By channeling, 
formality avoids the disuniformity of idiosyncratic elective identities. “The 
form furnishes uniformity—regularity, repeatability, reiterability, 
predictability—to identity, rendering it accordingly accessible to 
administration.”158 Regulators can place limits on who is eligible to execute 
formalities. The law can also limit those forms of identity that an individual 
may choose, following the principle of numerus clausus.159 The census, for 
example, provides five options for racial identification: White, Black or 
African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.160 This ensures some degree of uniformity 
in classifications and facilitates statistical analysis.161 Additionally, regulators 
can discourage the development of informal identities by rendering them 
legally invalid.162 
Thus, in theory, formal identity captures some of the advantages of both 
elective identity and ascriptive identity. It facilitates private autonomy with 
respect to identity choices, while also allowing the law to place some ascriptive 
limits on identity claims, which fosters stability, reliance, and efficient 
regulation. 
 
 156. Halley, supra note 9, at 24. Actual libertarians, however, seem to be frightened by formal 
identity’s Orwellian potential. See, e.g., NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN 
OPPOSITION (Carl Watner & Wendy McElroy, eds., 2004). 
 157. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 
238 (6th ed. 2009) (“[F]orm requirements can serve regulatory and fiscal ends, to educate the parties 
as to the full extent of their obligations, to provide public notice of the transaction, and also to help 
management efficiency in an organizational setting.”). Fuller did not appear to contemplate this set of 
advantages, possibly because he envisioned the private domain of contract as separate from the public 
domain of “administrative regulation.” See Kennedy, supra note 128, at 162. With respect to 
channeling, Fuller discussed how formalities might simplify the tasks of judges, but not administrators. 
See Fuller, supra note 10; see also supra text accompanying note 141. 
 158. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIAL SUBJECTS: WRITING ON RACE IN AMERICA 31 (1997); 
see also Dorothy Smith, Textually Mediated Social Organization, 36 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 59, 66 (1984) 
(“[T]he formality, the designed, planned and organized character of formal organization depends 
heavily on documentary practices, which co-ordinate, order, provide continuity, monitor, and organize 
relations between different segments and phases of organizational courses of action.”). 
 159. See supra note 120. 
 160. Race: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 8, 2013), http://www.census.gov/ 
topics/population/race/about.html. 
 161. It does not ensure complete uniformity, in that people have the option of selecting more 
than one race, or writing in another race that is not listed. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. CENSUS 
FORM 2 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/2010census/pdf/2010_Bilingual_Questionnaire_ 
Info.pdf. 
 162. See Fuller, supra note 10, at 801. 
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II. 
FUNCTIONS OF FORMAL IDENTITY 
This Part provides examples of how the drawbacks of ascriptive and 
elective models of identity have generated interest in formality with respect to 
citizenship, family, sex, and race. It provides insight into the law’s regulation 
of these identities by showing how formalities serve the evidentiary, 
cautionary, and channeling functions. It also reveals some unexpected ways 
that formal definitions create opportunities for individuals to challenge 
exclusionary ascriptive definitions of identity, and demonstrates that formal 
identities can be experienced as profoundly significant. 
The aim of this Part is to describe the functions of formal identity rather 
than endorse any particular legal rules. It does not claim that there is a trend 
toward formalization of identity; rather, it discusses both historical and 
contemporary examples that illuminate how identity formalities function. Nor 
does this Article claim that these identities are entirely formalized. For 
instance, not every parent may or must formally adopt her child. Rather, formal 
requirements exist alongside legal presumptions, barriers, and exceptions that 
reflect ascriptive and elective understandings. This Part aims to untangle the 
formal dimensions of identity doctrines and expose their functions. Part III will 
turn to dysfunctions of formal identity. 
A. Formal Citizenship 
A Russian subject consist[s] of body, soul, and passport. 
Russian Proverb163 
Formal understandings of citizenship exist alongside ascriptive and 
elective meanings.164 In the United States, the process of naturalization entails 
a series of administrative requirements culminating in formal ceremony.165 
 
 163. Isaac A. Hourwich, The Czar’s Police, 8 SOCIALIST REV. 138, 138 (1920). 
 164. I focus here on U.S. citizenship. For discussion of claims to citizenship in terms of formal 
identity in developing countries, see KAMAL SADIQ, PAPER CITIZENS: HOW ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 101–35 (2008), and in South Korea, see Jaeeun 
Kim, Establishing Identity: Documents, Performance, and Biometric Information in Immigration 
Proceedings, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 760, 763 (2011). 
 165. During the debate over the requirements for naturalization in 1803, Congress rejected a 
purely formal rule that would have allowed aliens to become citizens simply by making a declaration. 
One Republican criticized the formality for supposing there was “magic” in a declaration, 
a kind of legerdemain—which by hocus pocus, converted aliens suddenly into a fitness for 
citizenship[.] What was its slight-of-hand process, that it gave to the alien an impromptu 
knowledge of our Constitution and our laws? Did it possess an alchymical power, capable 
of an instantaneous transmutation of a base into a pure being? 
12 Annals of Cong. 576 (1803) (statement of Representative Michael Lieb). Although the “empty 
sound of declaration” could not convert alien to citizen, five-year’s residence was thought to instill the 
civic understanding and “common interest” necessary to the “pure being” of citizenship. Id. This 
language evokes an ascriptive concept of citizenship as civic spirit. But the five-year requirement 
might also be thought of as a sort of formality intended to induce caution by applicants and ensure they 
truly intended to elect citizenship, as continued presence in the United States was “the surest standard 
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Immigrant becomes citizen upon taking a public oath of allegiance.166 At the 
ceremony’s conclusion, the new citizen is provided with a certificate of 
naturalization, which serves the evidentiary function.167 The ceremony serves 
the cautionary function by “inducing the circumspective frame of mind 
appropriate in one pledging his future.”168 Many experience it as a ritual of 
great emotional significance.169 And finally, the naturalization ceremony serves 
the channeling function: without it, citizenship is not conferred, even if the 
applicant meets all the ascriptive prerequisites for citizenship and otherwise 
expressed an election to become a citizen.170 
Documents such as certificates of naturalization, passports, and birth 
certificates not only play mundane evidentiary roles as proof of citizenship in a 
variety of administrative contexts,171 but may also function as keepsakes of 
profound importance to their bearers.172 Federal judge Denny Chin, who 
regularly conducted the swearing in ceremony for new citizens while a district 
court judge, hung his grandfather’s certificate of naturalization on the wall in 
his chambers.173 Judge Chin has remarked: 
[E]ach time that I perform the naturalization ceremony, I tell the new 
U.S. citizens about my grandfather [who, due to the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts’ restrictions on immigration from China, entered the United 
States illegally with false papers in 1916]. I show them my 
grandfather’s naturalization certificate, which I take off the wall, frame 
and all. 
And when I show it to them, I think of my grandfather, of how hard he 
 
by which to test the desire for citizenship; it was action, and not declaration; it was fact and not 
theory.” Id. It might also serve a cautionary function for the polity, helping the state avoid hasty 
admittance of unfit citizens. 
 166. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012). 
 167. 8 C.F.R. § 338.1 (2015). 
 168. Fuller, supra note 10, at 800. 
 169. See, e.g., Tovin Lapan, Dozens Fulfill Dream of Citizenship in Emotional Las Vegas 
Ceremony, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/sep/17/dozens-fulfill-dream-citizenship-emotional-las-veg/ 
(quoting new citizen Dominik Kuna of Poland as saying, “During the oath it really hit me, I feel like 
(the United States) is part of me, and for the first time I’m part of it.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Duran-Pichardo v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 695 F.3d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 
2012) (holding petitioner who “did everything that was required for naturalization except take the 
Oath” was a noncitizen subject to removal, even if his failure to take the oath was a result of 
administrative error); Okafor v. Gonzalez, 456 F.3d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding petitioner was 
removable as a noncitizen where petitioner’s application for naturalization had been approved and he 
had signed a document containing the oath, but he failed to take the oath during the required public 
ceremony). 
 171. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 435.407 (2014) (ten-page list of “satisfactory documentary evidence” 
of citizenship such as a passport or birth certificate for proving eligibility for Medicaid or Medicare). 
 172. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Book Review, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 486, 486 (2012) (reviewing 
CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT (2010) and 
discussing the author’s deceased father’s passport). 
 173. Denny Chin, Representation for Immigrants: A Judge’s Personal Perspective, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 636–38 (2009). 
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worked for so many years waiting on tables, of how he became a 
citizen in 1947, of how he brought my parents into the country, of how 
they became citizens, and of how I, the son of a seamstress and 
Chinese cook, the grandson of a Chinese waiter, became a federal 
judge.174 
Judge Chin’s story illustrates how documentary formalities can become 
artifacts of identity. His grandfather’s naturalization papers came to be a 
cherished reminder of his family’s version of the American dream. 
In this story, expansion of legal access to the formality of naturalization 
disrupted a racially exclusionary, ascriptive concept of U.S. citizenship.175 
Formalization of citizenship may take the form of decreasing barriers to 
naturalization, thereby admitting individuals who challenge ascriptive 
definitions of citizenship based on race, parentage, or place of birth. Consider 
the DREAM Act, which would provide certain individuals who arrived in the 
United States as minors with a formal path to legal residency and ultimately, 
eligibility for citizenship.176 
Another example of formal citizenship is the equation of citizenship with 
passport.177 By granting a passport, the state formally acknowledges the citizen. 
However, passports have not always carried this meaning.178 In the nineteenth 
century, the law of citizenship rested expressly on ascriptive ideas about the 
racial character of America. Before the Civil War, only “free white person[s]” 
were eligible for naturalization.179 Whether free nonwhite persons born in the 
United States were citizens was a controversial question.180 Race, rather than 
documentation, was the marker of citizenship. For much of its history, the U.S. 
passport was not primarily used to identify a citizen, but rather to introduce its 
 
 174. Id. at 138; see also infra notes 258–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Chinese 
exclusion laws and “paper families”). 
 175. The Chinese Exclusion Acts were repealed in 1943, allowing Chinese immigrants to apply 
for naturalization. LAU, supra note 9, at 17. 
 176. Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013). While its 
procedures are formalities, the DREAM Act’s conditions for eligibility reflect ascriptive visions of 
“model” American citizenship, such as educational attainment or military service. See Benhabib, supra 
note 65, at 509. 
 177. See generally CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA 68 (2010) (discussing how 
the passport came to supplant other methods for determining U.S. citizenship). 
 178. Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835) (holding that a passport could not 
establish evidence of U.S. citizenship per se). In Urtetiqui, the Court was divided on whether the lower 
court had erred in admitting the passport into evidence, characterizing the passport as a “political” 
rather than a legal document. Id. To the extent this case stands for the holding that passports are not 
admissible as evidence of U.S. citizenship, it has been overruled by statute. See 22 U.S.C. § 2705(1) 
(2012). 
 179. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 153, 154–55. This racial limitation remained in 
effect until the Civil War. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 180. See Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 493, 511 (2013); id. at 520–26 (discussing controversy regarding the holding of Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) that “free blacks could not be considered ‘citizens’ within the 
meaning of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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bearer to foreign officials, request that he181 pass freely, and entitle him to the 
aid and protection of the United States while abroad.182 
Before the Civil War, some African Americans used the idea that a 
passport might constitute citizenship to challenge the equation of citizenship 
and whiteness. In his history of the passport, Professor Craig Robertson 
describes how African Americans took advantage of the intermittent 
availability of passports and other such documents to stake claims to 
citizenship and the rights it entailed.183 Between 1796 and 1868, thousands of 
free black sailors received “seaman’s protection” certificates stating the bearer 
was a “Citizen of the United States of America.”184 While a runaway slave, 
Frederick Douglass borrowed such a certificate and dressed as a sailor to pass 
as a free man.185 Robertson also tells the story of Robert Purvis, a “wealthy free 
man of color” who received a passport in 1834 after a well-connected white 
friend wrote a letter to the Secretary of State “invoking Purvis’s wealth and 
light complexion.”186 In securing a passport, Purvis won not only a claim to 
citizenship but also a claim to whiteness. However, the Secretary of State noted 
that Purvis’s case should not serve as precedent, because Purvis was “a 
gentleman, a man of property, of scarcely perceptive African descent.”187 
These examples demonstrate how access to formalities may be variable, 
discretionary, and manipulable, creating opportunities for those excluded by 
ascriptive definitions to achieve recognition. 
In the early twentieth century, passports again challenged ascriptive 
concepts that equated American citizenship with whiteness and 
“respectability.”188 Before World War I, passports were generally not required 
to enter the United States during peacetime; rather, border officials allowed 
those appearing to be respectable white persons to pass freely while restricting 
the movement of others.189 The threat of German spies during World War I 
called into question the equation of whiteness and citizenship, prompting the 
United States to require passports and visas at the border, to centralize the 
process for granting passports, and to request more documentary support for 
 
 181. I use the masculine pronoun here deliberately, since most women were not issued their 
own passports until World War I; rather, their husbands’ passports would state “accompanied by his 
wife.” ROBERTSON, supra note 177, at 156. 
 182. Id. at 22–26; see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 123 (1958) (“[F]or most of our history 
a passport was not a condition to entry or exit.”). 
 183. See ROBERTSON, supra note 177, at 131–34. 
 184. Id. at 131. 
 185. Id. (citing Kelly S. Drake, The Seaman’s Protection Certificate as Proof of American 
Citizenship for Black Sailors, 50 LOG OF THE MYSTIC SEAPORT 1, 11–12 (Summer 1998)). 
 186. See id. at 132–33. 
 187. See id. at 133. 
 188. Id. at 102. 
 189. Id. at 160. In 1882, Congress passed legislation excluding Chinese laborers, “‘idiots,’” 
“‘lunatics,’” and those likely to become “‘public charges.’” Id. at 161. In 1891, polygamists, those 
guilty of crimes of moral turpitude such as prostitution, and those suffering from certain diseases were 
also excluded. Id. 
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the claims made on passport applications.190 Thus, controversies over ascriptive 
meanings and concerns about fraudulent elective identities led to calls for 
formality. Journalists in the 1920s described the State Department’s 
standardization of the types of documents required for proof of citizenship as 
“the passport nuisance.”191 This formalization of citizenship sparked a backlash 
from those with vested interests in the ascriptive notion of citizenship as white 
respectability.192 These white citizens felt insulted that their citizenship was no 
longer assumed and now had to be documented.193 A similar backlash occurred 
upon the tightening of passport requirements at the U.S.-Canada border after 
September 11, with many white Vermonters taking “umbrage” that their status 
as law-abiding citizens was no longer to be treated as “inherent and easily 
readable.”194 These examples demonstrate how formal requirements, if applied 
uniformly, can level the privilege of those who meet essentialist ascriptive 
standards. 
In more recent years, a few courts have treated citizenship as a matter of 
formality—the designation on documents—regardless of whether the bearer 
met ascriptive or elective standards.195 A few courts have treated certain 
formalities not just as evidence of, or verdicts on, citizenship, but as 
constitutive of the status of citizenship, like title to property.196 In Hizam v. 
Clinton, the plaintiff, Abdo Hizam, was born in Yemen and issued a U.S. 
passport at the age of nine, which was twice renewed, allowing him to live for 
periods of time in the United States.197 Hizam, however, had never been 
eligible for U.S. citizenship, because his U.S.-citizen father had not spent the 
requisite ten years in the United States prior to Hizam’s birth.198 When Hizam 
 
 190. Id. at 193; see Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559, amended by Act of June 21, 
1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252, repealed by Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 
403(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 279. 
 191. ROBERTSON, supra note 177, at 216. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of 
Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 57 (2009). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 628 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2009) (interpreting U.S. 
statutes to render certificates of naturalization and passports “complete” and “conclusive” evidence of 
citizenship, akin to a judicial order that could not be attacked collaterally by third parties); Magnuson 
v. Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 334–35 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the State Department could not revoke a 
passport based on “second thoughts” due to “the high value of citizenship. Given all the rights that 
stem from citizenship, Congress would rationally limit the withdrawal of proof of citizenship to only 
the most serious grounds”), superseded in part by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012). It is important not 
to overstate this point. See, e.g., infra note 198. 
 196. As one treatise explained: “Like a court decree, the certificate of citizenship issued by the 
Attorney General is not subject to collateral impeachment, and unless it is cancelled . . . it must be 
accepted as establishing the title to citizenship of the person to whom it is issued.” 7 CHARLES 
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 99.04[4] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2008). 
 197. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2014). Hizam also received a Consular Report 
of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States. Id. 
 198. Id. at 105. On the application for Hizam’s passport, his father had truthfully stated that he 
had only spent seven years in the United States, but consular officials issued the passport anyway. Id. 
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applied for U.S. passports for his two children in 2009, the State Department 
discovered its error and revoked the passport.199 The district court was 
persuaded that the equities were on Hizam’s side, beginning its opinion by 
emphasizing that Hizam had held his passport since the age of nine, and 
making repeated references to the twenty-two year period in which the State 
Department made no attempt to revoke it.200 The district court held that 
provisions of the 1994 Immigration and Nationality Act that allowed the State 
Department to cancel “erroneous” passports did not apply retroactively, and 
therefore did not affect Hizam’s passport, which was first issued in 1990.201 It 
concluded that applying the law retroactively would unsettle the reliance 
interests of people like Hizam, who had made their homes in the United States, 
maintained family ties to the United States, and begun paying into U.S.-
government benefits systems.202 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that, “despite the equities in Hizam’s favor,” the courts had no 
power to declare him a citizen.203 It noted, however, that the State Department 
had agreed to “support other lawful means to provide relief to Hizam, including 
a private bill in Congress should one be introduced.”204 Although he lost his 
appeal, Hizam still might win his citizenship, as a result of his decades of 
reliance on citizenship formalities. The emphasis on reliance interests calls to 
mind the evidentiary function of formalities in providing security to identity 
claimants. 
Outside of the courts, employers seeking to comply with federal 
immigration laws prohibiting the hiring of unauthorized workers also apply 
formal understandings of citizenship.205 In 1997, the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services made available an internet database called “E-Verify” 
that allows employers to confirm that new employees are authorized to work in 
 
Courts are less sympathetic in cases in which claimants have made material misrepresentations on 
their passport applications. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(rejecting the rule that a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship in a case in which the 
plaintiff misrepresented her birthplace). In Moreno, the Third Circuit held that a passport “constitutes 
conclusive proof of citizenship only if the passport was issued to a U.S. citizen.” Id. at 257, 260 
(construing 22 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012), which “provides that a passport will serve as conclusive proof of 
citizenship only if it was ‘issued by the Secretary of State to a citizen of the United States.’”). The 
dissent argued, among other things, that “the inquiry is whether the State Department has determined 
the passport holder to be a U.S. citizen, not whether she actually is one.” Id. at 264 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
 199. Hizam v. Clinton, No. 11 Civ. 7693, 2012 WL 3116026, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012), 
rev’d & remanded sub nom. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 200. Id. at *1, *5, *7. 
 201. Id. at *7 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2012)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Hizam, 747 F.3d at 105. 
 204. Id. at 111. 
 205. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which prohibits 
employers from hiring “unauthorized aliens.” Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)). 
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the United States.206 E-Verify compares the information that an employee 
enters on her Form I-9207 to data from U.S. passports, visas, immigration and 
naturalization records, Social Security Administration records, and state-issued 
identity documents such as driver’s licenses.208 Although only 7 percent of 
employers have enrolled in E-Verify, Congress has considered several 
proposals to make the system mandatory.209 One of the justifications for the E-
Verify program was to replace ascriptive methods of determining work 
eligibility, in which employers discriminated against certain job applicants 
perceived as foreigners due to race, ethnicity, immigration status, national 
origin, appearance, accent, or other factors.210 Employers who use E-Verify 
must do so for all new hires, not just those who raise suspicions.211 Thus, like 
passport requirements, E-Verify’s formalities displace ascriptive definitions of 
citizenship and level privilege. 
Another example of the view that citizenship is a formality is the common 
phrase “undocumented immigrant,” which suggests the core meaning of 
citizenship is nothing but paper. In political discourse, the term 
“undocumented” has become the progressive alternative to the label 
“illegal.”212 By using “undocumented,” progressives may mean to reveal the 
formal and therefore empty and arbitrary nature of exclusionary visions of 
American citizenship. In her study of the immigration justice movement, 
Professor Rose Cuison Villazor has described how self-proclaimed 
 
 206. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY USER 
MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 4 (June 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_Native_Documents/manual-employer_comp.pdf; see also 
Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and Why They Should), 2 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 381, 392–94 (2012) (describing how E-Verify works). 
 207. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (revised Apr. 8, 
2013), FORM I-9, EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION, available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-9. 
 208. How E-Verify Works, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/what-e-verify/how-e-verify-works (last updated July 11, 2014). 
Many of these records may evidence formal identities in the sense that the term is used in this 
Article—that is, identities individuals enroll in themselves. But others may have been generated 
without an individual’s consent. 
 209. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., VERIFICATION NATION: HOW E-VERIFY AFFECTS 
AMERICA’S WORKERS 1 (2013), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=957 (discussing 
enrollment data as of 2012). Twenty states require at least some employers to use E-Verify, and the 
federal government requires it for certain federal contractors. Id. 
 210. Stumpf, supra note 206, at 394–96. 
 211. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, div C., § 404(d)(4), 110 Stat. 3009-664, 3009-664 to 3009-665. 
 212. See, e.g., Christine Haughney, The Times Shifts on ‘Illegal Immigrant,’ But Doesn’t Ban 
the Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/business/media/the-times 
-shifts-on-illegal-immigrant-but-doesnt-ban-the-use.html; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2047–48 (2008) (observing that the term 
“undocumented” connotes that “[f]irst, it may be unclear whether someone’s presence is unlawful, and 
second, even those whose presence is indisputably unlawful might not be deported”). 
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“American[s] without papers”213 and “undocumented Americans”214 intend to 
focus attention on the role of law in “their political invisibility, powerlessness, 
and vulnerability.”215 These activists have appropriated the metaphor of 
“com[ing] out of the closet” as “undocumented” to “change the way that people 
see undocumented immigrants.”216 In this way, attention to formality can create 
opportunities for individuals who are excluded from citizenship to argue that 
the rules are arbitrary and in need of reform. 
Thus, citizenship formalities serve a variety of functions. Documents such 
as passports serve an evidentiary function, streamlining decision making, 
avoiding fraudulent claims, and facilitating the reliance of citizens who pay 
taxes and take on other burdens of citizenship. Citizenship’s extensive formal 
rituals serve the cautionary functions of ensuring that new citizens are not 
admitted hastily and communicating the significance of the identity. 
Citizenship documents also serve formality’s channeling function, forcing 
individuals to sort themselves into immigration-status categories and allowing 
the state and employers to administer rules such as those determining work 
eligibility. Moreover, citizenship formalities may challenge exclusionary 
definitions in a variety of ways. They might replace rules that reflect ascriptive 
standards. They might be manipulable. And they might expose the arbitrariness 
of essentialist definitions. 
B. Formal Family 
The formal identity model also provides insights into how the law 
regulates kinship. This Section will discuss the functions of formalities in 
constituting marital and parental identities. 
Marriage. The requirements for legal recognition of marriage—generally 
a license, ceremonial solemnization, and registration—are paradigmatic 
“formalities” that render legal identities official.217 In addition, from the late-
1800s until the 1970s, wives were required to adopt their husbands’ 
surnames.218 This is not to say marriage is only formality.219 Many government 
 
 213. Villazor, supra note 176, at 7; see also Abrams, supra note 65 at 20 (“[U]ndocumented 
youth often feel like they belong to American society: ‘we are citizens without the papers,’ activists 
frequently say.”). 
 214. Villazor, supra note 176, at 7, 51–52. 
 215. Id. at 8. 
 216. Id. at 3. 
 217. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201, 9 U.L.A. 101 (1974) (setting forth the 
“Formalities” of marriage). 
 218. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital 
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 770 (2007); see also id. at 772 (describing how, during this time 
frame, a “married wom[a]n’s ability to engage legally in certain activities—such as driving or 
voting—was dependent on her bearing her husband’s name”). 
 219. It is elective in the sense that “the consent of the parties is essential.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & 
DIVORCE ACT § 201. Accordingly, states do not allow marriage between those whose consent might 
not be meaningful due to young age or mental incapacity. See John D. Fletcher, Validity of Marriage, 
2015] IDENTITY AND FORM 783 
agencies refuse to defer to marriage formalities out of concern that the couple 
only married to receive immigration, tax, or social security benefits rather than 
to “establish a life together.”220 These efforts to avoid “marriage fraud” assume 
the meaning of marriage is ascriptive, and they reflect the concern that 
marriage formalities do not prevent fraud because they are too easily 
revocable.221 
Common law marriage, still recognized in eleven states, is another 
exception to the law’s deference to formal marriage.222 Under this doctrine, a 
court may hold that a couple is married if they have carried on as if they were 
married for a certain period of time, even though the relationship was never 
formalized.223 But even in common law marriage cases, courts consider 
whether the couple adopted other legal formalities evidencing the intent to be 
married. Courts consider whether the couple “consistently declared 
themselves” to be single or married “on legal documents and forms,”224 such as 
tax returns,225 deeds to property,226 and medical records.227 
Some scholars view formal marriage as a way of avoiding essentialist and 
confining ideas about what it means to be married.228 Common law marriage, 
by contrast, historically required courts to measure relationships against 
gendered standards about the meanings of “wifely” and “husbandly” behavior, 
and in the process, reinscribed those standards.229 Formal marriage is 
 
36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 441 § 1 (Supp. 2014). Marriage law reflects ascriptive views of the 
meaning of marriage as well. Accordingly, some states restrict marriage based on consanguinity or a 
prior, undissolved marriage by one of the parties. Id. § 1.51. 
 220. Abrams, supra note 108, at 5–6. For example, the Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Amendments require recently married immigrants to come forward with evidence such as 
documentation of joint property ownership or the birth certificates of the couple’s children. Id. at 32 
(discussing 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.2(a)(1)(i)(B), 204.2(a)(1)(iii)(B), 216.4(a)(5) (2012)). 
 221. Id. at 44–46 (discussing how no-fault divorce facilitated “marriage fraud.”). 
 222. Common law marriage may still be valid in eleven states and the District of Columbia. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-109.5 (2015); IOWA CODE § 252A.3(6) (2015) (for purposes of child 
support); KAN. STAT. § 23-2714(b) (for purposes of divorce); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (2015); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (West 2015) (only at death); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 (2015); 
TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2014) (if 
validated by “court or administrative order”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Casey, 295 P.3d 1096, 
1100 (Okla. 2012); Zharkova v. Gaudreau, 45 A.3d 1282, 1290 (R.I. 2012); Creel v. Creel, 763 So. 2d 
943, 946 (Ala. 2000); Coates v. Watts, 622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 1993). Six other states may recognize 
common law marriages that were grandfathered in before a certain date. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 741.211 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(2) (2015); IND. CODE § 31-11-8-5 
(2015); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3105.12(B) (2015); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (2014). 
 223. See Clarke, supra note 36, at 570–74 (discussing elements of common law marriage). 
 224. Smith v. Smith, 966 A.2d 109, 115 (R.I. 2009). 
 225. See, e.g., In re Wagner, 893 P.2d 211, 215 (Idaho 1995). 
 226. See, e.g., DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 178 (R.I. 2004). 
 227. See, e.g., In re Estate of Love, 618 S.E.2d 97, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 228. See, e.g., Case, supra note 90, at 1774. 
 229. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 957, 957–58 (2000); id. at 983–90 (discussing a 1932 case in which the following evidence of 
common law marriage was presented at trial: the wife asked for her husband’s permission before 
accepting employment, she shopped for him, department stores allowed her to use his line of credit, 
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potentially more “flexible, liberatory, and egalitarian.”230 Like the law 
governing corporations, the law governing formal marriage does not require 
that the arrangement be entered into for any particular purposes.231 As 
Professor Case has written, “Just as a valid driver’s license will help get you 
onto a plane even if you have not driven in thirty years, so ‘a simple certificate 
of the state, regardless of whether the spouses love, respect, or even see each 
other on a regular basis, dominates and is supported.’”232 Formal marriage 
gives couples legal space to challenge conceptions of marriage as entailing 
traditional gender roles, monogamy, cohabitation, childrearing, or financial 
interdependence.233 
Formal marriage also allows unmarried couples to stay off the grid, by 
clarifying that if they do not execute marriage formalities, the law will not treat 
them as married. This allows individuals to opt out of legal marriage and the 
benefits and burdens it might entail. Brown v. Buhman is a case in point.234 
That case involved the constitutionality of a Utah statute that criminalized 
polygamy, defined to include any relationship in which a person already 
married “purports to marry another person.”235 The plaintiffs were five “self-
described polygamists that publicly lived in Utah as a plural family.”236 But the 
family patriarch, Kody Brown, had only sought a marriage license for his union 
with one of his wives.237 The court held that Brown had not violated the statute 
because he had not “purport[ed] to marry” any wife other than his first.238 To 
avoid unconstitutionality, the court narrowly construed the statute to prohibit 
only “the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible possession of two purportedly 
valid marriage licenses for the purpose of entering into more than one 
purportedly legal marriage.”239 The court thus adopted a highly formalized 
 
she cared for him and fed him when he was sick, the couple lived together, and servants, friends, and 
hotel employees knew the wife by her husband’s surname). 
 230. Case, supra note 90, at 1774. 
 231. Id. at 1777. 
 232. Id. at 1771 (quoting Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in 
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 721, 724 (2d ed. 1997)). 
 233. See id. at 1772–73. 
 234. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
 235. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2013). The statute also prohibited a person already 
married from cohabiting with another person. Id. At oral argument, the Utah County Attorney 
admitted that the prohibition on cohabitation would apply to religiously motivated plural marriage, but 
not garden-variety adulterous cohabitation. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. The court did not see 
any rational basis for the distinction, and struck down the statute’s cohabitation ban on free exercise 
grounds. Id. at 1176. 
 236. Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Utah 2012) (upholding plaintiffs’ 
standing to challenge Utah statute). The plaintiffs were well known for their reality television series on 
a national cable network, Sister Wives. Id. 
 237. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
 238. Id. at 1234 (quoting § 76-7-101). 
 239. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the Constitution requires that 
states formally recognize polygamy. Id. at 1215. 
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view of marriage that allowed the plaintiffs to continue their informal plural 
marriage without prosecution.240 
In holding marriage is formal, the court also challenged culturally 
essentialist views. The opinion placed the state’s prosecution of Mormon 
polygamy in the historical context of “Orientalism,” a colonialist worldview 
that saw Middle Eastern, African, and Asian cultures as savage and in need of 
correction and governance from superior Western nations.241 The court 
criticized the Orientalist logic of the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision, Reynolds 
v. United States, which upheld the criminalization of polygamy by describing 
the practice as one that had “always been odious among the northern and 
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, 
was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African 
people.”242 Thus, the Brown opinion employed formal marriage to challenge 
certain ascriptive versions of marriage based on colonialist views of racial 
superiority. 
Formality also provides convenient evidence of marriage. Formality cuts 
against the fraud concerns that plague elective marriage regimes, which must 
examine myriad forms of evidence for indicia of intent to be married. 
Formality serves the evidentiary purpose of demonstrating that one party did 
not “trick” the other into a common law marriage.243 The law provides the 
default terms for marriage, or parties may contract around those defaults, to a 
certain extent, with formalities such as prenuptial agreements.244 Those 
agreements play evidentiary roles in the event of conflict and may promote 
marital stability by settling the question of the parties’ financial arrangement.245 
Additionally, formal marriage fulfills Fuller’s cautionary function by 
ensuring that the parties truly intend to be married.246 This cautionary function 
 
 240. Cf. Davis, supra note 94, at 1960 (discussing the irony in how other courts have conferred 
legal recognition on informal marriages to prosecute them). 
 241. As an “interpretive framework,” the court drew on the work of postcolonial literary 
theorist Edward Said. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 n.12 (discussing EDWARD W. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979) (1978)). 
 242. Id. at 1186 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
 243. See Dubler, supra note 229, at 999–1002 (discussing legislative efforts to abolish common 
law marriage out of concern that the doctrine allowed scheming women, adventuresses, and gold 
diggers to “prey[] mercilessly on the weakness and vulnerability of unsuspecting men” who had not 
intended to marry). 
 244. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1917 (2012) (“Either by legislation or 
by court decision, all the states in the union and the District of Columbia have replaced a mandatory 
rule (statutory division of assets upon dissolution of civil marriage) with a default rule that the spouses 
can override by contract, including antenuptial agreements.”). 
 245. Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 505 (2005) 
(“[M]odern courts contend that prenuptial and postnuptial agreements about property distribution may 
actually encourage marriage (if the parties are not already married) and facilitate the stableness of a 
marital relationship in an era in which no-fault divorce is available and divorce rates are high.”). 
 246. To ensure caution, some states impose waiting periods. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
2.204 (West 2013) (imposing a seventy-two-hour waiting period that can be waived in several ways, 
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is well known in U.S. popular culture, giving rise to clichés such as “cold feet” 
and “left at the altar.”247 If courts recognized informal marriages, certain 
individuals might find themselves with duties to spouses that they never 
expressly intended to undertake.248 Requiring formality ensures that the law 
will not recognize a marriage unless the parties had a full and fair opportunity 
to agree to it. Formal requirements thus protect unwitting “spouses” from 
liability for alimony or property division. 
Formal marriage also channels private behavior into forms that are useful 
for public ordering. The movement to abolish common law marriage has 
coincided with the growth of the administrative state and its distribution of 
benefits based on marriage.249 Formal marriage makes these programs easier to 
administer by creating a clear test of who is married.250 It also channels 
individuals into a single form of marriage. An elective marriage regime, by 
contrast, would recognize all sorts of forms of domestic ordering, so long as the 
parties agreed to them, allowing complete freedom of customization rather than 
enforcing the numerus clausus. With consent, dignity, and autonomy as the 
only guiding principles, such a regime could not preclude consensual 
polygamous marriages, marriages of defined and limited durations, or self-
marriage251—arrangements that might throw a wrench in social programs 
premised on stable two-adult marriages. In Brown v. Buhman, the court 
reasoned polygamists should not be punished for their relationships as long as 
only one woman in each polygamous family could claim the formal “legal 
status” of wife.252 Because only one wife could claim the legal benefits of 
marriage, the government interest in avoiding “misuse of government benefits 
associated with marital status” dropped out of the picture.253 Thus, formal 
marriage secures evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions that make it 
more attractive for regulators than an unadministrable elective regime. 
 
including through premarital counseling); WIS. STAT. § 765.08 (2014) (five-day waiting period 
between application and license). 
 247. See, e.g., RUNAWAY BRIDE (Paramount Pictures 1999) (movie about bride who leaves a 
series of men at the altar). 
 248. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 855–57 (2005). The American Law Institute has 
recommended that property and support rules that apply to divorcing spouses also be applied to 
cohabitants, unless those cohabitants have expressly opted out. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002). To the best of my 
knowledge, no state has adopted this precise recommendation, although some provide rights to 
cohabitants in limited circumstances. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 59 (2010). 
 249. BOWMAN, supra note 248, at 25. 
 250. At the same time, it may allow opportunistic couples to marry for the sole purpose of 
receiving benefits. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 248, 252 (2011) (discussing “renewable marriage” and “self-marriage”). 
 252. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Utah 2013) (quoting State v. Holm, 
137 P.3d 726, 773–74 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., dissenting in part)). 
 253. Id. at 1219 (quoting State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004)). 
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Parenthood. Formalities often constitute parent-child identities,254 with 
adoption being the paradigmatic example.255 But there are other examples as 
well. Parental relationships have long been registered on birth certificates256 
and documented on other forms.257 The remainder of this Section will focus on 
three examples of the functions of documents in constituting parent-child 
identities: Chinese-American “paper families,” Missing Angel Acts, and 
methods for establishing paternity. 
A historical example of formal identity at the intersection of citizenship 
and family comes from the era of the Chinese Exclusion Acts.258 Between 1882 
and 1943, U.S. law imposed severe restrictions on immigration from China.259 
However, many Chinese immigrants had arrived in the United States before the 
exclusion laws took effect.260 Under U.S. law, their children, whether living in 
the United States or China, were eligible for U.S. citizenship.261 Estelle Lau has 
described how the practice of “paper sons and fictive kin” grew out of this 
 
 254. Professors Pamela Laufer-Ukeles and Ayelet Blecher-Prigat have written on “formal 
parenthood” although they would put under this label anyone with “pre-determined parental status,” 
whether “biological, presumptive, or adoptive.” Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 
421. These scholars use the term “formal” as opposed to “informal,” in the sense of compliance with 
abstract legal rules, rather than in my sense of an identity constituted by concrete formalities. See 
supra Part I.C. 
 255. Courts are resistant to enforcing private coparenting agreements, which are viewed as 
interfering with the principle of protecting the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Domestic 
Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1755–70 (2007). 
 256. Heather L. Brumberg et al., History of the Birth Certificate: From Inception to the Future 
of Electronic Data, 32 J. PERINATOLOGY 407, 407 (2012). The law does not always treat birth 
certificates as constitutive of parental status. In Adar v. Smith, an unmarried same-sex couple living in 
New York adopted a child, born in Louisiana, under New York law and received an adoption decree 
from a New York court. 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The adoptive parents then 
petitioned the Louisiana state Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics for a reissued birth certificate. 
Id. But under Louisiana law, only married couples may jointly adopt. Id. at 149–50 (citing LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 1221). The Fifth Circuit held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution did not require the Registrar to issue a revised birth certificate, in part because a birth 
certificate is merely an “enforcement measure,” as distinct from the underlying legal status and its 
associated rights. Id. at 157–61. The dissent saw the linkage between the birth certificate and the 
identity status as more inextricable, and accused the majority of “mislabel[ing] recognition of an out-
of state judgment . . . as enforcement of such a judgment.” Id. at 166 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 257. See, e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 349–50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing and 
remanding trial court’s finding that the former girlfriend of a child’s biological mother had no parental 
rights where the girlfriend had held the child out as her own by, inter alia, “sign[ing] up the minor for 
kindergarten and list[ing] herself as the minor’s stepparent or legal guardian on the registration form”). 
 258. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (suspending the “coming of 
of Chinese laborers to [the United States]” for ten years) (repealed 1943); Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 
25 (1892) (continuing the prohibition on immigration by “Chinese persons and persons of Chinese 
descent” for ten years) (repealed 1943); Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (making it “unlawful 
for any chinese laborer” who once resided in the United States but had since departed to return) 
(repealed 1943). 
 259. LAU, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
 260. Id. at 36. 
 261. Id. 
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“loophole.”262 The practice worked as follows: U.S. citizens of Chinese descent 
would return to China, where they would report the birth of a fictitious child, 
usually a son.263 This created a “slot” that would be sold some decades later to 
a person—unrelated to the U.S. citizen—who wanted to immigrate to the 
United States.264 The “paper son” would receive a birth certificate265 and would 
have to learn enough details about his paper family to pass a rigorous 
immigration inspection by skeptical authorities.266 U.S. immigration authorities 
were unable to apply ascriptive modes of family determination, due to 
ignorance about various Chinese cultural practices and inability to discern 
family “resemblances” among Chinese.267 And so they deferred to formalities 
and procedural rules.268 
Through this process, new families were created. By the 1920s, it was not 
uncommon for Chinese families to have generations of paper relatives.269 Over 
the course of the twentieth century, some of these “paper families” became just 
as real as any others, as individuals were required to live their lives in 
conformity with the stories they told to immigration officials to retain 
immigration status.270 In this way, these counterfeit formalities were 
constitutive of the very types of family relationships they were thought to 
falsify. 
Lau considers the paper families to be “weapons of the weak.”271 The 
mode of domination—the immigration bureaucracy used to enforce a racial 
exclusion—was turned into an opportunity for resistance and subversion of 
exclusionary immigration laws on a micro, everyday level.272 The history of 
paper families demonstrates how formal family definitions may appeal to 
regulators for their evidentiary functions at the same time that they prove 
manipulable by outsider groups. It also shows how legal formalities can create 
the families they purport to evidence. 
Missing Angel Acts provide a more contemporary example of how legal 
formality constitutes parenthood. These laws allow parents of stillborn babies 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. at 39. 
 266. Id. at 51. 
 267. Id. at 46, 100. 
 268. Id. at 78. 
 269. Id. at 37. 
 270. Id. at 132–33. When the government enacted a “Confession Program” in the 1950s that 
gave legalized status to those who agreed to disclose their fictive family relations, some “paper 
families” were further bonded, since a confession by any one member of the “family” could have 
repercussions for the whole network. Id. at 117–18. 
 271. Id. at 114–15 (discussing SCOTT, supra note 18). 
 272. Id. at 115. The downside, from the perspective of resistance, is that although “Chinese 
immigrants’ behavior was created by and responsive to the process of regulation,” regulators assumed 
the behaviors resulted from the inherent dishonesty and craftiness of the Chinese “as a race,” a 
stereotype that has had an enduring legacy for U.S. immigration law. Id. at 154–55. 
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to apply for birth certificates to document the life of the stillborn child.273 
Professor Carol Sanger has asked, “Why has the movement toward greater 
recognition of stillborns focused specifically on the documentation of birth?”274 
Part of her answer is that birth certificates attest to the identity of the parents as 
parents.275 “The certificate is proof that a real child—real enough to have its 
birth re-corded—was born to a woman now registered as its mother.”276 Parents 
of stillborns seek public recognition of that status, which they experience as 
made real by the physical birth certificate.277 
Fatherhood is also defined formally under many state laws. Under the 
Model State Vital Statistics Act, if a mother is married, a birth certificate will 
list her husband as her baby’s father by default.278 To the extent that marriage 
is defined formally as a licensed and solemnized relationship, fatherhood too is 
formal. A man becomes a father because of formal marriage, rather than 
because he is a genetic, functional, or intended parent. In cases in which the 
mother is unmarried, formalities may still be determinative. Federal law 
requires that all states allow paternity to be established by having the mother 
and putative father sign a “voluntary acknowledgement of paternity” (or VAP) 
at the hospital.279 This serves a cautionary function because prior to signing, the 
 
 273. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 281 n.57 (2012). The certificates are formalities in the sense I am discussing 
here because parents must decide to apply for them; they are not automatically conferred by the state. 
Id. at 306 n.193. 
 274. Id. at 272. 
 275. Id. at 273. Sanger also argues that the birth certificate serves “as an artifact of mourning” 
and “documentary proof of the baby’s existence.” Id. 
 276. Id. at 288. 
 277. Id. at 286. Quoting one mother: “‘To everyone else, it’s just a piece of paper, but to us it’s 
gold.’” Id. at 281. Another described the document as “‘dignity and validation.’” Id. at 287 (citation 
omitted). 
 278. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT 
AND REGULATIONS § 21(e) (1992), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/mvsact92b.pdf 
[hereinafter MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT]. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 119 (1989) (upholding California statute creating a presumption that a man married to a child’s 
mother is the child’s father against due process challenge by the biological father). 
 279. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (2012). Another example of a formality that may establish 
paternity is a writing signed by a sperm donor, required by some states for a sperm donor to assert 
parental rights. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2014) (“The donor of semen . . . for use in 
assisted reproduction of a woman other than the donor’s spouse is treated in law as if he were not the 
natural parent of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor 
and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”). But see, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B 
U.L.A. 355 (2002) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). 
Courts have also allowed motherhood to be defined in this manner. See Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 
P.3d 542, 553–58 (Kan. 2013) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1113, which allows maternity to 
be determined by a writing acknowledging parentage, to require enforcement of a coparenting 
agreement between two lesbian mothers of children born through assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART)). 
In 2015, California amended its Family Code to create three form documents that allow sperm 
donors, egg donors, and spouses or registered partners using ART to express their intention to be 
parents. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (West 2015). The form documents suffice as the “writing” 
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parents must be afforded certain due process safeguards, including oral and 
written notice of the legal rights and responsibilities that attach to paternity.280 
The VAP also serves an evidentiary function, creating a rebuttable or 
conclusive presumption of paternity, depending on the state.281 But in any 
event, it will be recognized as a basis for seeking child support without the 
need for further proceedings to establish paternity.282 As the California 
legislature explained, the purpose of the VAP is to create a “simple system” 
that will result in a “significant decrease in the time and money required to 
establish paternity due to the removal of the need for a lengthy and expensive 
court process.”283 The formality channels men into the categories of parents or 
legal strangers to the child—all-or-nothing arrangements—and furthers the 
“compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all children.”284 This 
system facilitates other government programs like child support enforcement 
and distribution of benefits.285 
The VAP may capture the benefits of elective paternity by formalizing a 
couple’s intent that a particular man become a parent, while ensuring stability 
in parental arrangements by estopping both parents from later contesting the 
acknowledgment.286 In Illinois, for example, a man who signs a VAP may only 
challenge paternity on grounds of “fraud, duress, or material mistake of 
fact.”287 The formality may also circumvent disputes over ascriptive (i.e., 
biological versus functional) definitions of parenthood. One Illinois court has 
held that a man who signed a VAP relinquishing his right to a genetic test 
could not later challenge paternity on the ground that he was not the child’s 
biological father.288 The court treated the acknowledgement like a contract, and 
concluded that it allocated the “risk of such a mistake” to the father.289 And 
 
required by Section 7613 for certain sperm donors and spouses to qualify as parents, although they do 
not preclude courts from considering other claims to parentage under California law. Id. § 7613.5(a). 
 280. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(iii). 
 281. 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(iv) (2014). 
 282. Id. § 302.70(a)(5)(vii). 
 283. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(b) (West 2014). 
 284. Id. § 7570(a). 
 285. Id. § 7570(b). 
 286. But see infra notes 288–89 (discussing cases in which courts did not enforce VAPs). 
 287. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) (2014). 
 288. In re N.C., 993 N.E.2d 134, 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Robinson 
v. Glenn, No. W2006-00557-COA-R3-JV, 2007 WL 1227377, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2007) 
(“[W]hen a man executes a VAP, he acknowledges that he accepts responsibility of being a parent to 
the child, and most importantly, he specifically waives his right to genetic testing.”). But see, e.g., 
Ipock v. Ipock, 403 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (allowing VAP to be rebutted with genetic 
testing, and holding that “DNA evidence must overshadow considerations related to public policy”). 
 289. In re N.C., 993 N.E.2d at 142. By contrast, under a Texas statute, a man who is not a 
child’s genetic father may petition for termination of the parent-child relationship if he “signed the 
acknowledgment of paternity . . . because of the mistaken belief, at the time the acknowledgment was 
signed . . . that he was the child’s genetic father based on misrepresentations that led him to that 
conclusion.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005(c)(2) (West 2013). 
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whether or not a man meets any ascriptive definition of a father, if he signed 
the VAP, he can be required to pay child support.290 
In addition to the VAP, twenty-five states maintain some form of 
“putative father registry.”291 Laws creating these registries were enacted in 
response to high profile court cases in which biological fathers challenged 
adoptions.292 The registries facilitate notice to putative fathers of court 
proceedings regarding adoption and termination of parental rights, serving a 
sort of cautionary function.293 Registration does not automatically confer 
parental status, but in twelve states, an unwed father who fails to register is not 
entitled to notice of adoption or other proceedings regarding the child.294 In 
Lehr v. Robertson, the Supreme Court upheld New York’s registration 
requirement against due process and equal protection challenges by a biological 
father contesting an adoption.295 The Court emphasized the father’s failure to 
protect his rights by “mailing a postcard to the putative father registry.”296 
Thus, registries give unmarried men who intend to be fathers and who qualify 
as fathers under ascriptive state-law definitions a formal channel for protecting 
their rights. At the same time, the registries extinguish the claims of those who 
fail to make use of that channel. 
In sum, formal family law doctrines can give individuals legal space to 
challenge ascriptive views of kinship and domestic ordering, which may reflect 
gender stereotypes, cultural biases, or one-size-fits-all visions of intimacy. 
Formalities play convenient evidentiary roles in establishing family: avoiding 
intractable debates between biological and social definitions, and difficult 
determinations of whether individuals intended to be family or acted like 
family. Like the naturalization oath, family law formalities such as the 
marriage ceremony and adoption proceedings are meant to induce caution and 
careful consideration. These formalities channel family arrangements into 
recognizable units for ease of administration by government programs, such as 
those that distribute benefits to spouses or require child support payments. 
They also carve out a space for intimate relationships that will not be subjected 
to marriage-like rights and duties, allowing people to avoid entangling the law 
in their intimate arrangements by refusing to formalize them. 
 
 290. 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(vii) (2014). 
 291. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE RIGHTS 
OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 2 (Jan. 2014), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf. 
 292. See, e.g., Marc Zappala, On the Benefits of a National Putative Father Registry, 28 A.B.A. 
CHILD L. PRAC. 91, 91 (2009). 
 293. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 291, at 2. Like the VAP, the registries also 
enable collection of child support. Id. 
 294. Id. Other potential parents may challenge a putative father’s claim based on ascriptive 
definitions of parenthood under state law. See id. at 5–95 (providing survey of state definitions of 
fatherhood). 
 295. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248–49 (1983). 
 296. Id. at 264; see also id. at 262 n.18. 
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C. Formal Sex 
In 2001, my mom, who had moved to San Francisco, called me and 
told me that my green card petition came through, that I could now 
move to the United States. I resisted it. . . . But then two weeks later 
she called me, she said, “Did you know that if you move to the United 
States you could change your name and gender marker?” That was all 
I needed to hear. My mom also told me to put two E’s in the spelling 
of my name. She also came with me when I had my surgery in 
Thailand at 19 years old . . . . At that time in the United States, you 
needed to have surgery before you could change your name and gender 
marker. So in 2001, I moved to San Francisco, and I remember looking 
at my California driver’s license with the name Geena and gender 
marker F. That was a powerful moment. For some people, their I.D. is 
their license to drive or even to get a drink, but for me, that was my 
license to live, to feel dignified. 
Geena Rocero297 
Formalities also receive deference in legal determinations of sex.298 The 
most notable example is legal deference to the birth certificate designation in 
cases involving transgender299 and intersex individuals.300 The initial sex 
designation on a birth certificate is not a formality of the type analyzed in this 
Article because it is ascribed to an individual at birth by someone other than the 
individual making an identity claim. But the idea that an individual might elect 
to change this designation, and thereby change her legal sex, invites 
comparison with other identity formalities. 
A discussion of formal sex requires some background on how sexes are 
initially assigned. Birth certificates have long required ascriptive descriptions 
of the sex of the infant, offering only two choices: boy or girl.301 A federal 
agency, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS),302 requires that states 
 
 297. Geena Rocero, Why I Must Come Out, TED (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/geena_rocero_why_i_must_come_out/transcript?language=en. 
 298. Courts sometimes refer to the concept of “legal” sex, as opposed to biological, social, or 
self-identified sex. See, e.g., Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(accepting as true the allegation that a plaintiff “had her sex legally changed [from male] to female” 
under District law and referring to her as “legally a female”); In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 
750 (B.I.A. 2005) (referring to “a legal change of sex”); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 157 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (referring to the question of whether a party was “legally male or female”). 
 299. See supra note 81 (defining “transgender”). 
 300. See supra note 50 (defining “intersex”), see also Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement 
on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e488–89 (2006), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/118/2/e488 (defining “intersex” to refer to disorders of 
sex development (DSDs): “congenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, gonadal, or 
anatomic sex is atypical”). 
 301. W.A. Plecker, A Standard Certificate of Birth, 5 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1044, 1044–45 
(1915) (recommending, in the interests of “[s]implicity” that birth certificates give the options of “Boy 
or Girl” rather than asking for “sex”). 
 302. Before the twentieth century, birth certificates were a matter of state and local practice. 
Brumberg, supra note 256, at 408. The NCHS, part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
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gather data upon all births including the baby’s sex.303 States later use this 
information to generate birth certificates.304 NCHS has issued a Model State 
Vital Statistics Act to provide guidance to states with the goal of creating 
uniformity in birth certificate practices.305 The Model Act provides that a 
hospital official is to obtain and record the required personal data.306 The 
options are “male,” “female,” or “not yet determined.”307 “Not yet determined” 
may apply to intersex infants. If a “not yet determined” is sent to NCHS, 
NCHS will follow up until it has obtained a “male” or “female” answer.308 
Some medical experts recommend that all intersex infants receive a sex 
assignment, after expedited but thorough expert evaluation, since “[i]nitial 
gender uncertainty is unsettling and stressful for families.”309 The NCHS does 
not specify whether the parents, doctors, or hospital officials are to decide on 
that initial category. Some advocates argue parents should make the ultimate 
decision, with the benefit of informed medical opinions.310 Others argue the 
 
now develops a standard form “birth certificate,” which individual states may supplement. Id. NCHS 
dictates its “standard form” birth certificate as a series of required electronic data fields. NAT’L CTR. 
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BIRTH EDIT SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE 2003 PROPOSED REVISION OF THE 
U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH, item 3, at 1 (July 2012), available at 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth_edit_specifications.pdf [hereinafter BIRTH EDIT SPECIFICATIONS]. 
 303. BIRTH EDIT SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 302, item 3, at 1. NCHS proscribes worksheets 
for mothers and hospitals to fill out immediately after the baby’s birth. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, FACILITY WORKSHEET FOR THE LIVE BIRTH CERTIFICATE (Feb. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/facwksBF04.pdf; NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
MOTHER’S WORKSHEET FOR CHILD’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE (Jan. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/momswkstf_improv.pdf. 
 304. NCHS uses the term “birth certificate” to refer to the data it collects, not the paper 
certificate with a state seal commonly thought of as the “birth certificate.” See NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE PANEL TO EVALUATE THE U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATES 2 
(Apr. 2000 Addenda Nov. 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/panelreport_acc.pdf 
[hereinafter NCHS PANEL REPORT] (emphasizing the “understanding that a ‘certificate’ is no longer 
represented by the piece of paper on which the data are collected, but by a standard vital statistics data 
base with a strong emphasis on electronic, automated data collection”). The “birth certificate” that an 
individual receives to prove facts about his or her birth is created later by state departments of vital 
statistics, drawing on the data collected at the time of the individual’s birth, including the sex 
determination. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, WHERE TO WRITE FOR VITAL RECORDS 
(Feb. 2015), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/w2w/w2w.pdf. 
 305. MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, supra note 278, Preface (providing that the goal is 
to “build a uniform system that produces records to satisfy the legal requirements of individuals and 
their families and also to meet statistical and research needs”). 
 306. Id. § 7(b) (providing specifications that apply to births in “an institution or en route 
thereto”); see also NCHS PANEL REPORT, supra note 304, at 6. 
 307. BIRTH EDIT SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 302, item 3, at 1. 
 308. Id. item 3, at 2. 
 309. Lee, supra note 300, at e491. 
 310. CONSORTIUM ON THE MGMT. OF DISORDERS OF SEX DEV., CLINICAL GUIDELINES FOR 
THE MANAGEMENT OF DISORDERS OF SEX DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD 25 (2006), available at 
http://www.accordalliance.org/dsdguidelines/clinical.pdf (“The role of health care professionals in 
initial gender assignment is to obtain and help interpret test results concerning the etiology and 
prognosis of the child’s DSD and concerning the status of the child’s anatomy and physiology (e.g., 
hormone production, hormone receptors, gross anatomy), so as to inform the parents’ decision about 
gender assignment.”). 
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designation should be left blank or filled in with a third category.311 The 
process for determining this initial designation is entirely ascriptive, as it 
involves the assignment of a sexual identity to an infant based on medical 
views of sex. 
While the initial sex designation is ascriptive, individuals may later elect 
to change that designation through a formal process.312 For the most part, state 
rules for changing birth certificate sex designations require surgeries.313 It may 
be possible to make corrections to the sex designation with a document from 
the hospital admitting a mistake.314 Absent such a letter, changes are more 
difficult.315 For example, the Model Act allows for amendment to the birth 
certificate’s sex designation “[u]pon receipt of a certified copy of an order of (a 
court of competent jurisdiction) indicating the sex of an individual . . . has been 
changed by surgical procedure.”316 Most states have adopted similar 
 
 311. In 2013, Germany enacted a law allowing parents to leave sex assignments blank. 
Germany Allows ‘Indeterminate’ Gender at Birth, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24767225. Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and India allow individuals to designate sex as “X,” “other,” or another third category 
for purposes of passports, voter lists, census forms, or national identity cards. Id.; see also Nelson 
Jones, Germany Now Lets Parents Check “No Gender” on a Baby’s Birth Certificate, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115450/germany-offers-third-gender-option 
-birth-certificate; Naftali Bendavid, Countries Expand Recognition for Alternative ‘Intersex’ Gender, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2013, 3:39 PM) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323893004579058822738037190. 
 312. Mottet, supra note 51, at 382 (stating that forty-six states explicitly allow changes to sex 
designations on birth certificates). However, some state courts have adopted an understanding of sex 
as that recorded on the birth certificate at the time of birth, and have refused to consider amended birth 
certificates on grounds that amendments are contrary to their state’s public policy or the legislature’s 
intent. In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
31, 2003) (“In this case, the amended birth certificate submitted by Nash as evidence of his sex was 
rebutted by the evidence already in possession of the trial court, to wit, Nash’s original birth certificate 
designating Nash’s sex as female.”); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(referring to the original birth certificate as “official”). 
 313. Mottet, supra note 51, at 400–02 (cataloguing state laws). 
 314. See OFFICE OF VITAL RECORDS, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
CORRECTING A BIRTH CERTIFICATE (Jan. 2015), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/vr/bcorrect.pdf (requiring a “[l]etter from hospital 
admitting error” to correct a child’s sex on a birth certificate); cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
103225 (West 2014) (allowing an amendment “[w]henever the facts are not correctly stated in any 
certificate of birth” if supported by an affidavit from the person seeking the change and “the affidavit 
of one other credible person having knowledge of the facts”). 
 315. The director of a legal advocacy group for children with intersex conditions has noted that 
it is growing more difficult to use state rules allowing corrections of “clerical error[s]” to change sex 
designations due to rules designed to limit changes to sex designations by transgender individuals. 
JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY & THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 115 (2013) (quoting Anne 
Tamar-Mattis, director of Advocates for Informed Choice, as stating, “In the past” clerks would accept 
“a doctor’s letter stating that a mistake was made . . . at face value,” but “[n]ow that many states have 
adopted written procedures for addressing transsexuals’ birth certificate amendment requests, 
bureaucrats automatically turn to those rules no matter how inappropriate or inapplicable they may 
be”). 
 316. MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, supra note 278, § 21(d). 
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requirements, although there is variation on what specific surgical procedures 
are required.317 
However, surgical requirements have received resounding criticism.318 A 
growing number of states have adopted rules that do not require surgery.319 
California, for example, allows a change if the applicant produces a 
“physician’s affidavit” indicating he or she sought “clinically appropriate 
treatment for the purpose of gender transition.”320 Although the sex designation 
on a birth certificate is generally the basis for the sex designation on other 
government identification records, such as passports, social security records, 
and driver’s licenses,321 sometimes these other documents may be changed 
without a corresponding change to the birth certificate.322 The rules for 
changing these documents are often more lenient. For example, several states 
allow changes to driver’s licenses with “(1) signed documentation from the 
license holder that they are seeking to have the gender on their license 
corrected to reflect their gender identity, and (2) the signature of a health or 
social service professional who attests, in their professional opinion, that the 
person’s gender is as stated.”323  
A theory of formal identity might support enforcement of sex designation 
changes.324 Some legal scholars have focused on birth certificate reforms as a 
 
 317. Mottet, supra note 51, at 400–02 (describing state requirements); id. at 401 (“[A]s a 
practical matter, sometimes any surgery will qualify an individual for correction, but other times an 
agency will have strict (generally unwritten) rules that a particular surgery must be shown.”). 
 318. See, e.g., Press Release, AMA Calls for Modernizing Birth Certificate Policies, AM. MED. 
ASS’N. (June 9, 2014), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-06-09-modernizing 
-birth-certificate-policies.page; Identity Documents and Privacy, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY, http://transequality.org/Issues/federal_documents.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 319. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430 (West 2014); D.C. CODE § 7-217(d) (2015); 
IOWA CODE § 144.23(3) (2014); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 35.2 (2015); OR. ADMIN. R. 
333-011-0275(1)(e) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5112(b) (2014); see also Mottet, supra note 51, 
at 403 (discussing Washington State’s administrative policy). 
 320. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430. The Social Security Administration has recently 
adopted a similar rule. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM SECTION: RM 
10212.200 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110212200 (providing 
sample letter). 
 321. Mottet, supra note 51, at 392; GREENBERG, supra note 315, at 69. 
 322. Mottet, supra note 51, at 411–12; GREENBERG, supra note 315, at 69. 
 323. Mottet, supra note 51, at 412. 
 324. However, in older cases in which courts were required to determine sex for purposes of 
state laws that only allowed cross-sex marriage, some courts divided along ascriptive versus elective 
lines, without emphasis on birth certificate designations. Compare In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 
120, 135 (Kan. 2002) (refusing to defer to a birth certificate’s amended designation because “[t]he 
plain, ordinary meaning of ‘persons of the opposite sex’ contemplates a biological man and a 
biological woman and not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.”), and Kantaras v. 
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (relying on the “understanding of the 
common meaning of male and female, as those terms are used statutorily, to refer to immutable traits 
determined at birth”), with M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (“The 
evidence and authority which we have examined, however, show that a person’s sex or sexuality 
embraces an individual’s gender, that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense 
of sexual identity and character.”). 
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way out of the ascriptive versus elective sexual identity debate. For example, 
one scholar calls birth certificate reform the “path forward” out of the debate 
between courts, which rely on “physical attributes or presumed genetic traits of 
the body,” and transgender rights advocates, who point to “a person’s innate 
sense of themselves as male or female.”325 The requirements for changes to 
birth certificates—whether they include surgery, hormonal therapy, or simply a 
physician’s letter—might be considered ascriptive standards based on medical 
understandings of sex.326 But they might also be formalities, in that they are 
thought to provide simple evidence of sex, ensure a claimant has exercised due 
caution before making a legal transition, and channel a claimant into either a 
stable male or female identity.327 
Controversies over who may use sex-segregated restrooms demonstrate 
how formal sex designations serve an evidentiary function. Many employers 
will not allow transgender employees to switch restrooms without changes to 
the sex designation on the employees’ driver’s licenses or other identification 
documents.328 Far from being a trivial issue, disputes over transgender and 
intersex individuals’ use of restrooms have resulted in loss of employment, 
police harassment, and violence.329 Consider one Minnesota city’s response to 
controversy over who may use sex-segregated restrooms and changing 
 
 325. Mottet, supra note 51, at 379; cf. GREENBERG, supra note 315, at 71 (arguing against 
“rules that limit people’s right to have their official sex markers reflect their self-identified sex”). But 
see Spade, supra note 9, at 750 (arguing that “reliance on gender as a point of data and classification in 
these systems has less value than is assumed and should be reduced”). 
 326. One court refused to defer to a birth certificate designation because it was a “ministerial 
act[]” that did not “involve fact-finding.” In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005) (holding “the mere issuance of a new birth certificate cannot, legally speaking, make 
petitioner a male”). The court noted that the plaintiff’s physician had “admitted that the only reason he 
signed the physician’s affidavit in connection with the issuance of the new birth certificate was to ‘help 
out’ petitioner and make it easier for him to legally change his sex from female to male,” and it was 
“clear that the reassignment ha[d] never been completed.” Id. at 308–10. 
Another court expressed skepticism of the formality of a first name change from “Steven” to 
“Rebecca,” noting “[p]laintiff was not required to present any proof of biological sex or sex 
reassignment to legally change her name.” Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-02-
1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 2460636, at *1 n.3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (employment discrimination 
dispute regarding whether plaintiff could use the women’s restroom facilities). In that case, the 
plaintiff’s birth certificate designation was not changed until after the alleged discrimination occurred. 
Id. at *1. 
 327. See Mottet, supra note 51, at 416–17. 
 328. Id. at 394. 
 329. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
an employer did not discriminate on the basis of sex when it terminated an employee with male 
genitalia for using female restroom facilities); GRANT BOWERS & WENDY LOPEZ, WHICH WAY TO 
THE RESTROOM? RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 5 
(Apr. 2012), available at 
http://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/Respecting%20the%20Rights%20of%20Transgender%
20Youth%20and%20appendices.pdf (“[T]rans students may be subject to ridicule, abuse, or assault, 
physical or sexual, in public lavatories.”); Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 17 n.5 (2003) (discussing the author’s experience “spen[ding] 23 hours 
in jail on a false trespassing charge” after “using a men’s room in Grand Central Station”). 
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facilities.330 By way of background, Minnesota state law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of a person’s “self-image or identity not 
traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.”331 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held, however, that by this provision the 
legislature did not intend to restrain employer discretion with respect to 
defining “men” and “women” for purposes of sex-segregated restrooms and 
changing facilities.332 In that case, the court rejected a plaintiff’s argument that 
her employer had discriminated by “designating restroom use according to 
biological gender” rather than “self-image of gender.”333 But the law does not 
require a “biological gender” rule; it also allows employers to opt for a self-
identification rule if they so choose.334 Faced with the choice between an 
ascriptive or elective rule, in April 2012, the City of Crosby, Minnesota, passed 
a “gender discrimination policy” that provides: 
It is the policy of the City of Crosby that City facilities of any kind or 
nature that are labeled “Men” or “Women” or other words to indicate 
gender, are for use by those persons of the biological gender so 
indicated. If in doubt, the City may require proof of biological gender 
by means of production of a birth certificate issued by the State of the 
person’s birth.335 
The rule defers questions of sex determination to a formality. The assumption 
behind the policy is that birth certificate authorities verify sex based on a 
biological test. During debates over this measure, the city’s attorney 
acknowledged that “[i]f a person has gender reassignment surgery, they can 
petition to have their birth certificate changed.”336 The formality simplifies sex 
determinations for city officials, avoiding the specter of on-site anatomical 
examinations and deferring controversies to birth certificate authorities. 
In addition to this function, deference to formalities may serve the aim of 
forcing a measure of circumspection about claims to gender identity. Part of 
 
 330. Linda Peeples, Crosby Council Votes ‘No’ to Social Host Ordinance, CROSBY-IRONTON 
COURIER, Apr. 11, 2012, at 1, 13. 
 331. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03 subd. 44, 363A.02 subd. 1 (2014). 
 332. Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001). 
 333. Id. Although the plaintiff had also alleged a Texas court had granted her petition for a 
“gender change ‘from genetic male to reassigned female,’” the court did not consider a formal 
definition of sex for purposes of restroom usage. Id. at 721. I note that the court appears to be using the 
term gender as a synonym for sex, in a way that would seem oxymoronic to many feminists. See supra 
note 78. 
 334. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the 
argument that an employer’s policy of allowing a self-identified female to use the women’s restroom 
facilities constituted sexual harassment of other women). 
 335. Minutes of Crosby, Minnesota, City Counsel Meeting (Apr. 9, 2012) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Crosby Minutes]. According to Mottet, challenges to access to sex-segregated restrooms 
generally do not arise for individuals with gender-conforming appearances. Mottet, supra note 51, at 
419. But when controversies do arise, institutions typically turn to formal documentation, as the 
Crosby City Council did. See id; Crosby Minutes, supra. 
 336. Peeples, supra note 330, at 13. 
798 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:747 
this motivation is paternalistic—ensuring that individuals are committed to a 
new gender identity and will not later come to regret their decisions.337 But the 
cautionary function also protects third parties from “gender fraud.”338 A person 
cannot easily elect to switch formal sex designations just for purposes of 
restroom misconduct if she must complete an administrative process every 
time. Thus, even in states that do not require surgery, formal definitions of sex 
may have appeal over elective ones by alleviating some of the fraud concerns 
related to restrooms.339 
Deference to birth certificate designations also serves administrative 
interests in uniformity. In another Minnesota case, the plaintiff, Christine 
Radtke, had been dropped from enrollment in her husband’s employer-
sponsored health care benefits fund based on the fund’s determination that she 
was a man and that therefore, her marriage to another man was illegal and she 
did not qualify as an eligible “family dependent.”340 The court refused to adopt 
the fund’s proposed definition of sex as “an immutable biological 
determination at birth” because of definitional disagreements over the 
ascriptive meaning of sex.341 Instead, the court reasoned that “[a]n individual’s 
sex includes many components, including chromosomal, anatomical, hormonal, 
and reproductive elements, some of which could be ambiguous or in conflict 
within an individual.”342 But it did not rely on Radtke’s self-identification as a 
woman alone.343 Rather, the court analyzed, in detail, Radtke’s compliance 
with applicable state regulations for receiving a birth certificate designating her 
sex as female.344 It held that to determine an individual’s sex for purposes of 
Minnesota’s marriage law, “it is logical to look to ‘the designation appearing 
on the current birth certificate issued to that person by the State in which he or 
she was born,’ and to the official government documents issued by the State of 
Minnesota, including court orders and marriage certificates and licenses.”345 
 
 337. See Spade, supra note 329, at 21, 25 (describing how trans people must often conform to a 
medical understanding of “gender identity disorder” in which they feel “trapped in the wrong body” to 
convince mental health professionals they will not “regret” sexual reassignment surgery or legal 
gender-marker changes). 
 338. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. Mottet points out that there are no 
reported cases of transgender individuals using antidiscrimination laws to access restroom or shower 
facilities for criminal purposes. Mottet, supra note 51, at 422. 
 339. See Mottet, supra note 51, at 435–36 (proposing an administrative procedure that would 
require a notarized statement from a physician). But see Spade, supra note 329, at 31 (discussing 
conversations with New York City birth certificate authorities “who [were] deeply concerned about 
people ‘changing back’ if they lower their [surgical] requirements”). 
 340. Radtke v. Misc. Drivers & Helpers Union Local # 638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental 
Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1024 (D. Minn. 2012). Such a case would be unlikely to arise today, as 
Minnesota has since legalized same-sex marriage. See MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2014). 
 341. Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Radtke argued that as a result of the birth certificate change process, “[she] was judicially 
and administratively recognized for all purposes as female.” Id. at 1027–28. 
 344. Id. at 1025–26, 1035–36. 
 345. Id. at 1032 (quoting In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 752 (B.I.A. 2005)). 
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Behind the Radtke court’s argument that it was “logical” to defer to the 
birth certificate designation were assumptions about formality’s utility in 
facilitating sex-based regulation. The court explained, “The only logical reason 
to allow the sex identified on a person’s original birth certificate to be amended 
is to permit that person to actually use the amended certificate to establish his 
or her legal sex for other purposes, such as obtaining a driver’s license, 
passport, or marriage license.”346 It listed state and federal government 
agencies that had recognized Radtke as female for purposes of administering 
benefits programs and collecting taxes.347 The court rejected the notion that the 
state might recognize Radtke “as female for some purposes . . . but not for 
others.”348 
When recognized by the law, formal sex may allow intersex and 
transgender individuals to achieve recognition and challenge the equation of 
certain biological traits with gender identities, norms, and stereotypes. 
Administrative and even medical treatment requirements for changes to sex 
designations might be understood as formalities, intended to ensure that 
individuals consider their decisions with caution, and to channel them into one 
of two binary identities, male or female, enabling sex-segregated institutions to 
readily categorize them without having to engage in debates about ascriptive 
versus elective meanings. 
D. Formal Race 
The concept of formal race has less traction in law than formal 
citizenship, family, or sex.349 This may be on account of ideologies of 
colorblindness,350 or because historically, racial registration and identification 
practices have been utilized for purposes of slavery, apartheid, and genocide.351 
In the early twentieth century, formal racial-identification practices facilitated 
enforcement of antimiscegenation laws in some U.S. states.352 By the 1970s, 
 
 346. Id. at 1034. 
 347. Id. at 1028. 
 348. Id. at 1034. 
 349. To clarify, I use the term “formal race” here in the particular sense of formalities that the 
law recognizes as conferring racial status, not in the sense of abstract or colorblind racial ideologies. 
See supra note 10. 
 350. See Gotanda, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing the ideology of “colorblind constitutionalism” 
in which “public officials exercising state powers operate according to the rule that race is not to be 
considered”). 
 351. See Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 343–47 (2002) (discussing laws requiring slaves to carry passes 
in the United States prior to the Civil War, Nazi use of administrative means such as the census, 
identification cards, and passports to identify Jews during the Holocaust, South African laws requiring 
black citizens to carry passes during Apartheid, and identity cards distinguishing Hutus and Tutsis 
during the Rwandan genocide). 
 352. In 1924, Virginia passed the Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, which sought to ensure 
accurate registration of race to facilitate the state’s ban on interracial marriage. Act to Preserve Racial 
Integrity, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975). As a result, Virginia’s Bureau of Vital Statistics 
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most U.S. jurisdictions had repealed racial registration laws, but racial 
information was still commonly found on locally generated birth certificates.353 
These designations are not formal identities as the term is used in this Article 
because local officials assigned racial classifications based on ascriptive 
standards, and individuals did not opt into racial categories in any meaningful 
sense. 
As with changes to sex designations, changes to racial designations on 
birth certificates could hypothetically be conceptualized as formal identities. 
However, modern birth certificates do not list an individual’s race.354 Rather, 
intake forms request the races of an infant’s parents.355 This has not stopped a 
parent’s race from being imputed to a child. In the early 1980s, Suzy Guillory 
Phipps was denied a passport because she had claimed to be “white” on her 
application, while her birth certificate indicated that her deceased parents were 
“colored”—designations the midwife possibly ascribed to them when Phipps 
was born.356 Phipps claimed the birth certificate had come as a “shock,” since 
she had always considered herself to be white.357 Phipps sued the State of 
Louisiana to change her parents’ designations and lost.358 On appeal, the court 
found Phipps had no right to challenge the birth certificate designations, 
because she herself had “not been racially classified,” rather, it was her parents’ 
races she sought to contest.359 Adopting an elective concept of race, the court 
 
“began an aggressive effort to ‘properly classify[] [Virginia’s] population as to color,’ and the agency 
unilaterally altered racial designations on birth, marriage, and death certificates.” Sharfstein, supra 
note 47, at 1506–07. Other states also had general laws on racial classifications, or laws specific to 
certain legal domains, such as education and marriage. DAVIS, supra note 42, at 9. 
 353. Gotanda, supra note 10, at 35. 
 354. The federal Certificate of Live Birth, the standard intake form prescribed by NCHS for 
collecting birth data, has never included an item for the race of the infant. See NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEM: MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS, 
1950–95, at 28–31 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEM], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/usvss.pdf. 
During its last review of the data to be collected on the form birth certificate, completed in 2003, 
NCHS rejected the suggestion that a “race of child” item be added to the birth certificate on grounds 
that sound in elective identity. NCHS PANEL REPORT, supra note 313, at 85. The subgroup charged 
with reviewing birth certificates was concerned about “ethical issues,” in particular, that “[t]he child 
may very well later choose a different race than what the parents chose.” Id. 
 355. See U.S. VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEM supra note 354, at 29. In 1989, a separate query for 
“Hispanic origin” was added. Id. For purposes of coding the race and Hispanic origins of infants in its 
database, NCHS assigns designations to infants based on the mothers’ self-reports, although in the 
past, NCHS applied complicated formulas considering the race of both parents. Id. at 16; Ford, supra 
note 9, at 1257–60. 
 356. DAVIS, supra note 42, at 10. The Department of Homeland Security no longer requests an 
individual’s race in its passport application, so such a case would be unlikely to arise today. See DEP’T 
OF STATE, APPLICATION FOR A U.S. PASSPORT (Sept. 2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/212239.pdf. 
 357. DAVIS, supra note 42, at 10. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Doe v. State, 479 So. 2d 369, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1985). One judge dissented from this 
reasoning, and was “compelled to point out that the society in which plaintiffs grew up, and perhaps to 
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noted there was “no proof in the record” that Phipps’ parents “preferred to be 
designated as white.”360 Indeed, “[t]hey might well have been proud to be 
described as colored.”361 
Another case from the 1980s comes closer to a formal definition of race. 
In that case, two brothers were estopped from claiming black identities by past 
formalities.362 Paul and Philip Malone were two Boston-area firefighters who, 
by all reports, appeared white, but self-identified as African American on job 
application forms after learning their maternal grandmother was African 
American.363 The Malone brothers were hired under an affirmative action 
policy and then fired many years later after their claims to African American 
identity were brought to light.364 The courts sided with the employer. When the 
Malones had first applied as firefighters in 1975, they had identified as 
“white.”365 Moreover, birth certificates proved the Malone family had 
“reported consistently to be White” “for three generations.”366 The court denied 
the Malones’ claim, interpreting their inconsistent identifications as fraud.367 
Many documents collect racial information for purposes other than 
formalizing identities. Birth certificate race designations do not make 
appearances in later cases on racial identity, possibly because NCHS issued a 
revised form birth certificate in 1968 that instructed that data on the parents’ 
races were “for medical and health use only.”368 Similarly, I have not located 
 
a lesser extent our present society, classify one according to ancestral designations, ‘you are what your 
parents are.’” Id. at 373 (Armstrong, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 360. Id. at 372 (majority opinion). 
 361. Id. 
 362. See Rich, supra note 73, at 216–17. 
 363. Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, slip op. at 3 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Suffolk Cnty., July 25, 
1989). 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 19. 
 367. Id. at 24. 
 368. Compare NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1968: VOLUME I—NATALITY, app. 3-4, fig.3-A (1970) [hereinafter NATALITY 1968], 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/vsus_1968_1.pdf (1968 revised Certificate of Live 
Birth), with NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1956: 
VOLUME I, at XIV, fig.2 (1958) [hereinafter NATALITY 1956], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/VSUS_1956_1.pdf (1956 revised Certificate of Live Birth). The 
standard certificates are revised approximately every ten years. In both 1956 and 1968, NCHS 
reported that most states were conforming closely to their standard form. NATALITY 1956, supra at 
XIV; NATALITY 1968, supra at 3-3; see Sally Northam & Thomas R. Knapp, The Reliability and 
Validity of Birth Certificates, 35 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGICAL & NEONATAL NURSING 3, 5 fig.1 
(2006) (providing Texas’s data collection form as representative, which requests the mother’s and 
father’s races but indicates the information is “confidential,” “for medical and public health use,” and 
“will not be shown on certified copies”). Although California designates racial information 
“confidential” and “for public health use,” it will release the portion of the form including the racial 
data on request to certain persons, including the person named on the certificate and a parent who 
signed the certificate. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 102425–102430 (West 2014). In 1995, 
concerns about offensive racial descriptors prompted California to enact a law allowing a person to 
receive a new birth certificate if “his or her existing birth certificate contains a derogatory, demeaning, 
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any examples of the use of an individual’s own census records to resolve 
disputes over that individual’s race.369 While the process of responding to the 
census plays a role in the formation of racial identities,370 recent census records 
are kept confidential and used only for statistical purposes.371 
Indian identity is an important exception to the general trend against 
formalization of race. Tribal membership is considered a category at the border 
of race and citizenship.372 Many legal determinations turn on whether a 
claimant has Native American status. Status may determine eligibility to vote 
in tribal elections or run for tribal office; the existence of tribal, state, or federal 
court jurisdiction or taxing authority; rights to child custody, hunting, and 
fishing; and access to federal and tribal benefits programs in employment, 
education, healthcare, and other social services.373 Each of these legal regimes 
defines Native American status differently. Some definitions are ascriptive—
looking to descent from a member of a specific tribe, descent from a member 
of any tribe, or cultural affiliation with a tribe.374 Other legal definitions are 
elective, relying on self-identification.375 
 
or colloquial racial descriptor,” meaning “any term that the registrant determines is insulting to a racial 
group.” Id. § 103260(a). It is left up to the individual whether terms “constitute racial slurs or are 
otherwise offensive.” Id. § 103355. 
 369. Census designations are not formal identities insofar as any person in a household may fill 
out the census form for everyone living in that household without the consent or knowledge of each 
person described. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, note 161 (requesting that an unspecified recipient 
fill out information for everyone staying or living in the apartment, house, or mobile home). 
 370. The way the census accounts for multiracial identities has inspired political debate and 
scholarly attention. See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity 
with Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1256–71 (2014) (discussing controversies over the 
purposes and consequences of racial data collection practices, which have at times sought to avoid 
“intermixing of the races,” to study and remedy racial discrimination, or to protect the rights of 
individuals to self-identify in ways that reflect their lived experiences and ensure their psychological 
health). 
 371. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2012) (requiring that the government use census information only for 
statistical purposes and keep census forms confidential). 
 372. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (rejecting an Equal Protection 
challenge to a Bureau of Indian Affairs’ employment preference that was “not directed towards a 
‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’” but rather, that “applies only to members of ‘federally 
recognized’ tribes”). For commentary on this distinction, see generally Bethany R. Berger, Race, 
Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 23 (2013); Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably 
Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012); Addie C. 
Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 
968 (2011); Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity 
Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801 (2008). 
 373. Berger, supra note 372, at 29–31. 
 374. Id. 
 375. When a defendant in a discrimination case disputes whether a plaintiff was a Native 
American and therefore a member of the “protected class,” courts frequently deny summary judgment 
based on evidence that plaintiffs self-identified as Native American in the workplace. See Wood v. 
Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Feb. 19, 2010) (where “both Plaintiff and Defendant’s employees believed that Plaintiff was American 
Indian” despite lack of “definitive proof of ancestry” and “Plaintiff’s previous reporting on 
employment and other records describ[ed] himself as Hispanic and white”); Eriksen v. Allied Waste 
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But increasingly, the law is turning to formal definitions of Native 
American identity: reliance on whether an individual is formally enrolled in a 
federally recognized tribe.376 The Bureau of Indian Affairs, a branch of the 
federal Department of the Interior, recognizes 562 tribes.377 These tribes set 
forth their own requirements for membership in their constitutions, articles of 
incorporation, or ordinances.378 Virtually all require that an applicant 
demonstrate she has descended from a member of a tribe.379 But tribes do not 
require any sort of genetic test to prove descent.380 Typically, applicants must 
provide documents tracing their descent to a tribal member listed on a registry 
known as a “base roll.”381 Many base rolls were determined by a federally 
authorized census of tribal members, taken around the turn of the twentieth 
century.382 Most tribes also require a “blood quantum,”383 in the form of a 
requirement that a certain percentage of an individual’s ancestors appeared on a 
 
Sys., Inc., No. 06-13549, 2007 WL 1003851, at *3, *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007) (where “Plaintiff 
represented herself as a Native American to her co-workers” despite “lack[ing] documentary or 
tangible evidence to substantiate family stories that she is descended from Native Americans”); 
Greene v. Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2004) (where 
“Plaintiff[] assert[ed] to Defendants that she was Native American” despite “evidence that the Plaintiff 
was not Native American based on her birth certificate, those of her parents, the fact she is not an 
enrolled member of an Indian tribe, and Plaintiff’s own representations on her employment 
application”). 
 376. Gover, supra note 43, at 244. 
 377. Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
http://www.doi.gov/tribes/enrollment.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 378. Id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72, n.32 (1978) (“A tribe’s right 
to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as 
an independent political community.”). This is not to say that tribes select membership rules free of 
federal influence. See Gover, supra note 43, at 254–69 (describing varying levels of federal 
involvement in tribal membership policies). 
 379. Berger, supra note 372, at 28. Gover conducted an empirical survey of the enrollment 
policies of 245 federally recognized tribes. Gover, supra note 43, at 245–46. She explains that lineal 
descent rules have replaced rules based on parental enrollment or residency, because federal policies 
from approximately 1950 to 1970 encouraged many tribal members to sever ties with tribes and 
relocate from reservations. Id. at 248. Thus, lineal descent rules “are forms of self-help that are 
intended to reconstitute a tribe as a historically continuous community.” Id. Gover distinguishes these 
lineal descent rules from race-based exclusions by arguing that many tribes require descent from that 
particular tribe, as opposed to federal rules looking to descent from members of any tribe. See id. at 
250–51. 
 380. Cf. supra notes 44–45 (discussing controversies over genetic definitions of race). 
 381. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 377. 
 382. See Gover, supra note 43, at 260–62; see also Cara Cowan-Watts, Being an Indian: It’s 
About Ancestry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racial-justice/being-an 
-indian-its-about-ancestry (discussing membership criteria for the Cherokee tribe). 
 383. See Gover, supra note 43, at 251 (“Seventy percent of tribal constitutions now contain a 
blood-quantum rule . . . .”). The Department of the Interior has pressured tribes to include blood 
quantum requirements because it “considers blood quantum to be a measure of a person’s political 
relationship to the tribe.” Id. at 264–65. These requirements are also considered necessary because 
“unqualified lineal descent rules would likely be over-inclusive for many tribes, and so place an 
unreasonable burden on tribal resources.” Id. at 297. 
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base roll.384 But these blood quantum requirements are not thought of as 
ascriptive. Rather, “tribes . . . seek to avail themselves of blood quantum as a 
pre-existing, well-documented administrative device.”385 Tribes may also 
impose additional requirements, such as residency or contact with the tribe.386 
Ancestry requirements for tribal citizenship are defended against the 
charge of racial essentialism with appeals to their formality. For example, the 
Cherokee Nation requires applicants for citizenship “to provide documents” 
tracing their ancestry to “at least one direct Cherokee ancestor listed on the 
Dawes Final Rolls, a federal census of those living in the Cherokee Nation that 
was used to allot Cherokee land to individual citizens in preparation for 
Oklahoma statehood.”387 One Cherokee official has defended the policy by 
explaining, “Being Cherokee is not about what you look like . . . . Today, 
Cherokee citizens come in every shape, size, and religious background.”388 
Rather, the ancestry policy rewards those whose ancestors elected Cherokee 
identity at a time when the burdens of that election were more onerous: 
[The 1898 to 1914 era of the Dawes Rolls] was a defining time for 
Cherokee citizenship as many people of mixed ethnicity rejected 
citizenship in the Tribe. Their decision forever impacted their 
descendants who also lost citizenship with that choice. At a difficult 
time for Indian people, my ancestors chose to remain Indian and 
declare their citizenship with the Cherokee Nation when others walked 
away.389 
This remark reflects a variation of the inauthenticity critique, that elective rules 
allow fair weather claims to identity. Formal requirements preclude such 
claims. They also serve a channeling function, evident in the official’s remark 
 
 384. See Berger, supra note 372, at 28–29 (discussing how blood quantum requirements are 
“tied to descent from an individual listed on a particular census roll of a tribe at a particular time” 
rather than any sort of “biological” inquiry). 
 385. Gover, supra note 43, at 298. 
 386. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 377. 
 387. Citizenship, CHEROKEE NATION, 
http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/Citizenship.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 388. Cowan-Watts, supra note 382. Controversy arose in response to a dispute over the 
citizenship status of individuals descended from Cherokee Freedmen—African Americans who had 
been slaves of Cherokee tribe members before the Civil War. “Freedmen” are listed separately from 
“Cherokees by Blood” on the Dawes Rolls. The Final Rolls of Citizens and Freedmen of the Five 
Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory, 03/04/1907, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://research.archives.gov/description/300321 (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 389. Cowan-Watts, supra note 382. This remark raises questions about whether the choices of 
ancestors should bind future generations. Additionally, scholars have noted that some Indians refused 
to be listed on the Dawes Rolls to protest the federal policy of breaking up tribal lands. See Krakoff, 
supra note 372, at 1068–69. Considered in this light, that their descendants are now precluded from 
asserting tribal membership is a “tragic irony.” Id. For other criticisms of the accuracy of base rolls, 
see Gover, supra note 43, at 260–62.  
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that “[t]o me, you are either Indian or you are not.”390 Even a critic of formal 
membership rules must admit that “these are relatively bright lines.”391 
In 2011, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a resolution 
urging law schools to adopt a formal definition of Native American identity.392 
Accompanying the resolution was a report that expressed skepticism of both 
ascriptive and elective concepts of Native American identity.393 It criticized 
descent-based definitions on the ground that “distant ancestry is unlikely to be 
a part of a person’s current ethnic identity, or qualify one for tribal 
citizenship.”394 It also expressed skepticism of elective concepts of Native 
American identity as allowing “fraud” and “box checking” by law school 
applicants misrepresenting themselves as Native American.395 
While few people would indicate they were Asian-American or 
African-American on a law school application unless it was a part of 
their identity, for some reason there is a wide level of comfort about 
self-identifying as Native American even though they are not in fact 
Native American. This is particularly disconcerting given that being 
Native American is not just an ethnic identity, but is an actual 
citizenship in an Indian tribe or Nation which carries with it a formal 
tribal enrollment number, not unlike a social security number.396 
The ABA’s evidence of fraud was the disparity between the number of self-
identified Native American lawyers on the census (228) and the number 
reportedly graduated by ABA-accredited law schools over that same time 
period (approximately 2,610).397 
The ABA’s response was a resolution urging that law schools require 
additional information from applicants who identify as Native American, such 
as “citizenship, Tribal affiliation or enrollment number, and/or a ‘heritage 
statement.’”398 The resolution begrudgingly includes “and/or a ‘heritage 
statement’” as a nod to the idea that formal identity may be underinclusive. But 
the report makes clear that the “best practice[]” is for a law school to require 
proof of enrollment.399 The report highlighted formality’s cautionary purpose 
of “provid[ing] at least some deterrent to an applicant who seeks to 
 
 390. Cowan-Watts, supra note 382. 
 391. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2013). 
 392. See A.B.A. House of Delegates, Res. 102 (Aug. 8–9, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_102.authcheckdam.pdf 
 393. See Patty Ferguson, Report Accompanying A.B.A. House of Delegates, Res. 102 (Aug. 
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_102. 
authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter A.B.A. Report]. The author of the report was the President of the 
national Native American Bar Association. Id. at 6. 
 394. Id. at 5. 
 395. See id. at 1, 5. 
 396. Id. at 1. 
 397. See id. at 5. 
 398. Id. at 7. 
 399. Id. at 1. 
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misrepresent his or her race or ethnicity.”400 It also appealed to formality’s 
channeling function, stating “Native American tribal identity is not an 
amorphous, ill-defined concept. It is a very concrete citizenship requirement, 
detailed and well-defined in tribal constitutions and laws, and recognized by 
the federal government.”401 In rejecting opportunistic or ad hoc self-
identifications, the report emphasized that formal identity entails not just rights, 
such as voting and land ownership, but also responsibilities, such as serving on 
juries and paying taxes.402 
Thus, there are few contemporary examples of formal race operating in 
the law. Unlike regulators of citizenship, marriage, parenthood, and sex, 
government agencies regulating race, most notably the EEOC, have shifted 
away from ascriptive definitions and toward elective ones.403 Concerns about 
racial fraud and lack of uniformity in racial classification have not had 
sufficient force to temper elective definitions with formal requirements. The 
best example of formal race is arguably the conflict over whether Native 
American identity is race or citizenship, a question that goes to the political 
status of tribes. 
*** 
In sum, formal identity doctrines mediate conflicts between and among 
ascriptive and elective identity models, with advantages for individuals, 
outsider groups, and the legal system. Individuals may consider formalities to 
have profound significance, as marking the moment when they first experience 
their identities as real. The expansion of access to formal processes for securing 
identity recognition can also have serious material consequences for those 
facing deportation, denial of marital or parental rights, expulsion from sex-
segregated spaces, or exclusion from race-based remedial programs. 
Universally applied formal requirements may level privilege by replacing 
essentialist and discriminatory ascriptive rules. Outsiders may find formal 
barriers easier to surmount than other forms of identity gatekeeping. Formal 
definitions may expose that an identity status is merely “on paper,” creating 
space for new arguments about an identity’s meaning. Or formal 
understandings of identity may allow those who seek to disclaim identities to 
avoid legal entanglements by avoiding formal arrangements. 
 
 400. Id. at 5. 
 401. Id. at 2. 
 402. See id. By contrast, in cases alleging employment discrimination on the basis of Native 
American status under Title VII, courts have held that plaintiffs are not required to show tribal 
enrollment to prove they are members of the protected class. See, e.g., Smith-Barrett v. Potter, 541 F. 
Supp. 2d 535, 539 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[W]hile official tribal membership may provide strong 
evidence of one’s claim to American Indian heritage, the absence of tribal membership does not . . . 
signify non-membership in the larger protected class.”); Greene v. Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 
F. Supp. 2d 442, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2004) (noting plaintiff’s lack of enrollment was irrelevant to her 
membership in the protected class where her employer “surely knew that Plaintiff claimed she was 
Native American”). 
 403. See Rich, supra note 74, at 1521. 
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Formal definitions also have advantages over elective doctrines in terms 
of administrability. Formalities provide a check on fraud, an inducement to 
circumspection, and a degree of uniformity. Therefore, regulators who have 
been relying on ascriptive definitions may be more willing to move toward 
formal definitions than elective ones. Advocates of elective identity may see 
formality as an attractive second-best solution. The next Part of this Article will 
discuss reasons to be critical of formalization projects. 
III. 
DYSFUNCTIONS OF FORMAL IDENTITY 
Although formal identity has advantages over ascriptive and elective 
models, it also risks reinforcing inequality based on identity. This Part 
discusses reasons for skepticism about whether formalities are indeed useful 
tools for contesting the ascriptive meanings of legal identities.404 It describes 
potential dysfunctions of formal identity: commodification, bureaucratization, 
discrimination, pigeonholing, and legitimation. While these costs may not 
outweigh the benefits of formalization in every situation, they should be 
considered by those who see progressive potential in, for example, an 
understanding of citizenship as documentation, marriage as license and 
ceremony, parenthood as a signature on an acknowledgment form, sex as a 
designation on a birth certificate, or race as a check box or enrollment number. 
A. Commodification 
The first potential dysfunction of formalization of identity is that it puts 
those without resources at a disadvantage, by making identity claims costly ex 
ante and setting traps for the legally unwary. Thus, requiring formality may 
effectively commodify identity status, restricting access to identities for all but 
the wealthy and legally sophisticated.405 Although it is generally true that 
formalities impose costs and burdens on their users, whether this 
commodification argument has purchase in any particular dispute over 
formalization depends on the relative costs and complications of proving 
identity under alternative definitions. 
 
 404. Fuller did not give sustained attention to the dysfunctional aspects of formality because he 
constrained his theory to a limited subset of contracts, and within that subset, he only gestured to 
questions of bargaining power, see Kennedy, supra note 128, at 125–26, and distributive justice, id. at 
171–72. 
 405. I refer to commodification simply in the sense of putting a price on identity, and I use the 
label to discuss how access to formalities may depend on class. I do not argue that identities are 
matters of such importance that they should never be corrupted by pricing. Nor is my argument about 
identity as an item that might be exchanged for value or an aspect of an individual’s human capital. Cf. 
Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2152 (2013) (criticizing “racial 
capitalism,” defined as the problem of white institutions extracting value from a student or worker’s 
minority status for purposes such as showcasing diversity). 
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Formalization entails new transaction costs, such as legal fees, hassles, 
and lost time, for those who would otherwise be presumed to hold certain 
identities under ascriptive definitions or allowed to elect identities ad hoc.406 
Even costs that may seem minor to some, such as $135 for a passport, or $25 
for a birth certificate or marriage license, may be prohibitive for the indigent.407 
Fee waivers for the indigent are only intermittently available, and it may be 
difficult for those without legal advice to apply for them.408 For those who live 
in remote areas, the costs of travel to government offices with limited hours 
may impede access to formalities.409 Documentation requirements may place 
individuals in a catch-22; for example, a birth certificate may be required to get 
a driver’s license, but a driver’s license may be required to get a birth 
certificate.410 
Formal requirements can also set traps for the legally unwary.411 The idea 
that formalities might serve a cautionary function assumes those making claims 
to identities have the sophistication to understand and utilize legal processes, 
and the knowledge and foresight to predict that their informal identities will not 
be recognized. Requiring compliance with bureaucratic formalities 
marginalizes those without legal sophistication and resources, as well as those 
 
 406. On the other hand, ex ante formalization might be less costly than litigating post hoc 
disputes over identity claims about whether one meets ascriptive or elective definitions. For example, a 
marriage license and city hall ceremony is less expensive than a court battle over whether a common 
law marriage existed. Formalization may also be less expensive than changing one’s appearance or 
behavior to meet an ascriptive definition. But if formalities are not universally accessible, only the 
wealthy and sophisticated will be able to take advantage of their cost-saving evidentiary functions. 
 407. KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
OBTAINING VOTER IDENTIFICATION 1, 14 (2012), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/ 
f5f28dd844a143d303_i36m6lyhy.pdf. One survey suggests that citizens earning less than $25,000 per 
year were twice as likely to lack access to a document proving their citizenship. BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY 
PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 1, 2 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF], available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf (telephone survey of 987 randomly selected 
voting-age citizens). 
 408. Certain immigration forms, not including passports, may be provided free to the indigent, 
upon satisfactory completion of a five-page form regarding inability to pay. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-912: REQUEST FOR FEE WAIVER (revised 
May 10, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-912.pdf. The form has 
nine pages of instructions. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
FORM I-912: INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUEST FOR FEE WAIVER (revised May 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-912instr.pdf. 
 409. See GASKINS & IYER, supra note 407, at 1 (“Nearly 500,000 eligible voters do not have 
access to a vehicle and live more than 10 miles from the nearest state ID-issuing office open more than 
two days a week. Many of them live in rural areas with dwindling public transportation options.”). 
 410. See Catherine Wiehl, Reliance on Identification to Secure the Blessings of Liberty and 
Property, 81 UMKC L. REV. 509, 510–11 (2012). 
 411. See Michael Serota, Intelligible Justice, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649, 659–62 (2012) 
(describing low levels of “legal literacy” in the United States). Ascriptive definitions may set traps for 
the unwary as well, but they are less likely to do so as they are generally intended to reflect accepted, 
extralegal standards. 
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who distrust, fear, or blindly defer to legal processes.412 Many formalities, such 
as legal documents, are akin to contracts of adhesion—with terms drafted by 
lawyers or government officials, presented on a “take it or leave it” basis.413 
Those who sign (or do not sign) such documents may not have any meaningful 
understanding of their terms, may not believe they can renegotiate the form, or 
may have a distorted understanding of the purposes to which the formality will 
be put.414 Or they may simply not be paying attention.415 As sociologists have 
described, people lose focus when confronted with too many bureaucratic 
formalities purporting to be critical.416 The party who fails at documenting her 
identity may experience losses that are disproportionate to her administrative 
errors. She may find herself deported, without the right to visit her children, 
without recognition of her marriage, or unable to claim a gender or racial 
identity. 
The link between formalization and commodification is apparent in the 
citizenship context. To be sure, the buying and selling of citizenship is a 
criminal offense,417 at odds with the “self-proclaimed legacies of immigrant 
nations that historically allowed newcomers from very modest beginnings the 
opportunity to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.”418 Yet, as Professor 
Eleanor Brown has argued, the idea that rights to immigrate “are not being 
‘sold’” is a carefully maintained “illusion.”419 The formal path to citizenship is 
an expensive one, difficult to navigate without legal services. “[E]lite 
applicants typically employ attorneys and sometimes lobbyists who charge 
high fees to navigate the complexities of the Immigration and Nationality 
 
 412. See Perillo, supra note 143, at 70 (“[R]ules of form unduly favor the party who has easy 
access to legal advice over the party who does not.”). 
 413. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943). 
 414. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 711–18 (2011) (discussing reasons consumers fail to understand mandatory 
disclosures, including illiteracy, innumeracy, and comprehension difficulties); W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 
(1971) (“[I]n the usual case, the consumer never even reads the form, or reads it only after he has 
become bound by its terms. Even the fastidious few who take the time to read the standard form may 
be helpless to vary it. The form may be part of an offer which the consumer has no reasonable 
alternative but to accept.”). 
 415. Cf. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 414, at 689–90 (discussing the problem of the 
“accumulation” of mandated disclosures in modern life, which disclosees do not have time to process). 
 416. Carol A. Heimer, Conceiving Children: How Documents Support Case Versus 
Biographical Analyses, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 95, 98 (Annelise Riles 
ed., 2006); cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting Normative and 
Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 617, 624–26 (2012) (discussing reasons consumers do 
not read boilerplate contracts). 
 417. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1425–1427 (2012). However, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
creates a visa category for those who invest more than $1 million in the United States and create at 
least ten U.S. jobs. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2012). 
 418. SHACHAR, supra note 30, at 55–56. 
 419. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
1047, 1049 (2011). 
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Act.”420 It is often noted that an immigrant’s chance of success in removal or 
asylum proceedings depends on her access to quality legal services.421 
Immigrants unfamiliar with U.S. culture and distrustful of legal authorities may 
end up prey for unscrupulous and incompetent advisors, inadvertently waiving 
claims by failing to assert the correct legal arguments or assemble the right 
evidence early enough in the process.422 Those who lack trust in official legal 
channels or do not have access to legal counsel may pay steep costs in the 
black market for identity documents.423 
The E-Verify system for determining work eligibility provides another 
example of how formal identities may be inaccessible.424 Its procedures create 
significant obstacles for low-wage workers.425 Clerical errors are not 
uncommon, resulting from discrepancies in how names are recorded, mistakes 
in data entry on the employer end, and errors in the Social Security 
Administration or the Department of Homeland Security databases.426 If a 
worker wants to challenge an initial determination that she is not authorized to 
work in the United States, she must contact the appropriate agency within eight 
days.427 Sometimes an in-person visit to the agency’s office, which may be 
several hours away, is required.428 It may be easier for some workers to meet 
these formal requirements than to conform to racial stereotypes about 
citizenship as whiteness.429 But formal requirements impose more burdens than 
an elective citizenship regime that would not entail any sort of verification. 
 
 420. Id. at 1050. 
 421. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the 
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 5 (2008) (“While differences in success rates [between 
immigrants with and without lawyers] do not by themselves tell us about causation, these data 
uncomfortably suggest that outcomes can be affected by whether the immigrant can afford a lawyer or 
has the ability to access free legal services.”). 
 422. Id. at 7–9. 
 423. Brown, supra note 419, at 1050. The paper families of the early twentieth century provide 
a historical example. See supra notes 258–72 and accompanying text. Lau describes how “[e]very 
detail of the immigration process was commodified and sold—for cash or credit.” LAU, supra note 9, 
at 65. For example, one Chinese immigrant paid $2,000 just for the false papers that were required for 
his son come to the United States. Id. at 64. 
 424. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 425. NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., VERIFICATION NATION: HOW E-VERIFY AFFECTS AMERICA’S 
WORKERS 3–4 (2013), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=957; Stumpf, supra note 
206, at 399. 
 426. Stumpf, supra note 206, at 399, 408. A study commissioned by the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services reported that the rate of erroneous initial rejections by E-Verify is 0.3 percent. 
WESTAT, EVALUATION OF THE ACCURACY OF E-VERIFY FINDINGS x, 23 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_Native_Documents 
/Everify%20Studies/Evaluation%20of%20the%20Accuracy%20of%20EVerify%20Findings.pdf. 
Although this is a small percentage, if every U.S. employer used E-Verify, the number of false 
negatives would be between 150,000 to 500,000 individuals, a number approximately between the 
populations of Green Bay, Wisconsin, and Tucson, Arizona. NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 
425, at 3. 
 427. NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 425, at 2. 
 428. Id. at 6. 
 429. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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Formalization may also commodify family status. Formal marriage 
requires the couple to pay for a license and ceremony, and to have access to 
and willingness to utilize government services. This may disadvantage the 
party with less bargaining power (often the wife), who is unable to persuade 
her partner to comply with marital formalities, and then finds herself on the 
losing end of disputes regarding property division upon termination of the 
relationship.430 This example, though, only works on the assumption that the 
couple would have easily been presumed married under an informal 
definition.431 But consider same-sex couples who want to coparent, where one 
member of the couple is not a presumed parent under state law.432 Requiring 
that parent to adopt may impose costs that an automatic presumption of 
parenthood would not.433 
Formal parenthood disadvantages those unaware of the steps they must 
take to formalize their identities. For example, the biological father in Lehr v. 
Robertson lost his rights to custody because he failed to mail in a postcard 
registering his claim to paternity.434 In dissent, Justice White criticized this 
reasoning as the “sheerest formalism.”435 He noted that the father had alleged 
the mother had “concealed her whereabouts from him” after the child’s birth, 
and the father went so far as to hire a detective agency to find his daughter.436 
Shades of Lehr can be seen in arguments related to the meaning of parenthood 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.437 The issue 
in that case was whether a child’s biological father, a member of the Cherokee 
nation, could block his daughter’s adoption by a non-Indian couple under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).438 ICWA was intended to prevent the 
breakup of Indian families.439 In Adoptive Couple, the child’s biological parents 
were engaged to be married, but had a falling out before the baby was born.440 
The mother then sent the father a text message “asking if he would rather pay 
child support or relinquish his parental rights.”441 The father replied, via text 
 
 430. See supra note 22. 
 431. It may be difficult and costly to prove a common law marriage existed, and litigation is 
unlikely to be worthwhile unless the couple had enough assets to fight over. 
 432. See Polikoff, supra note 25, at 207. 
 433. Id. at 216. Second-parent adoptions typically cost $2,000 to $3,000 in home-study and 
legal fees. See How Much Does Adoption Cost?, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/how-much-does-adoption-cost (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
However, if the couple is unmarried, the adoptive parent would generally be entitled to a tax credit for 
these expenses. See I.R.C. § 23(d)(1)(C) (2012). The credit was $10,000 in 1996, to be adjusted for 
inflation. Id. § 23(b)(1), (f). 
 434. See 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983). 
 435. Id. at 275 (White, J., dissenting). 
 436. Id. at 269. 
 437. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013). 
 438. Id.; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). 
 439. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
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message, that he would relinquish his rights.442 The father later testified that he 
believed he was relinquishing his rights to the mother, not the child, and that he 
did not know the mother planned to place the child up for adoption.443 On the 
basis of these and other facts,444 the Supreme Court held the provision of 
ICWA designed “to prevent the ‘breakup of the Indian family’” to be 
“inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth 
and never had custody of the child.”445 
Formalization also imposes costs on claimants to racial and sexual 
identities. In the context of sex designations, rules requiring surgery or 
hormonal therapy as prerequisites to birth certificate changes have operated to 
commodify sexual identity for many transgender persons unable to afford 
medical treatment.446 Even if medical treatment were not required, the costs of 
procuring a court order or pursuing an administrative process could be 
burdensome.447 As most rules regarding racial identity in affirmative action 
programs are elective, increasing formalization—for example, a rule requiring 
evidence of past racial identifications or tribal enrollment—would likely 
increase the costs and complications of proving race for claimants.448 
B. Bureaucratization 
[B]eing an Indian is in some ways a tangle of red tape. On the other 
hand, Indians know other Indians without the need for a federal 
pedigree, and this knowledge—like love, sex, or having or not having 
a baby—has nothing to do with government. 
Louise Erdrich, The Round House449 
Another criticism of formal identity is that it may reduce identities to 
bureaucratic processes. Max Weber described the “characteristic principle of 
 
 442. Id. 
 443. Brief for Respondent Birth Father at 7–8, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1191183. 
 444. The biological father later signed papers stating he was not contesting the baby’s adoption, 
but he argued he did not realize their meaning, and he sought legal advice on how to contest the 
adoption the next day. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59. The Court also noted the biological 
father provided no financial assistance to the mother during her pregnancy or to the baby during her 
first four months of life, despite his ability to do so. Id. at 2559. 
 445. Id. at 2557. The Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the biological father was a 
“parent” under ICWA. Id. at 2620. 
 446. See Mottet, supra note 51, at 407–10. Mottet writes: “A cascade of unnecessary 
expenditures result from surgeries, including depleting one’s personal financial resources, causing an 
interruption in one’s school or work, being unable to complete family care-giving duties, and relying 
on financial or care-giving resources from family members or others.” Id. at 410. 
 447. Cf. id. at 431 (advocating an administrative process over a court-order requirement to 
reduce costs). 
 448. Proving eligibility for tribal membership may require computer literacy or even the 
services of a professional genealogist. Genealogical Research, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
http://www.doi.gov/tribes/research.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 449. LOUISE ERDRICH, THE ROUND HOUSE 30 (2012). 
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bureaucracy” as “the abstract regularity of the execution of authority.”450 
Formalities are useful instruments of bureaucracy because they are 
standardized, routinized, and universal.451 The ideal formal identity doctrine 
makes identity claims a bureaucratic process of executing the correct legal 
formality, and uniformly enforces only those identity claims that comply with 
that process. 
Formalization thus confers authority on bureaucratic processes rather than 
other social experiences or nonlegal experts. Those who see identities as based 
in community understandings, relationships, creativity, and spontaneous 
interactions might balk at the idea that they ought to be a matter of formal 
registration.452 Weber described the bureaucracy with the dark metaphor of an 
“iron cage”453 and the bureaucrat as “only a single cog in an ever-moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march.”454 
The fact that people enroll in formal identities for themselves does not resolve 
this critique.455 Individuals who execute formalities may begin to regard their 
lives as projects to be managed according to disciplinary norms, rather than 
projects entailing creativity and freedom.456  
Bureaucratic forms of identity recognition may crowd out the imaginative 
space for other understandings of identity. The demand for formalities may 
reflect a sort of documentary essentialism in which documents become fetish 
 
 450. MAX WEBER, ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 70 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed.,1968). 
Weberian bureaucracy is not, therefore, the same as common law reasoning, and is not an apt analogy 
for American judicial processes in general. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 
92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1450–52 (1983). 
 451. See generally David Dery, “Papereality” and Learning in Bureaucratic Organizations, 29 
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 677 (1998). 
 452. In the context of contracting, Fuller noted that “[t]here is a real need for a field of human 
intercourse freed from legal restraints.” Fuller, supra note 10, at 813. This need is “not merely 
spiritual,” but essential to commerce, since business deals “can often emerge only from a converging 
series of negotiations, in which each step contains enough assurance to make worthwhile a further 
exchange of views and yet remains flexible enough to permit a radical readjustment to new situations.” 
Id. Fuller thought this to be all the more relevant in the context of marriage, arguing that “successful 
human association depends upon spontaneous and informal collaboration.” Lon L. Fuller, The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 371 (1978). For this reason, he concluded that 
courts should “refuse[] to enforce agreements between husband and wife affecting the internal 
organization of family life.” Id. This claim is very controversial. See Davis, supra note 94, at 1960–61 
(discussing the extensive body of legal scholarship “analogiz[ing] marriage and intimacy 
commitments to business associational models”). 
 453. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1958) (1904). 
 454. WEBER, supra note 450, at 75. 
 455. Philosopher Michel Foucault famously argued that power may be “disciplinary”: exerting 
influence by training individuals, who become “instruments of its exercise.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 
1979) (1975); cf. id. at 189–92 (discussing how documentation of individuals is a mechanism of 
disciplinary power in medical, military, and educational institutions). 
 456. Cf. Michel Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress, in 
THE FOUCAULT READER 340, 350 (Paul Rabinow, ed. 1984) (asking, “[C]ouldn’t everyone’s life 
become a work of art?”). 
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objects necessary for people to experience their identities as real.457 Individuals 
seeking recognition fixate on acquisition of formalities like passports, birth 
certificates, or marriage licenses. Consider the mothers of stillborn babies 
seeking birth certificates to validate the lives of their children and their 
identities as mothers.458 The outsized attention paid by the “birther” movement 
to President Obama’s purportedly fraudulent birth certificate is another 
example.459 The craving for recognition may even cause identity claimants left 
out by ascriptive rules to mimic official formalities. For example, some same-
sex couples whose states did not permit them to marry nonetheless pursued 
official name changes so that both members of the couple would have the same 
surname.460 The fixation with official recognition may reaffirm the formality’s 
primacy in defining identities, to the exclusion of other sources of identity 
definition. The sincerity with which people pursue formal identities may 
preclude the sort of irreverent, hyperbolic, dissonant, jarring, or parodic 
performances of identity that could expose the cracks and fissures in 
essentialist definitions and create space for new identity configurations.461 
Judith Butler’s famous example of a playfully parodic identity is that of Divine, 
a drag queen whose “impersonation of women implicitly suggests that gender 
is a kind of persistent impersonation that passes as the real.”462 Unlike 
formalities, informal practices of identity formation might be iterative, 
reflective, playful, and flexible. Legal rules that ascribe identities might better 
adapt to an understanding of identity as forged through multiple social 
relationships. 
There are a number of objections to this bureaucratization argument. First, 
in identity contexts, formal rules may be preferable to the ascriptive ones they 
replace. Generally, ascriptive rules that assess whether identities meet social 
definitions reflect essentialist and deterministic scripts.463 In his history of the 
 
 457. To fetishize an object is to attribute human properties to it, such as social status. See 
generally Tim Dant, Fetishism and the Social Value of Objects, 44 SOC. REV. 495, 495, 497 (1996) 
(explaining theories of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Jean Baudrilliard related to fetishism). The 
term is derived from the worship of religious objects. Id. at 497. 
 458. See supra notes 273–77 and accompanying text. 
 459. See Matthew W. Hughey, Show Me Your Papers! Obama’s Birth and the Whiteness of 
Belonging, 35 QUALITATIVE SOC. 163, 170–71 (2012). 
 460. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 773 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (Civ. Ct. 2003) (granting a woman’s 
application to change her last name to that of her same-sex life partner, despite the then-existing 
prohibition on same-sex marriage); Liza Mundy, Mrs. & Mrs. Smith: How Some Gay Couples 
Reclaim Old Marriage Traditions, ATLANTIC (May 29, 2013, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/05/mrs-mrs-smith-how-some-gay-couples-reclaim 
-old-marriage-traditions/276307 (quoting one wedding officiant regarding same-sex couples seeking 
to marry who traveled from states that ban same-sex marriage to Washington, D.C.: “Returning home, 
they find that ‘being able to change their name is a way to have their home state recognize their 
marriage,’ in spirit if not in fact”). 
 461. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISIM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 30–
31 (1990). 
 462. Id. at x (discussing the John Waters character featured in Female Trouble and Hairspray). 
 463. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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passport, Professor Robertson described how the bureaucratization of identity 
entailed “a process of exclusion and marginalization,” as reliance on 
identification documents replaced “local forms of identification based on 
different understandings of authenticity, self, and status.”464 This at first sounds 
as though something important was lost, but the local forms of identification 
that Robertson described were almost invariably based on distinguishing 
outsiders from insiders based on class, race, and disability.465 Elective rules, by 
contrast, would give priority to self-determination. But under an elective-
identity regime, there is no guarantee that individuals will see their identity 
options as anything other than those that follow routine scripts.466 
Second, bureaucracy is incapable of squelching all creativity. Sociologists 
have demonstrated how the understanding of bureaucratic processes as 
“‘detach[ing] and obliterat[ing] social relationships’ and eras[ing] human 
agency” is too simplistic.467 In their study of systems of classification, Geoffrey 
Bowker and Susan Leigh Star have observed that “[e]ven the most regimented 
infrastructure is ineluctably also local: if work-arounds are needed, they will be 
put into place.”468 Estelle Lau’s paper families are an example of how outsiders 
found a work-around to exclusionary bureaucratic processes in immigration 
law. Perhaps unintentionally, the bonds between these paper families often 
came to be experienced as just as “real” as other family bonds.469 
Third, there is some question as to whether formal identity doctrines 
eliminate the space for development of informal and off-the-grid identities. 
Consider again Judge Waddoups’s formal understanding of marriage as no 
more than license and solemnization.470 By limiting legal recognition of Kody 
Brown’s marriages to just his formal wife, the court avoided criminalizing his 
other relationships.471 Nonetheless, Kody Brown considers three other women 
to be his wives under the religious doctrine of “celestial plural marriage.”472 
And yet, there is still some merit to the criticism that formal identity is 
stifling bureaucratization, because being off the identity grid may render 
individuals extremely vulnerable. Although formal identity may have saved the 
 
 464. ROBERTSON, supra note 177, at 10–11. 
 465. See, e.g., id. at 12. 
 466. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
 467. Heimer, supra note 416, at 96 (quoting Wendy Espeland, Power, Policy and Paperwork: 
The Bureaucratic Representation of Interests, 16 QUAL. SOC. 297, 299 (1993)). 
 468. GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 314 (1999) (giving examples of how hospital workers use forms for 
unintended purposes); see also HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 194–98 
(1967) (explaining practical reasons why workers may keep “bad records”). 
 469. See supra notes 269–70 and accompanying text. 
 470. See supra notes 234–40 and accompanying text. 
 471. See supra notes 234–40 and accompanying text. 
 472. KODY, MERI, JANELLE, CHRISTINE & ROBYN BROWN, BECOMING SISTER WIVES: THE 
STORY OF AN UNCONVENTIONAL MARRIAGE 3 (2012). Advocates for polygamist families disagree on 
whether they would prefer “official recognition” in the form of “licensing and positive legal 
regulation” or for “the state to stay out of their intimate lives.” Davis, supra note 94, at 1960. 
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Brown family from prosecution, it excludes three of the “sister wives” from the 
potential protections of spousal status, including medical decision-making 
authority, eligibility for state, federal, and employer benefits programs, court-
supervised division of property and payment of alimony upon divorce, and 
advantageous estate and other tax treatment.473 In the context of parenthood, 
staying off the grid may leave a person without rights to be involved in the life 
of a child.474 In the context of citizenship, it means living in constant fear of 
deportation, being vulnerable to exploitation by criminal networks, and being 
without access to social services or stable employment.475 In the contexts of 
race and sex, it is difficult to find social space that might even metaphorically 
be said to be “off the grid.”476 
C. Discrimination 
Ideally, formal identities would be universally available and formal 
requirements would be uniformly enforced.477 But more often, legal identities 
are hybrids of formal, ascriptive, and elective elements, and enforcement takes 
place in contexts of inequality.478 Under certain circumstances, formalization of 
identity may reinforce the problems of essentialism and determinism that 
plague ascriptive definitions of identities. These circumstances include when 
formalization is not allowed universally, but rather, is limited to those who 
meet ascriptive definitions. They also include when formalization is not a 
 
 473. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–57 (Mass. 2003). 
 474. See supra note 122. 
 475. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in 
the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2010). 
 476. This point is often made in response to calls for “colorblind” decision making. See, e.g., 
Gotanda, supra note 10, at 18 (“One cannot literally follow a color-blind standard of conduct in 
ordinary social life” because “[t]o be racially color-blind . . . is to ignore what one has already 
noticed.”). With respect to formalities, admissions officers may assume that those who select “decline 
to state” when asked about race on law school applications are white. Cf. Camille Gear Rich, Decline 
to State: Diversity Talk and the American Law Student, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 539, 553 
(2009); see also id. at 555 n.45 (finding no empirical evidence to suggest that those applicants 
selecting “decline to state” in response to inquiries about race on law school applications have any 
admissions advantage over those who select “white”). With respect to sex and gender, the moment of 
the declaration “It’s a girl” or “It’s a boy” may be the moment when a baby is recognized as human. 
See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 232 (1993); see 
also supra note 309 (discussing recommendations that intersex babies be assigned a sex to avoid 
parental distress). But see, e.g., supra note 311 (discussing countries that allow the sex designation on 
identification documents to be left blank or filled in with a third alternative); Julie Scelfo, A University 
Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-third-gender 
-neutral.html?_r=1 (discussing efforts by the University of Vermont to give students the option of 
gender neutrality). 
 477. Cf. Fuller, supra note 10, at 802 (“[I]n the law, the ideal type of formal transaction would 
be . . . abstracted from the causes which gave rise to it and which has the same legal effect no matter 
what the context of motives and lay practices in which it occurs.”). 
 478. Cf. id. (“Most of the formal transactions familiar to modern law, however, fall short of the 
[ideal type]; the channels they cut are not sharply and simply defined.”). 
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universal requirement. If those who meet ascriptive definitions achieve 
identities by default, then individuals who must formalize their identities face 
unequal burdens. If formalization is required only to caution individuals against 
choosing certain identities but not others, it may express discriminatory 
preferences. Even if formalization is universally required, those who do not 
meet ascriptive definitions may be subjected to discriminatory policing of 
formal requirements. And finally, systems of formal verification may be 
designed in ways that cause more difficulties for members of subordinated 
groups or those who defy stereotypes. 
Selective formalization may be discriminatory when those who do not 
meet ascriptive standards do not have the option to formalize their identities. 
When the formality is a state-issued license, the government may establish 
barriers that require individuals to meet certain ascriptive definitions before 
they may apply.479 Examples include requirements that prospective citizens 
demonstrate their good moral character, that marriage be between only two 
people, that an adoptive couple show their fitness as parents, that transgender 
men have mastectomies, or that Indian tribes extend membership only to those 
with Indian ancestry. In these examples, ascriptive definitions play a leading 
role and formality is backstage. Formality merely moves the question of 
ascriptive meaning one level back, to the licensing authority. Yet the selectivity 
of these formalities may be forgotten in legal discussions. As the author of the 
only empirical study of tribal membership policies concluded, “[E]ven while 
the federal government’s relationship with ‘Indians throughout the United 
States’ is now almost exclusively confined to members of federally recognized 
tribes, public decision-makers and theorists alike often have no clear idea of 
who is included in the tribal class or why.”480  
Selective formalization may also be discriminatory if certain people are 
assumed to be holders of identities by default. Those that must formalize their 
identities face disproportionate burdens. The unmarried father in Lehr, for 
example, had to take steps to formalize his paternal identity, while the birth 
mother did not.481 The law presumes parental status from gestation. The birth 
certificate does not ask the mother to “acknowledge maternity.” By contrast, 
fathers who are married to birth mothers,482 or who participate in the rearing of 
their children may not be required to preserve their rights with these 
 
 479. See Case, supra note 90, at 1765 (describing the state’s involvement in marriage as 
“monopoly control over licensing”). 
 480. Gover, supra note 43, at 246. 
 481. See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text. 
 482. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248–49 (1978) (upholding, against an equal 
protection challenge, a law allowing a father of a child born in wedlock to challenge an adoption, but 
not the biological father of a child born out of wedlock who had not petitioned a court for legitimation 
of the child). 
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formalities.483 They meet performative definitions of fatherhood, and so they 
are fathers by default. 
Furthermore, formalities may express discriminatory messages when their 
cautionary aspects are meant to discourage individuals from changing their 
identities or deter individuals from adopting marginalized identities.484 The 
cautionary function is by nature paternalistic, in that it is intended to serve an 
individual’s own good by prompting her to “think twice” before entering into a 
legal arrangement.485 This paternalism is troubling when cautionary barriers are 
not proportionate to the legal consequences of identities, and instead reflect 
unexamined social judgments prioritizing static identities. For instance, 
requirements that transgender individuals acquire authorization from medical 
authorities before they may change sex designations on identification 
documents may be intended to discourage changes, based on a view that sex 
should be binary, exclusive, and static.486 Additionally, family law doctrines 
may reflect paternalistic stereotypes that women are more likely than men to 
experience regret about surrendering parental rights.487 
A related problem is disparate policing of formal requirements by legal 
authorities. Arizona law S.B. 1070 requires police officers stopping, arresting, 
or detaining any person to request that person’s driver’s license or other 
citizenship documents if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” regarding that 
person’s immigration status.488 This provision has been labeled the “show-me-
 
 483. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (striking down a statute that allowed 
a mother, but not a father, to veto an adoption, when the father had both admitted paternity and 
participated in the rearing of the children). 
 484. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1752–53 (2008) (discussing how waiting period restrictions on 
the right to abortion may be designed to “deter” abortion and “to persuade a woman to carry a 
pregnancy to term,” expressing the government’s interest in protecting fetal life). 
 485. See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational 
Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 802 (2014) (“Fuller here accepted that formalities can serve 
paternalistic ends, protecting a transferor against the hazards of subsequent regret.”). 
 486. Spade, supra note 329, at 31 (discussing how New York City policymakers insisted on 
medical gatekeeping requirements to “police trans identity” and ensure those who change gender 
markers will not want to “chang[e] back”). Paternalism may also take the form of trying to deter an 
individual from changing her gender identity because the change is likely to subject her to 
discrimination or other negative social consequences. 
 487. Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 
297–98 (2011) (discussing how court decisions protecting potential parents from regret often minimize 
the interests of fathers in paternity while assuming that women’s interests in maternity are paramount). 
 488. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015). The Supreme Court upheld this statute in 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–09 (2012), against the challenge that it was preempted 
by federal law. The Court held that an officer could also verify an individual’s citizenship status 
against the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement database. Id. at 2508. Other states have 
passed similar laws. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (2015); IND. CODE § 11-10-1-2 (2014). 
Arizona also confirms immigration status before issuing a driver’s license, although the trend among 
state legislatures is to move away from tying driver’s licenses to immigration status. See NAT’L 
IMMIGR. LAW CTR., INCLUSIVE POLICIES ADVANCE DRAMATICALLY IN THE STATES 2–5 (Oct. 2013), 
available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963. 
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your-papers requirement.”489 Such laws have been criticized for giving rise to 
racial profiling, since officers are likely to require documentary proof of 
immigration status only from those who appear Hispanic, speak Spanish, or are 
otherwise regarded as foreign by the officer.490 Politicized demands for 
President Barack Obama’s long-form birth certificate have been interpreted as 
a species of racial profiling in which people of color are made to continuously 
verify their claims to belonging in the American polity.491 Even when they do 
have the requisite formalities, those who do not meet ascriptive definitions of 
identity may be accused of forgery or asked for even more documentation.492 
Similarly, those who fail to meet sex stereotypes may be targeted by 
formal requirements. For example, the Crosby, Minnesota, city council policy 
providing for sex segregation of certain facilities, such as locker rooms, allows 
city officials to request a birth certificate proving an individual’s “biological 
gender,” “[i]f in doubt.”493 This policy reaffirms ascriptive notions of gender 
identity, since it requires that an official first have a “doubt” about a gender-
nonconforming person using the locker room before requesting a birth 
certificate.494 
Finally, many formalities are likely to create new difficulties for those 
who already face systemic discrimination based on gender, age, and race, 
because women, the elderly, and nonwhites are less likely to have accurate 
identification documents.495 E-Verify errors are more likely to affect women, 
who more often undergo name changes upon marriage or divorce, as well as 
individuals from cultural groups with naming practices or spellings unfamiliar 
to U.S. employers.496 
 
 489. Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 49, 56 (2013). 
 490. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333, 355–63 (2013); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in Arizona, 1 
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 168, 170 (2012). 
 491. Hughey, supra note 459, at 164. 
 492. Id. at 166. 
 493. See Crosby Minutes, supra note 335. 
 494. The policy is typical. Mottet, supra note 51, at 419 (describing common employer practice 
as follows: “[T]he default rule is essentially a social one: if you look like a man, you can use the men’s 
room and if you look like a woman, you can use the women’s room. When a person’s gender is 
challenged, a person is likely to receive access only if they can present identification with a matching 
gender marker.”). 
 495. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF, supra note 407, at 3 
(finding 18 percent of Americans over 65, and 25 percent of African American citizens did not have 
government-issued photo IDs); id. at 2 (finding that only 48 percent of voting-age women have a birth 
certificate with a current legal name, and only 66 percent of women with any proof of citizenship had 
a document with a current legal name); Brumberg, supra note 256, at 410 (noting that nonwhites have 
been less likely to have their births registered and are more likely to have missing data on their birth 
certificates). 
 496. Stumpf, supra note 206, at 400. For example, some individuals of Hispanic or Arab 
origins may have multiple surnames that are not recorded in the same way on all their identity 
documents. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT 
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D. Pigeonholing 
The channeling function of formalities may be a vice as well as a virtue. 
Formalities are meant to mark clear divisions between identities so as to 
facilitate private and public ordering. But the channels they create may be 
perplexed by liminal, diverse, marginal, dynamic, and disruptive identities. 
And individuals claiming these complex identities may be frustrated by 
demands that they pigeonhole their lives into the channels offered by forms. As 
Fuller remarked, “[T]he legal alphabet” is controlled by “judges, legislators, 
and text-writers.”497 Yet “the actual course of history is determined by a 
continuous process of compromise between those who wish to preserve the 
existing patterns and those who wish to rearrange them.”498 In law, “forms have 
at times been allowed to crystallize to the point where needed innovation has 
been impeded.”499 
Line drawing problems are characteristic of formal legal rules. Liminal 
identities—like those that go along with intersex status, pregnancy, or being in 
foster care—are troubling for formalities that ask whether one is a man, 
mother, or family member. These problems attend not just to identities 
constituted by formalities but to all abstract legal forms of identity. In theory, 
formalities could accommodate liminal identities with more nuanced 
categories.500 For example, immigration law includes many intermediary 
designations between alien and citizen, such as visa holders in various 
categories or lawful permanent residents. Each of these categories is subjected 
to unique legal treatment. Foster parents are also the subjects of their own set 
of formalities. But intermediary statuses such as these create problems, because 
other legal regimes may be premised on binary identities. For example, is a 
foster child a “family member” who might inherit a rent-stabilized apartment in 
New York City?501 Following the numerus clausus principle, formalities are 
generally utilized to channel individuals into a confined number of options.502 
Formalities may also cause problems when identities are diverse rather 
than exclusive, such as multinational, multiracial, or intersex identities. 
Multiracial individuals may experience forms that offer exclusive choices as 
 
VERIFICATION: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT SIGNIFICANT 
CHALLENGES REMAIN 19 (2010)). 
 497. Fuller, supra note 10, at 802 (quotation marks omitted). 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 803; cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 120, at 35 (discussing how “the numerus 
clausus sometimes frustrates parties’ objectives” by preventing them from achieving legitimate goals); 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988) (discussing 
oscillation of legal forms between rules and standards). 
 500. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 473–75 (arguing for a 
registration system for “functional parents” or limited guardians with “flexible, limited, and 
consensual” parental rights and duties). 
 501. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(o)(2) (2015) (providing an eight-factor 
inquiry for determining whether an individual who is not “immediate family” is a “family member”). 
 502. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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failing to recognize their complex identities and causing psychological and 
dignitary harms.503 Or consider the case of the intersex plaintiff in Johnson v. 
Fresh Mark, who sued her employer after being restricted to using the men’s 
restrooms.504 When asked for a clinical opinion on her sex, the plaintiff 
submitted a letter from counsel stating she was “‘neither entirely male [nor] 
entirely female.’”505 Dissatisfied with this “decidedly non-clinical 
explanation,” the court concluded that “the company made a good faith effort 
to determine which facilities were appropriate for Plaintiff, but left with her 
counsel’s ambiguous response, was forced to rely on the unequivocal 
information provided on her driver’s license.”506 
Still, formalities may accommodate diverse identities by giving 
respondents the option to choose more than one category or to choose none of 
the above.507 However, if individuals choose multiple identities, they may 
subvert the formality’s function of channeling them into exclusive categories 
for administrative or other purposes.508 Making options exclusive may further 
the administrative aim of limiting the number of persons eligible to demand 
resources based on particular formal identities. For example, since the 1960s, 
there has been an uptick in the number of Indian tribes prohibiting multiple 
tribal memberships.509 The increase coincides with congressional confirmations 
of judgment awards to be paid out to tribal members.510 One scholar argued 
that this development “provided incentives for tribes to formalize membership 
rules where informal rules had been used in the past, in order to limit 
membership to . . . conserve tribal resources by prohibiting the enrollment of 
persons likely to be served by other tribes.”511 
Formalities also trouble those with marginal identities—members of 
groups who do not meet norms or stereotypes associated with that group—for 
example, white people with low economic or social status,512 or masculine 
 
 503. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 370, at 1248 (discussing the multiracial category movement). 
 504. See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997–98 (2003), aff’d, 98 Fed. 
App’x. 461 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 505. Id. at 998. 
 506. Id. at 1000. 
 507. For example, since 2003, parents have been able to select more than one racial category to 
describe themselves on their child’s birth certificate, consistent with changes to the census form. 
Brumberg, supra note 256, at 409. 
 508. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 370, at 1259 (discussing how Department of Education rules 
on collection of racial data “lump all self-identified multiracials into one category . . . which then has 
no specific or independent meaning within the DOE reporting structure”). 
 509. Gover, supra note 43, at 273. 
 510. Id. at 296. 
 511. Id. at 297. 
 512. Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1516 (2010) (discussing 
“whites who only enjoy white privilege in contingent, context-specific ways”); see also LAURA E. 
GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 149 (2007) 
(considering “the twenty-first-century legacy of Mexican Americans’ history as off-white—sometimes 
defined as legally white, almost always defined as socially non-white”). 
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women. Such individuals may find formalities coercive, and feel forced to 
make choices that do not ring authentic. 
The most unique disadvantage of formal identities, relative to ascriptive 
and elective ones, is that they are confounded by dynamic identities: identities 
that change over time or depend on context. Formalities leave documentary 
traces that “inhibit forgetting.”513 The idea that a past formality might estop an 
individual from claiming a different identity is based on an understanding of 
identity as impervious to change or reformulation depending on context. But 
people do not always experience identity in this static and acontextual way. 
Researchers have found that many multiracial individuals change their racial 
identifications in different situations and over their lifetimes.514 For example, 
consider a multiracial woman who is only willing to identify as such if she 
believes her employer’s diversity program is genuine as opposed to 
tokenizing.515 The effects can be passed down through the generations, as one 
whose ancestors did not sign the Dawes Rolls may not have a claim to tribal 
membership.516 Or a person whose parents brought her to the United States 
without pursuing immigration formalities may find herself estopped from 
claiming U.S. citizenship. This estoppel problem is a growing risk as 
technology facilitates better collection and retention of records. 
Formalities need not be static; as in contracting, they may be revocable or 
have conditions for termination. Some formalities, such as marriage and 
naturalization, are generally revocable through new formalities, while others, 
such as adoption, are not.517 One explanation might be the extent to which 
revocation could affect third-party or public interests, such as the well-being of 
children. 
Curiously, sex-designation changes, which would seem to affect few 
public interests outside the prison and restroom contexts, are considered 
irrevocable. Courts have held that sex changes should not be allowed on birth 
certificates unless the change is “irreversible” and “permanent.”518 Even some 
advocates of allowing a change without proof of surgery have argued, “It’s the 
 
 513. Dery, supra note 451, at 687. 
 514. Nancy Leong, Half/Full, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2013) (discussing 
sociological research); Rich, supra note 74, at 1532–35 (same). 
 515. Cf. Jessica M. Vasquez, Blurred Borders for Some but Not “Others”: Racialization, 
“Flexible Ethnicity,” Gender, and Third-Generation Mexican American Identity, 53 SOC. PERSP. 45, 
61 (2010) (discussing reasons for inconsistent racial identifications). 
 516. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 517. Parents who give up adopted children may be guilty of the crime of abandonment and sued 
for child support. See Lisa Cornwell, Cleveland and Lisa Cox, Ohio Couple, Give Back Adopted Son 
After 9 Years, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2013, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/15/cleveland-and-lisa-cox-give-back-adopted-son 
_n_4283178.html. 
 518. In re R.W. Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 87 (Md. 2003); see also M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that sex changes should be allowed on birth certificates if 
the changes are “consistent” and “irreversible”); Mottet, supra note 51, at 416–17 (discussing concerns 
by administrators and judges about “avoiding multiple corrections”). 
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permanence of the transition that matters most.”519 The rationale for this 
concern is not articulated, and there is a lack of empirical evidence that 
individuals are likely to want to “switch back.”520 The unstated anxiety may 
pertain to whether the formality is fulfilling the cautionary function of 
requiring the claimant to think carefully about his or her transition. For this 
reason, perhaps, advocates of more lenient rules recommend another layer of 
formality for a birth certificate change: a doctor’s letter attesting to the 
genuineness of the individual’s gender transition, rather than proof of 
surgery.521 
Most troubling for formalities are disruptive identities that refuse 
categorization or seek to destabilize categories through such means as gender 
parody. Consider again Divine the drag queen, whose performance of gender 
norms is not about passing as a woman, but rather, calling attention to the 
constructed nature of gender and sex.522 This performance may or may not 
subvert gender norms, depending on context.523 In any event, such 
performances may not be intelligible to legal formalities. 
E. Legitimation 
[M]oral questions arise when the categories of the powerful become 
the taken for granted; when policy decisions are layered into 
inaccessible technological structures; when one group’s visibility 
comes at the expense of another’s suffering. 
Geoffrey Bowker & Susan Leigh Star 524 
A potential risk of formal identity is that it may be so effective in 
channeling private behavior and facilitating public order that it legitimates 
distinctions based on identities. Legitimation is the idea that law is “a series of 
ideological constructs that operate to support existing social arrangements by 
convincing people that things are both inevitable and basically fair.”525 Certain 
types of rights claims only succeed by reproducing ideological premises that 
 
 519. Damien Cave, New York Plans to Make Gender Personal Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/nyregion/07gender.html?pagewanted=all (quoting then-
New York City health commissioner Dr. Thomas R. Frieden). 
 520. Mottet, supra note 51, at 416–17. 
 521. See id. 
 522. See supra note 462 and accompanying text; Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender 
Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 527 (1988). 
 523. See Butler, supra note 522, at 527. 
 524. BOWKER & STAR, supra note 468, at 320. 
 525. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1350 (1988). For example, critical 
race theorists argued that the civil rights laws of the 1960s, while appearing to embody an 
“unambiguous commitment to antidiscrimination,” were founded on “many conflicting . . . interests” 
that “actually reinforce[d] existing social arrangements, moderated to the extent necessary to balance 
the civil rights challenge with the many interests still privileged over it.” Id. at 1348. Thus, the formal 
commitment to equality of opportunity contained the seeds of the ideology of colorblindness that 
obscures systemic and material inequality. See id. at 1343–46. 
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are neither inevitable nor fair. For instance, a law providing slaves with certain 
rights against their masters may constrain the behavior of slaveowners while at 
the same time reaffirming the institution of slavery.526 By improving conditions 
for slaves, these rights may make the case against slavery seem less urgent, or 
they might make slavery appear fair and normatively palatable.527 As an 
empirical matter, this may be debated, and attention to context is crucial.528 
Slaves who claim rights, for example, may be engaged in “strategic 
exploitation of loopholes in their legally prescribed status rather than 
constitutive reproductions of that status.”529 
Legitimation arguments are often made against a variety of rights claims, 
not just those premised on formal identities.530 However, claims to formal 
identity have unique ways of legitimating institutional arrangements. Formality 
may be seen as a way of transcending political controversies over ascriptive 
versus elective definitions of identities, turning those identities into legal 
questions that can be resolved objectively on the basis of simple evidence. 
Formal identity may also go along with documentary essentialism, in which 
people feel their identities are made “real” by formalities like birth 
certificates.531 The significance of these real identities may prove difficult to 
challenge. Formalities may thus have a depoliticizing effect, shutting off 
avenues for debate over the purposes of legal rules that turn on identity 
classifications. 
In addition to this sort of ideological legitimation, formal identity may 
facilitate regulatory projects by governments or corporations. If formal 
identities are to be useful they must be recorded, and those records may be put 
 
 526. See John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again, 18 
LAW & HIST. REV. 627, 645–46 (2000) (discussing this example). 
 527. Cf. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative 
“Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 421–24 (2002) (discussing legitimation in the 
context of arguments over the death penalty). Steiker and Steiker referred to reforms that forestall 
broader change by improving conditions as “entrenchment” and to reforms that create a false sense of 
the normative legitimacy of a social practice as “legitimation.” Id. 
 528. See Crenshaw, supra note 525, at 1350 (arguing that the theory of legitimation is a 
“general one” that requires attention to the “reality of oppression”); Alan Hyde, The Concept of 
Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WISC. L. REV. 379, 426 (arguing that the concept of 
legitimation “leads researchers into easy hypotheses about the effect of legal phenomena without the 
necessity of empirical support”). 
 529. Witt, supra note 526, at 646. 
 530. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429 (1995) 
(“Legal scholars who write about legitimation concern themselves with the ‘hegemonic’ power and 
function of legal discourse and doctrine; they focus on the various ways in which law in all of its 
manifestations helps to generate ways of thinking that reinforce numerous aspects of social life that 
might otherwise be considered normatively undesirable.”). 
 531. See supra notes 458–59 and accompanying text. 
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to ill or unintended uses.532 In his critique of systems of gender classification, 
Professor Dean Spade has argued, “[F]ormal recognition and classification 
bring new efficiencies to violence.”533 
Consider, for example, formal identity in the immigration context. Some 
scholars have argued that legal reforms that incrementally expand the 
categories of people who may claim citizenship legitimate the concept of 
national citizenship, which is, at heart, exclusionary.534 Formal citizenship—the 
idea that citizenship will be bestowed on those who follow the rules, wait their 
turn, and comply with the formalities of naturalization—now serves as an 
argument for the fairness of excluding those who have not pursued formal 
routes.535 
Coinciding with the formalization of citizenship is the increased linkage 
of rights and duties to citizenship or other formal immigration statuses. In the 
twentieth century, the ability to travel across U.S. borders and to work in the 
United States became tied to immigration status. The E-Verify database is now 
used only to verify work eligibility, but could someday be used as part of a 
more comprehensive strategy of immigration enforcement.536 Why, for 
example, should the right to practice law,537 purchase health insurance,538 or 
drive a car539 in the United States depend on immigration status? Are the 
undocumented excluded from these rights as part of a strategy of “attrition 
through enforcement”: discouraging the presence of undocumented persons by 
 
 532. Whether such harms materialize depends on the extent to which information is kept secure 
and privacy is protected. Transgender rights advocates argue for robust protections of privacy related 
to birth certificate changes. Mottet, supra note 51, at 437–47. 
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 535. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, What is “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”? Taking the Long 
View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225, 233–34 (2010) (discussing the objection that “legalization endorses 
lawbreaking” and violates the “‘rule of law’”). 
 536. See Stumpf, supra note 206, at 412. 
 537. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 129, 133 (Cal. 2014) (asking, “Is there any reason, under 
state law, that undocumented immigrants, as a class or group, should not be admitted to the State 
Bar?” and concluding the answer is no). 
 538. NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., IMMIGRANTS AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 
(revised Jan. 2014), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=157 (noting that 
undocumented immigrants are not permitted to purchase health insurance from state insurance 
exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
 539. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The 
Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 222–24 (2004) (arguing against state laws limiting 
immigrant eligibility for driver’s licenses). 
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wearing them down?540 The concept of attrition through enforcement deserves 
normative and empirical scrutiny to determine whether it might have a 
deterrent effect or just force undocumented lives underground into dangerous 
black markets and informal economies.541 
Legitimation arguments are common in debates over the meaning of 
marriage. Many have argued that expanding the right to marriage to same-sex 
couples legitimates the institution of marriage, to the exclusion of other forms 
of intimate ordering.542 In 2004, the U.S. General Accounting Office found 
“1,138 federal statutory provisions classified to the United States Code in 
which marital status [was] a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, 
and privileges.”543 Defining marriage based more on formal choice and less on 
ascriptive stereotypes makes this distribution more palatable. As a result of the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, some states have been phasing out marriage-
like alternatives such as domestic partnerships and civil unions.544 But why 
does the law channel intimate orders into just two categories: married couples 
or not? Why does the law distribute resources based on marriage, as opposed to 
other caregiving arrangements, like parenthood, eldercare, or extended 
families?545 
Legitimation through formalization may operate in less obvious ways. 
Abortion-rights advocates have voiced opposition to Missing Angel laws that 
allow women to obtain birth certificates for stillbirths.546 Their practical 
concern, that birth certificates might be issued to women who have had 
abortions, was allayed by clarifications in legislative language.547 Still, 
Professor Sanger has asked whether public recognition of motherhood in the 
stillbirth context may have costs for “women who do not want to become 
mothers” in the abortion context.548 By recognizing the fetus as a child, birth 
 
 540. Note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (West 2012). 
 541. See Chantal Thomas, Immigration Controls and “Modern-Day Slavery” 6 (Cornell Law 
Sch. research paper No. 13-86, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2294656 (arguing 
that “the lack of valid immigration documentation and status enables . . . conditions of coercion” in 
which trafficked workers “remain under enslavement”). 
 542. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK 
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q. (1989), reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO & CON 122 (Andrew 
Sullivan ed., 2004). 
 543. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., to Hon. Bill 
Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
 544. See, e.g., Inga Nelson, Note, Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships as 
Marriages in Same-Sex Marriage States, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1183–91 (2014). 
 545. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 231–32 (1995) (envisioning “a redistribution or 
reallocation of social and economic subsidies now given to the natural family . . . to support caretaking 
as the family intimacy norm”). 
 546. Sanger, supra note 273, at 305. 
 547. See id. at 307. 
 548. Id. at 310. 
2015] IDENTITY AND FORM 827 
certificates for stillbirths may further a social understanding of all pregnant 
women as mothers, contributing, over time, to the erosion of Roe v. Wade.549 
With respect to formal sex, Professor Spade has argued that 
“administrative classification of identities does invisible work of naturalizing 
categories of classification, inviting the question: Why is gender identification 
taken for granted as a legitimate domain of governance?”550 While Professor 
Spade acknowledged that liberalization of the rules governing the requirements 
for changes to sex designations on identity documents would be a positive 
development, “to imagine only these reforms is to miss the greater insight that 
this matrix of policies allows.”551 Instead, he argued that the incoherence of 
various state and federal policies on sex classifications should help bring into 
view the lack of utility of sex classifications for administrative schemes.552 
Concerns over legitimation may explain the limited uptake of the idea of 
formal race at a time when many consider race to be anachronistic or altogether 
irrelevant. U.S. law prohibits the use of census data for anything other than “the 
statistical purposes for which it is supplied.”553 In the World War II era, the 
U.S. government used statistical census data to determine the location of the 
Japanese American population for purposes of internment.554 
In the affirmative action context, Native American identity is cast as more 
a question of citizenship than race. Yet in that context, debates about formal 
identity may overshadow questions about the substantive purposes of identity 
classifications. The ABA report urging law schools to adopt a formal model of 
Native American identity does not contain any discussion of how law schools 
use Native American identity status or what definition would best serve those 
purposes.555  
*** 
The “emptiness” of formality gives it appeal for reformers who seek to 
contest the ascriptive meanings of legal identities and allow greater self-
definition. Formalities have evidentiary benefits, providing individuals with the 
security that the law will recognize their identity claims, and facilitating 
reliance on those identities by others. But formalities can become the sole 
arbiters of identity, bureaucratizing understandings of the self and constricting 
the space for creativity and improvisation. By inducing caution, formalities can 
ensure that identity choices are more meaningful. Yet some formalities may 
impede rather than induce deliberation, fail to make clear their purposes, 
 
 549. Id. Sanger did not argue that Missing Angel Acts are motivated by any position on 
abortion; rather, she argued that “they contribute to a thicker mix of cultural signs and coordinates in 
which fetal and embryonic life are claimed as full human persons.” Id. 
 550. Spade, supra note 9, at 738. 
 551. Id. at 802. 
 552. Id. at 803. 
 553. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(1) (2012). 
 554. Sobel, supra note 351, at 349. 
 555. See supra note 393. 
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impose paternalistic barriers to disfavored identities, or be inaccessible to those 
without resources. Identity formalities also channel: facilitating private and 
public ordering by providing uniform and easily administrable categories. But 
in doing so, formal requirements may trap individuals into standardized and 
decontextualized legal packages or leave them outside the law’s recognition. 
The ease of administration and seeming neutrality of formal identities may 
obscure underlying discrimination, and legitimate the use of identity-based 
classifications that should be subjected to scrutiny. 
IV. 
RETHINKING THE LEGAL FUNCTIONS OF IDENTITIES 
The question of people’s identity will forever be befuddling if 
detached from the purposes for which the question is being asked. 
Once the purposes are disclosed, the perspective of the inquirer, the 
perspective of the evaluator, the perspective of the community, and in 
some cases, self-proclaimed identity become critical. Neither 
perceptions by outsiders nor claims of insiders are “objective.” Each 
reflects interests and a position, a perspective. 
Martha Minow556 
This final Part argues for reexamination of the many purposes of identity-
based regulation rather than a wholesale move toward formalization. 
Formalization, in theory, is an attractive compromise between ascriptive and 
elective models because it serves evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling 
functions. But what substantive ends do these formal functions serve? In the 
context of contracting, formalities may serve the substantive purposes of 
protecting private autonomy, facilitating reliance, and avoiding unjust 
enrichment. In identity contexts, whether to adopt formal definitions depends 
on what substantive interests the particular identity classifications serve, 
whether those substantive aims are normatively justified, and if so, whether 
formal definitions are the best means of meeting those aims. 
This Part argues for context-dependent, rather than all-purpose, identity 
definitions, which might be ascriptive, elective, or formal, depending on the 
substantive aims of the doctrine. Elective definitions may be appropriate where 
the law’s concern is protecting privacy and autonomy. Ascriptive definitions 
may be appropriate where the law regulates identity as a proxy for another 
substantive interest apart from protecting the right to self-definition. Formal 
definitions may be appropriate when the law seeks to facilitate identity choices, 
but it is necessary to mark a clear division between those who do and do not 
hold particular rights or duties, to caution individuals before they choose those 
rights or duties, and to provide stability and security in those identities.557  
 
 556. Minow, supra note 118, at 116. 
 557. Cf. Fuller, supra note 10, at 800 (arguing that the question of when to require formalities 
depended on whether they were needed to satisfy their formal “desiderata,” in other words, the 
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To the extent that the law defers to formalities, those formalities should 
induce caution proportionate to the rights at stake, be accessible to everyone, 
and be transparent about their consequences. Although demands for formal 
evidence of identity may be premised on questionable fraud concerns, 
advocates may find that the security formality provides is an immediate 
imperative for those made vulnerable by identity-based regulation. 
A. Questioning Channels 
Thinking about identity formalities in terms of their channeling function 
raises questions about the need for clear, all-purpose divisions between who is, 
and is not, a certain type of person. These questions include: (1) should 
eligibility for rights and responsibilities hinge on a particular identity status, 
and (2) are there reasons to define identities uniformly across all legal domains, 
or might identities be “unbundled” and defined differently depending on the 
legal context? Answering these questions requires interrogation of the various 
uses of legal distinctions based on citizenship, family, race, and sex. 
Furthermore, addressing these questions requires shifting the focus from 
policing group membership lines to questioning the relevance of group 
membership. 
Another commercial law analogy is helpful here. Property rights are often 
explained with the metaphor of a bundle of sticks.558 Property is not simply an 
owner’s right to a thing, but rather, “a relationship among human beings such 
that the so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit 
others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the assistance of 
the law in carrying out his decision.”559 Ownership is a bundle of rights, such 
as the right to exclude others from the property, the right to use the property, 
the right to sell the property, and so forth. Thinking of property ownership in 
this way denaturalizes property arrangements and opens the door to consider 
what it would mean to disaggregate the various sticks, or take apart the rights 
in the bundle. The bundle metaphor calls into question linkages between a 
status and its associated rights or duties that might otherwise be taken for 
granted. 
Legal identities might also be susceptible to unbundling, allowing for 
different definitions depending on the particular context. Creating multiple 
legal definitions may avoid the suggestion that bureaucratic processes have the 
 
evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions, as well as the substantive bases of contract law); 
Kennedy, supra note 128, at 103 (“Viewing consideration doctrine as a formality, we ask the extent to 
which, in any given situation, it promotes the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions Fuller 
peremptorily assigns to formalities. Viewing the doctrine as a restriction on freedom of contract, we 
ask whether the restriction confines enforcement appropriately, given the goals of securing private 
autonomy, compensating reliance, and preventing unjust enrichment.”). 
 558. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 
(1996). 
 559. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373 (1954). 
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power to render identities authentic in all spheres of social life. This variability 
may also avoid the inequalities that result when certain statuses are formally 
enshrined for preferential or disadvantageous treatment across the board. 
Defining identities contextually rather than for all purposes is less likely to 
pigeonhole individuals into categories that do not match their lived 
experiences. Rather than legitimating identity-based regulation, the bundle 
metaphor might reveal that identities are standing in as proxies for other 
concerns that the law might more directly regulate without the need to assign a 
status to an individual at all. 
Consider the possibility of unbundling citizenship. Those who see 
liberatory potential in formal identity might call for expanding access to 
naturalization for certain undocumented immigrants. Legalization may help 
those who meet its prerequisites and can afford to pursue it. But so long as 
undocumented migration to the United States continues, this strategy will 
require repetition by every generation.560 If we consider the substantive 
purposes of citizenship distinctions instead, we might question why ever more 
rights and duties are being tied to citizenship status. Professor Ayelet Shachar 
has examined the concept of “unbundling” the rights and duties associated with 
national citizenship.561 This might entail a corresponding expansion of the 
notion of human rights or basic rights that all are entitled to, regardless of 
membership in political communities.562 Unbundling citizenship rights might 
also prompt smaller-scale questions about whether documentation of 
citizenship should be a prerequisite for access to police services, health care, 
driver’s licenses, or employment. 
Expansion of formal family might entail recognizing new forms of 
marriage, enforcing more parenting agreements, or abandoning presumptions 
of parenthood. But why are the identities of spouse and parent the focal points 
of regulation? As Professor Kerry Abrams has written, “Marriage has become 
the receptacle for all sorts of attempts to solve social problems, but it is no 
longer a robust enough institution to serve this function.”563 Why should the tax 
code treat formally married couples differently?564 Why are public benefits, 
 
 560. See Motomura, supra note 535, at 240 (arguing that disputes over legalization will recur 
for the next generation if the United States pursues limited legalization programs rather than making 
permanent changes to expand who may pursue legal status under the immigration laws, “foster[ing] 
international economic development, and better serv[ing] the population in the United States that is 
most vulnerable to economic displacement by newcomers”). 
 561. SHACHAR, supra note 30, at 61–66. 
 562. Id. at 62; see also Bosniak, supra note 66, at 467–70, 502. 
 563. Abrams, supra note 108, at 6. 
 564. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 343, 
340 (1994) (arguing for “[m]andatory separate returns” because allowing joint returns makes marriage 
“bonuses or penalties unavoidable”). 
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such as social security, tied to marriage rather than dependency?565 
Policymakers should articulate the reasons for relying on marriage rather than 
treating it as a “reflexive depository for . . . largesse.”566 Professor Martha 
Fineman has argued that if the purpose of the state’s endorsement of marriage 
is to facilitate private caretaking of dependents, the state might provide 
resources to caretakers directly.567 
In addition to ensuring care for dependents, family law doctrines serve a 
variety of substantive purposes, including, for example, “autonomy, pluralism, 
privacy, and gender equality.”568 To better serve these aims, many legal 
scholars have argued for disaggregation and reconfiguration of various parental 
rights and responsibilities.569 To this end, rather than asking whether 
parenthood should be formal, ascriptive, or elective as a general matter, we 
might ask what substantive purposes the legal distinction is intended to serve in 
each context and what definitions are best tailored for them. The clarity offered 
by formal channels will not always secure these ends.570 
Likewise, rather than seeking to extend the right to make formal changes 
to sex on birth certificates, reformers might ask what purposes sex designations 
are serving in the law. The Supreme Court has abandoned the premise that the 
sexes of spouses are relevant to marriage.571 Yet the sex segregation of various 
physical spaces is rarely questioned. Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that 
2006 efforts to liberalize New York City’s rules for changes to sex designations 
 
 565. Cf. Abrams, supra note 108, at 40–44 (discussing how public benefits are linked to 
marriage on the “assumption” that “most people were married and that most wives were financially 
dependent on their husbands”). 
 566. Abrams, supra note 108, at 66. 
 567. See FINEMAN, supra note 545, at 231–32 (arguing that rather than traditional families 
anchored by married couples, the state should subsidize “a non-traditional configuration of family” in 
the form of dependents and caretakers). 
 568. See Appleton, supra note 487, at 259. 
 569. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 913 (2006) (arguing for separation of the economic responsibility for 
a child from custody rights); Michele Goodwin & Naomi Duke, Parent Civil Unions: Rethinking the 
Nature of Family, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (proposing that parental civil unions allowing more 
than two parents related by family or friendship replace the foster care system); Laura T. Kessler, 
Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 72–77 (2007) (exploring legal recognition of 
more than two parents); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding 
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 388 (2008) (considering how the law might 
“facilitate and enable the care networks that support and assist parents”). Professor Glenn Cohen has 
argued that the right not to be a parent be disaggregated into “multiple possible sticks, including the 
right not to be a genetic parent, the right not to be a legal parent, and the right not to be a gestational 
parent.” I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1118 
(2008). 
 570. Cf. Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 
2012 (2014) (discussing the rules versus standards debate and arguing for “thinking critically about 
how to take the best of both in designing frameworks that accommodate the dizzying rate of social and 
technological change manifesting itself in domestic relations disputes”). 
 571. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court issued Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 
14–556, 14–562, 14–571, 14–574, slip op. (U.S. 2015). 
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on birth certificates failed because reformers did not consider the state interests 
involved in sex classifications.572 Spaces such as restrooms, prison cells, and 
hospital rooms may be sex segregated in the interests of safety or privacy.573 
But in the debate over expanding access to formal sex, these policy concerns 
were not raised and so could not be contested.574 If they had been, they might 
have been debunked.575 There is an “absence of data” on whether segregated 
restrooms keep women safe from crime.576 And as Professor Yoshino wrote, 
“To the extent that privacy concerns rest on a fear of sexual objectification, 
they rely on a specious assumption of universal heterosexuality.”577 Rather than 
asking who belongs in which spaces, the question might be how spaces could 
be rearranged to ensure safety and privacy for everyone.578  
Rather than using formality to channel individuals into easily 
administrable racial identities, we might similarly ask why the law relies on 
racial classifications. Professor Lauren Sudeall Lucas has argued for more 
 
 572. See Kenji Yoshino, Sex and the City: New York City Bungles Transgender Equality, 
SLATE (Dec. 11, 2006, 2:43 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/12/sex_and_the_city.html (arguing that 
reformers should have articulated the “interests that a person or the state might have in another 
person’s gender . . . more clearly . . . so they could have been contested”). In 2014, New York City 
reconsidered this issue and liberalized its rule to eliminate surgical and name-change requirements. 
BD. OF HEALTH, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF 
AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 207 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 2–3 (Dec. 2014), available 
at http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/sites/default/files/adopted_rules_pdf/f-dohmh_12-12-
14_b_art._207.pdf. 
 573. Yoshino, supra note 572. Yoshino also points to concerns regarding fraud and national 
security. Id.; see also Mottet, supra note 51, at 414–15 (discussing law enforcement concerns).  
 574. Other policy concerns are raised in favor of sex segregation in sports, such as the argument 
that women and girls will not otherwise have fair opportunities to compete. Skinner-Thompson & 
Turner, supra note 111, at 277. Whether these concerns justify sex segregation, and if so, how sex 
should be defined, depends on the sport. See, e.g., Erin Buzuvis, Caster Semenya and the Myth of A 
Level Playing Field, 6 MOD. AM. 36, 39 (2010) (arguing, with respect to the Olympics and other elite 
athletic competitions, that the “long term goal” should be to “reconceptualiz[e] sports to allow for 
more integrated competitions that group athletes by physical characteristics other than sex” and that 
the short term goal should be to move from ascriptive to elective rules with respect to sex verification, 
qualified by a good faith requirement); Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 111, at 287 
(explaining that many youth sports teams are integrated because differences between the sexes in 
physical abilities are not significant prior to puberty). 
 575. See generally Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in 
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 219–24 (Harvey Molotch & Laura 
Norén eds., 2010) (responding to the concerns that unisex restrooms would result in crime, be unclean, 
and eliminate an important space for “female sociability”). 
 576. Id. at 220. Professor Case argued that the “illusion of safety” in the women’s restroom 
may even facilitate crime, describing a case in which a female victim attempted to elude her male 
assailant by hiding in the women’s restroom, but he followed her into the restroom and killed her. Id. 
 577. Yoshino, supra note 572. 
 578. Case, supra note 575, at 217 (“If the model of the airplane toilet, a model much closer to 
the toilet stall in a typical women’s room than to the urinal in a typical men’s room, were to become 
the universal norm, ending sex segregation in the toilets need not mean a loss of privacy for women.”); 
cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Inside Out, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 95, 96 (2011) (arguing that rather than 
segregating gay and transgender inmates to protect them from sexual violence, prisons should be 
concerned with all types of vulnerability to violence).  
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careful consideration of the purposes to be achieved by racial classifications, by 
“untangl[ing]” elective race from ascriptive race.579 Employment 
discrimination law, for example, seeks to ensure equal opportunity. 
Technically, the most common method of proving employment discrimination 
requires a plaintiff to show “that he belongs to a racial minority.”580 But 
disputes over membership in racial groups are not often litigated under this 
doctrine.581 Rather, courts ask whether the employer perceived the employee as 
a member of a particular race and discriminated on that basis. This ascriptive 
definition of race is tailored to the purpose of the law: to prohibit ascriptive 
racial classifications that are discriminatory; not to protect elective racial 
identifications. Formal racial identifications are not relevant to proving 
employment discrimination, except insofar as they shed light on whether an 
employer knew about an employee’s race.582 
In the context of affirmative action, race is almost invariably defined 
based on individual election at the time of application—at least officially.583 
Unofficially, employers and educational institutions may use ascriptive notions 
of race based on appearance.584 They may also consider formal designators of 
racial affiliation, such as resume lines listing the Black Law Student’s 
Association or La Asociación Latina.585 In the context of Native American law 
school applications, the ABA now recommends deference to formal tribal 
enrollment.586 Whether a definition of race based on appearance, community, 
election, or formal affiliation best serves the purpose of affirmative action is 
 
 579. Lucas, supra note 370, at 1248–50. 
 580. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 581. See Greene v. Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2004) 
(noting there is “very little case law on what is required to show membership in a protected class”); 
Metoyer v. State, 874 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that “the ‘membership’ 
requirement of the prima facie case must not be taken too literally” since “Title VII must not be used 
to promote further racial and ethnic categorization” (quoting Gilbert v. Babbitt, No. Civ. A. 92-
1124(NHJ), 1993 WL 468465, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 1993))). 
 582. See, e.g., supra note 402 (collecting cases on Native American identity); Nieves v. Metro. 
Dade Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 955, 962 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (refusing to conclude that a plaintiff fell outside 
the protected class of Hispanic persons even though the plaintiff failed to identify himself as Hispanic 
on his employment application). 
 583. One law professor and former law school admissions officer has argued that institutions 
should require “diversity statements” to provide “the necessary context that would demonstrate why 
the self-identification is meaningful to [the applicant] by connecting identity with perspective.” Philip 
Lee, On Checkbox Diversity, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 203, 215 (2013). I leave for another day the 
question of what this practice measures, and whether it requires that a candidate “perform” her identity 
according to certain stereotypical narratives. Cf. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 46, at 116–33 
(discussing the social and institutional meanings of “[a]cting [d]iverse”). 
 584. A former human resources employee at a large corporation told the author that they prefer 
to receive applications with pictures of the candidate so as to better identify those who might qualify 
for affirmative action. 
 585. Cf. EEOC v. Target Corp., 460 F.3d 946, 961 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing plaintiff’s 
argument that her employer could have inferred her race from the African American sorority on her 
resume). 
 586. See supra note 392 and accompanying text. 
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seldom debated or discussed.587 This may be due to discomfort around issues of 
race and disagreement on the validity of affirmative action in general. 
Alternatively, hesitation to examine which definition of race is best for 
affirmative action might be due to disputes about which purposes affirmative 
action should serve: remedying patterns of discrimination, correcting historical 
injustice, ensuring equality of opportunity, breaking down stereotypes, 
achieving a diverse workforce or classroom, improving the institution’s image, 
avoiding litigation, or something else. In the affirmative action context, 
Professor Camille Gear Rich has called for a move away from “authenticity 
inquiries,” which are focused on determining “race writ large,” and toward 
functionalist ones, which ask whether a person has experienced the sort of 
“racialization” that might contribute to the employer’s remedial or diversity 
oriented goals.588 Such an approach would call into question reliance on formal 
race, since “a person with a record of inconsistent racial designations may have 
a particularly insightful and interesting perspective on racialization that would 
be relevant in conversations about diversity.”589 It would also call into question 
a definition of Native American identity as formal citizenship rather than 
ascriptive racial identity.590 And it would require critical examination of the 
argument that law school affirmative action policies ought to benefit only those 
Native Americans who take on the burdens of tribal membership, such as jury 
service and taxes,591 and whose ancestors formalized their Indian status through 
census designations.592 
B. Inducing Proportionate Caution 
Whether formalization is appropriate also depends on whether caution is 
required, and whether the requisite formality is effective at inducing the 
appropriate level of caution. Fuller argued that whether formality is required 
for cautionary purposes depends in part on the importance of the transaction.593 
As the stakes increase, so too should the elaborateness of the formality.594 But 
at a certain point, the costs of formalities may be so high as to have a deterrent 
 
 587. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 393, at 4 (referring vaguely to types of Native American 
ancestry that are not sufficient for “official academic and legal purposes”). 
 588. Rich, supra note 73, at 198. 
 589. Id. at 208. 
 590. There are reasons to question whether formal tribal enrollment is a good metric of these 
concerns. See David Treuer, How Do You Prove You’re an Indian?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/for-indian-tribes-blood-shouldnt-be-everything.html (“I 
know full-blooded Indians who have lived their entire lives on reservations but can’t be enrolled 
because they have blood from many different tribes, and I know of non-Indians who have been 
enrolled by accident or stealth just because they’ll get something out of it.”). 
 591. See supra note 402. 
 592. See supra note 389. 
 593. Fuller, supra note 10, at 805. 
 594. Id. (“We must preserve a proportion between means and end; it will scarcely do to require 
a sealed and witnessed document for the effective sale of a loaf of bread.”). 
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effect, limiting access to identities to those who can pay the price.595 Moreover, 
the design of some formalities may induce disregard or confusion rather than 
careful contemplation.596 
The stakes of identity determinations might be benchmarked against those 
of wills, trusts, and estates, which require the formalities of a writing, 
signature, and attestation.597 These instruments may determine the distribution 
of property after an individual dies, or even custody of her children. Many of 
the rights and duties currently associated with citizenship and family have 
similar, if not more significant, consequences for individuals. The 
consequences increase as the law imposes more barriers to exit from identities. 
By contrast, the consequences of “mistakes” as to sex and race designations for 
individuals are rarely articulated. Onerous cautionary requirements for formal 
changes to sex or race may reflect a brand of paternalism rooted in stereotypes 
about authentic identities.598 
In popular discussions of formal identity, the question of the 
proportionality of the formality to the stakes of recognition is often forgotten. 
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the adoptive couple’s brief began with the 
phrase, “After unceremoniously renouncing his parental rights to his unborn 
daughter – Baby Girl – in a text message . . . .”599 But the “unceremonious” 
nature of a text message, sent in the context of a conflict over a broken 
engagement, ought to suggest that it is exactly not the sort of formality that 
might ground a surrender of custody rights.600 The format of the text message 
does not lend itself to careful contemplation of potentially binding 
obligations.601 What sort of formal requirements might induce contemplation 
requisite to the stakes involved—such as signatures, notarization, waiting 
 
 595. See supra Part III.A (discussing the commodification problem); Kennedy, supra note 152, 
at 1692 (“[W]hatever its purpose, the requirement of a formality imposes some cost on those who 
must use it, and it is often unclear whether the lawmaker intended this cost to have a deterrent effect 
along with its cautionary and evidentiary functions.”). 
 596. See supra notes 411–16 and accompanying text. 
 597. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 598. See supra notes 484–85 and accompanying text. 
 599. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-
399), 2013 WL 633597. This example begs the question of whether the father had any legitimate 
expectation of parental rights based on biology. The point is not to argue that he did; rather, it is to 
argue that formal identity obscures important questions about the functions of parenthood as an 
institution. 
 600. Cf. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558 (discussing adoption papers signed by the birth 
father stating he was “not contesting the adoption”). 
 601. The “median teen text user” sent sixty texts per day in 2012. See Amanda Lenhart, Teens, 
Smartphones & Texting, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Teens-and-smartphones/Summary-of-findings.aspx. That 
text messages have been featured in so many political sex scandals demonstrates the lack of sober 
contemplation required by the medium. 
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periods, witnesses, ceremonies, or court proceedings—is a question for 
empirical research.602 
For formalities to be effective at helping individuals make considered 
choices, their roles must be widely understood.603 The inference that an 
individual intended to disclaim an identity cannot be drawn from her failure to 
execute a formality if she was not on notice of the required formalities. 
Although many people are aware that legal marriage requires license and 
solemnization in the majority of states, popular myths may persist that 
cohabitation over a certain period of time gives rise to common law 
marriage.604 If the law seeks to induce caution with formalities, it may make 
sense to refuse custody rights to a man who had the opportunity to sign a 
voluntary acknowledgment but decided against it. But it makes less sense to 
deny all custody rights to a father who failed to submit a written notice to a 
state’s putative father registry, whether out of ignorance of the a child’s birth or 
ignorance of the law.605 
To be effective in inducing better choices, a formality must be clear about 
the purposes that identity elections will serve. The Voluntary Acknowledgment 
of Paternity, for example, provides notice to the father and mother of the rights 
and duties of parents.606 By contrast, other formalities, such as check boxes for 
racial identification, may fail to communicate what an individual is signing up 
for. This sort of opacity prevents a formality from serving a cautionary 
purpose. An individual may be comfortable identifying as a Native American 
for purposes of making connections with other Native Americans in a diversity 
program, but not for a program that entails receiving different consideration for 
 
 602. For an empirical examination of which types of formalities serve the cautionary function 
in contracting, see Zev J. Eigen & David A. Hoffman, A Fuller Understanding of Contractual 
Commitment 7 (Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2015-11, 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567830 (discussing the results of online 
experiments showing that recitals of consideration “did no significant work in motivating individuals 
to stick with their commitments,” while providing nominal amounts of money increased compliance). 
 603. This claim may be in tension with the argument that identities ought to be disaggregated. 
See supra Part IV.A. Without careful consideration of how to facilitate notice and enhance public 
understanding, disaggregation of traditional identities may increase complexity, create confusion, and 
impair decision making. 
 604. Sarah Primrose, The Decline of Common Law Marriage & the Unrecognized Cultural 
Effect, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 187, 187 n.1 (2013) (discussing popular myths regarding common-law 
marriage in the United States). Although there is only anecdotal evidence of the extent of this 
misconception in the United States, empirical studies in the United Kingdom show a significant 
percentage of the population erroneously believes that cohabitants accrue spouse-like rights over time. 
Pascoe Pleasence & Nigel J. Balmer, Ignorance in Bliss: Modeling Knowledge of Rights in Marriage 
and Cohabitation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 297, 299–300, 321–22 (2012). 
 605. The doctrine makes more sense if the core meaning of fatherhood is ascriptive rather than 
elective or formal. If fatherhood is defined as acting in some essential way—such as being married to 
the child’s mother, cohabiting with the child, caring for the child, or providing financial support—then 
it is less troubling that a man who does not engage in these behaviors might waive his rights to the 
child by failing to register. 
 606. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i) (2012). 
2015] IDENTITY AND FORM 837 
purposes of hiring and promotions. Yet if that individual checks the Native 
American box on an employer form, she may find herself listed as Native 
American in a number of human resources databases, used for a variety of 
purposes. 
If one aim of formal identity is to facilitate the expression of individual 
intent in a more meaningful way, the requisite formalities should be universally 
accessible. The inheritance law context is again instructive here. Many 
individuals die intestate due to “the relative inaccessibility of the will-making 
process because of its obscurity, complexity, and cost.”607 The process entails 
transaction costs, including estate planning lawyers and a significant time 
investment, disproportionately disadvantaging those of lower socioeconomic 
status.608 This distinguishes the will-making process from formalities like those 
required for legal marriage, which are more easily accessible.609 This 
comparison suggests that marriage formalities may provide a more promising 
model for forms of identity with similar or lower stakes.610 For example, for 
changes to the sex designation on a birth certificate, a simple and inexpensive 
administrative procedure is preferable to a rule requiring a court order or 
medical procedure.611 
C. Assessing the Role of Evidence 
Finally, whether to move toward formalization requires assessment of the 
need for documentary evidence of identity. This raises questions about whether 
legal identities should be stable and transparent. By creating stable markers of 
identity, formalities may facilitate reliance on identities and avoid unjust 
enrichment resulting from bad faith or opportunistic claims. But stability may 
not always be necessary to meet the substantive goals of identity regulation. 
Moreover, in the identity domain, security may be stultifying and reliance may 
amount to confidence in confining stereotypes. The transparency that results 
from formal evidence may conflict with privacy concerns. 
 
 607. Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 877, 879 (2012). 
 608. Id. at 878–79. 
 609. Id. at 879. 
 610. For example, a couple can marry in Seattle, Washington, after procuring a sixty-four dollar 
license, waiting three days, finding two witnesses, and paying an eighty dollar fee for a municipal 
court ceremony, although rates increase on weekends. Marriage Ceremony Information, SEATTLE 
MUN. COURT, http://www.seattle.gov/courts/judmag/marriage.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015); King 
County Marriage Licensing, KING CNTY., http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/marriage.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 611. Mottet, supra note 51, at 431–32 (discussing the costs of procuring a court order, which 
include “hiring an attorney competent in the matter, taking time off work or school to meet with an 
attorney and appear in court, traveling to the courtroom and attorney’s office (the cost of which, 
especially for non-residents of the state, may be significant and time consuming),” and recommending 
that people be allowed to change birth certificate sex designations through a simple administrative 
process instead). 
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Formal evidence may be thought to provide a check against fraud. But 
fraud concerns are often premised on contestable ascriptive notions of, for 
example, who is a “real” American and deserves work in the United States, 
who is “really” married and should qualify for public benefits, who is a “real” 
woman and may use the women’s locker room, or who is a “real” Native 
American and is eligible for affirmative action. Formalities only defer 
controversies over authenticity back to licensing authorities. Those authorities 
may not have applied definitions suited to the purposes of identity regulation. 
Accordingly, moves toward formalization intended to police the boundaries of 
authentic identity deserve closer scrutiny. Even when framed in terms of 
avoiding opportunistic or bad faith claims, fraud concerns assume that stable 
and consistent identities serve important interests, such as the reliance interests 
of third parties and the public. Those interests should be questioned. 
Whether an identity ought to be stabilized so that others may rely on it 
bears on the issues of whether formalization is appropriate, whether formalities 
ought to be easily revocable and renewable, and what privacy guarantees ought 
to be attached. Stability against government disruption may be a worthwhile 
goal for citizenship because it would allow citizens to invest in building lives in 
the United States.612 Likewise, children benefit from security and stability in 
parents.613 Partners in a marriage may benefit from some level of stability as 
well, although there are reasons to regard this interest with suspicion.614 
By contrast, the beneficiaries of stable and transparent sex, gender, and 
racial identities are often left unidentified. When policing of sex-segregated 
spaces is motivated by the desire to preserve traditional gender norms, the 
public’s reliance interest in those norms should be articulated and debated. 
With respect to race, institutional reliance on an individual’s past racial 
identifications may not be justified, depending on the purpose of the inquiry. If 
affirmative action policies are designed to address racial marginalization, 
deference to past formal identifications may be a poor proxy for that 
experience, as a person’s encounters with discrimination may change 
 
 612. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. Similarly, formal tribal citizenship may foster 
investment in tribes. See supra note 402 and accompanying text. 
 613. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND 
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 15–20, 45–47 (2004) (discussing benefits of continuity of care for 
children and society); JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN 
FAMILY LAW 111–22 (2000) (discussing evidence of the benefits of stability in child-parent 
relationships). 
 614. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 
U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1290–91 (1983) (discussing reasons to be skeptical of policies enacted to further 
the state interest in marital stability; for example, the fact that “state action can only encourage or 
discourage in a rough sort of way a relationship so dependent upon individual volition and 
commitment,” and because the goal of marital stability may be “predicated on a series of stereotypes” 
about gender and family). 
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throughout her life.615 Moreover, these contexts implicate privacy concerns, as 
race, sex, and gender identities are often sources of stigma and discrimination. 
Nevertheless, evidence provides an important measure of security to those 
claiming identities. Lives, livelihoods, and families may depend on stable 
recognition of citizenship, kinship, sex, or race. Advocates for those made 
vulnerable by identity-based regulation (such as DREAMers616 or Geena 
Rocero617) may decide that formal identity best serves the immediate interests 
of their clients or constituencies.618 Hopefully, the pursuit of formal recognition 
in these instances can coincide with longer-term questions about the justice of 
identity-based regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Formalities may seem to provide a respite from the informal mess of the 
everyday experience of identity as a set of entangled relationships, complicated 
intersections, and power dynamics. Although it is productive to examine formal 
identity as an independent model, formality does not afford a clean break from 
the ascriptive versus elective identity debate. By establishing channels for the 
expression of identities, formalities can create new essentialist definitions of 
those identities. Formal identities may prove just as confining and static as 
those explicitly based on nature or nurture. Formal requirements may facilitate 
self-determination for some while setting traps for unwary others. This Article, 
which began as a critique of form, has ended as a critique of identity. Rather 
than expanding access to identities by replacing ascriptive definitions with 
formal ones, we might consider why legal rules hinge on identities at all, and if 
the reasons are valid, consider what definition of identity best serves the law’s 
purpose.  
  
 
 615. Rich, supra note 73, at 217. Rich discusses the Malone brothers, and queries whether they 
might have experienced discrimination after first identifying as black. Id. 
 616. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 617. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 618. Cf. Spade, supra note 329, at 29–30 (struggling with tensions between the ultimate policy 
goal of “deregulation of gender” and advocacy for transgender clients). 
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